711.56352/7–2552: Telegram
No. 863
The Ambassador in Spain (MacVeagh) to the
Department of State1
82. USNEG. Fol from San Sebastian via Madrid. In talk I had with FonMin July 17, he asked me how I felt our base negots are proceeding and I replied optimistically but said we now await Wash views re July memo handed Train by Arguelles (my tel 41 July 122). He then remarked Span views presented in that informal manner through Train because proper moment not yet arrived for discussion on govt-to-govt level (he said “between you and me”), thus confirming view expressed mytels 35 July 11 and 46 July 143 [Page 1867] that no Span intention exists terminate negots if suggestions our memo found unacceptable. However, he added that such moment drawing near, since fundamental aspects beyond experts’ competence and eventual view now taking shape, and said he wld like talk with me about these now, though cld only do so personally and not officially.
FonMin then proceeded develop viewpoint that negots as instituted have confused two logically distinct problems, one having to do with Spain’s possibilities as factor in West Def, and other with utilization of Span bases by US forces, “which is your principal object”. He said he has not a doubt that proposed MSA agrmt may be worked out, with some modification, to mutual satisfaction, and added he understands US Govt is aware that, with some help on our part, Span industry can make substantial contribution to West Def, as for instance in production of munitions. On other hand, however, he said that to grant use of bases wld at once change Span position from one of “neutrality” to one of “pre-belligerence”, and this cld not possibly be undertaken without assurance of commensurate Def means, which country does not now possess. He then immed spoke of other West nations being assured of support in case of attack through membership in Atlantic alliance, and particularly of Port, whose Azores agrmt4 was concluded within supporting framework NATO, and clearly indicated not only that promise of greater mil aid than presently offered is necessary in his view for conclusion of desired base agrmt with Spain, but that conclusion of what he called “little agrmt”, basic to present package and giving Spain some advance assurance of US support in case of war, cld be equally decisive in bringing our two points of view together.
I asked FonMin, in connection above, whether he indeed feels Spain cld remain neutral if Sovs attack West Eur, since I previously had understood the contrary, both as regards himself and Span mil auths. To this, he replied substantially. On contrary, we feel certain we cannot remain neutral, and even that Sovs may drop parachutists our territory immed in order take West from the rear. But Sov plans against us will certainly be far greater (presumably from bombing) if bases granted, and this increased jeopardy thus caused to Span nation cld not be covered by assistance limited merely to training and construction of bases themselves.
FonMin concluded by saying he looked forward to further talks after awaited views received from Wash. Meanwhile I report above “personal” reactions since believe them in fact more than personal [Page 1868] and likely to foreshadow, at least in part, much official reasoning to be encountered later. Perhaps his “logic” can be met with logic of our own, but behind all this reasoning there wld appear something more fundamental which I believe shld not be overlooked. This is that we are definitely on the asking end in these negots. Spain is by no means so anxious to receive our aid as we are to get something by giving it. Furthermore, she is not at all anxious to have large numbers of fon mil on her territory in peacetime, and is in fact afraid of the internal problems which such sitn might produce. It wld indeed be mistake to imagine that her govt has any fundamental objection to cooperating with us. Its generous willingness to cooperate, without any quid pro quo whatsoever, in facilitating our Eur evacuation needs, wld amply prove this if proof were needed. But that matter cld be decided in secret and can be worked out in secret up to moment evacuation begins. In this case, no such advance secrecy is possible, and in view of extraordinary concessions we are asking, Govt must have quid pro quo sufficient to offset possible local opposition, particularly from Army which is its chief support. If one combines its feeling that to sign our presently proposed agreement would enhance Spain’s jeopardy in war and increase her internal problem in peace with this fear of displeasing army which together with public has conceived exaggerated expectations from Adm Sherman’s visit and more especially from subsequent highly publicized mission of Sufrin and Spry—its reluctance to proceed on such limited basis as we have proposed becomes, I think, understandable without need of involving other causes. Accordingly, problem at present wld seem to be to find some formula for base agrmt capable of meeting essential Span requirements for quid pro quo without going beyond what bases themselves are worth to us and this Kissner is trying to facilitate by his screening of Span mil estimates to discover how much is really essential. In addition some thought might, and I believe, shld be given to feeling of Spans that if asked to act as our allies they shld be assured of being treated as such. After some experience in talking and dealing with them here, it is my considered, if not original conviction that a modicum of attention to their pride is worth many dollars.
- Repeated to Paris, London, and Rome.↩
- Document 861.↩
- See footnotes 2 and 4, ibid↩
- The text of the Defense Agreement Between the United States and Portugal Respecting Use of Facilities in the Azores, Sept. 6, 1951, is in 5 UST (pt. 3) 2263.↩