711.56352/8–252: Telegram
No. 864
The Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to the
Department of State1
106. USNEG. ReDeptel 87 July 27.2 Regret I failed make sufficiently clear that FonMin’s remarks reported mytel 82 all stemmed from my mention of Arguelles’ memo3 and shld be understood in connection therewith. In using words “little agrmt”, he was only repeating and qualifying, with the addition of “little”, the suggestion of an additional agrmt basic to the present package originally made in Sect III of that memo and now again included in Vigon’s memo to Kissner (see mytel 98 of July 304) forwarded today by desp. Essential idea appears to be that failure to advance in negots for base facilities here arises from “difference of treatment” accorded this country, i.e., lack of fundamental agrmt such as NAT provides for other Western nations granting us similar facilities. This idea, briefly elaborated by FonMin, is clearly stated in above-cited section of Arguelles’ memo, and close similarity of language used by both FonMin and Chief of Staff, together with reliable indications that at least that section of memo is of Franco’s own authorship, wld seem prove it of capital importance in top-level Span thinking at this time. Precise form which such agrmt might take in special case of Spain not yet specified by Spanish, who apparently awaiting Dept’s reactions before committing themselves to details, but seriousness with which gen idea held here, as well as psychological implications discussed below, cannot be doubted, and, therefore, it may be worth careful consideration, especially as indications point to possibility concluding detailed econ and mil agrmts substantially not too different from those we have proposed if some formula satisfactory to both sides can be worked out in connection with this fundamental and essentially political requirement.
Believe Dept shld be advised this matter closely connected with widespread natl resentment over recent dipl boycott, of which our policy in refusing treat Spain defense-wise on equal basis with other Western nations is seen as survival and extension into another [Page 1870] field. Overt reversal this policy on our part, through consideration of this country as partner in Def effort rather than untouchable pariah possessed of facilities for sale, is apparently what is sought, with at least the possibility attaching thereto of our reducing present excessive Span demands to realistic proportions through granting such sop to local pride. This last is meaning of concluding sentences mytel 82 about which Dept inquires. Actually “pride” may be too feeble word to use in this connection, since nothing less than injured natl dignity is involved and influence of this as inhibitory factor in Span behavior can hardly be overestimated.
In view of all the above, though no official statement yet available re actual content envisaged for suggested “little agreement”, perhaps a guess and suggestion of my own may be warranted. Thus to meet Span needs as presently expressed it wld seem that agrmt might recite determination of both parties to cooperate generally in Def of Western civilization and specifically to render each other all appropriate assistance to that end within limits of their respective abilities as long as present danger of Eastern aggression lasts. It might further state that Spain will do its utmost to facilitate such use of her territory by US Air Force and Naval Units during that period as may be mutually found desirable under conditions to be jointly decided on, and also that US during that period will do its utmost with financial and mil means at its disposal to cushion impact of mutual Def efforts on Span econ and provide training and equip for such Span forces as may, by joint agrmt, be called on to cooperate with forces of US. Finally, it might provide that detailed fulfillment of general obligations thus assumed by both parties will be assured and regulated by subsidiary econ and mil agrmts specifically drawn up in common for that purpose. Little, if anything, more wld appear necessary on present indications, and if it were found possible for us to propose a “little agrmt” along such gen lines as these, which I believe add nothing to our present intentions but only make them explicit, I feel the gesture might not only save our negots from what now seems possible stalemate but even advance them appreciably on road to success.
- Repeated to Paris, London, and Rome.↩
- In telegram 87, the Secretary of State requested that telegram 82 from Madrid (supra) be clarified. (711.56352/7–2552)↩
- Transmitted in Document 861.↩
- Telegram 98 consisted of an inventory of documents handed Kissner by Vigon on July 30 at the eleventh meeting between the negotiators. The documents, then in the process of translation, were detailed lists of Spanish military requirements. (711.56352/7–3052)↩