865.00/12–2954: Telegram
No. 798
The Chargé in Italy (Durbrow) to the
Department of State
2376. Limit distribution. Following is text of memorandum of conversation Ambassador had with Scelba Dec. 27 on economic matters.
Ambassador raised question of Vanoni plan, which we understood had been accepted by Ital Govt and was to be discussed by OEEC in Paris and would be given favorable considerations by [Page 1720] Butler, Marjolin and Erherdt. She pointed out that this seemed to constitute an accepted channel for the discussion of Italian economic planning and aid. She added there was some uncertainty in her mind as to the exact significance which Scelba attached to the visit of an American economic expert which he had raised in a previous conversation (Embtel 2218 Dec. 14 [15])1 and which plainly suggested a new approach to question of future planning and aid.
Scelba countered that the Vanoni plan had not been accepted by the govt, but was a “private study” under consideration, and that it could be altered or turned down by the president of the council. He then stated, speaking very confidentially, that he himself had considerable doubt as to whether the plan would solve Italian difficulties, or whether OEEC was indeed the best forum for its discussion. He said that the point was that while such discussion would be economic that the economic difficulties of Italy had a political basis. He stated that the political situation was very grave, particularly in view of the Sicilian elections coming up, and that prior to these elections he would like to be able to announce a plan designed to solve the country’s economic problems. (Vanoni himself stated did not expect OEEC report on plan to be ready before May. Tousfo 543 Dec. 272)
He continued that OEEC could, no doubt, discuss technical aspects, but that the real answer to the politico-economic problems of Italy depended upon close bilateral relations with the United States.
The Ambassador raised the question of the sensitivity of congressional opinion to the appropriation of any very substantial further financial aid as a weapon against communism. Scelba referred to his first conversation with the Ambassador early year3 in which, he said, he had been told that the President would make very exceptional efforts to aid Italy if the Italian Govt took vigorous action to defeat the Communist Party and to restore a healthy democracy.… Scelba said that they could not take such action immediately at that time because of other problems, primarily Trieste, which he believed to be essential pre-requisites to anti-Communist action. Today his govt was stronger and enjoyed a prestige which permitted it to take action. He continued that there were two great difficulties in attacking the PCI. One is that this party is very strong, and that violence and armed internal struggle must be foreseen as possibilities.
[Page 1721]The second factor was this: that the anti-Communist struggle can take place only in a favorable politico-economic climate. “If I could assure employment to everyone and state that only the Communist Party prevented the realization of this plan, then I could attack the Communist Party on an all-out basis.”
The Ambassador spoke of the necessity of there being a precise plan if not a Vanoni, then a “Scelba plan”! which would be known to the Congress, and which the Congress could support financially, as a blueprint of Italian action, in case the Italian Govt ran into difficulties in its fight against the PCI. Without responding precisely to this, Scelba reverted to the need for an economic expert to visit Italy. He said that the Vanoni plan was too vague, that if he himself considered it so, it was, of course, incomprehensible to a foreigner, and that he would be hard put to explain it with conviction in Washington, for instance. Could not President Eisenhower send an economist to aid Italian technicians in working out a project which would have a real chance of success? The presence of one or more American technicians here would be essentially a time-saving device since agreements would be reached on the spot and not require passing of drafts back and forth between Rome and Washington.
Scelba stated that the economic problem was urgent. The Govt has committed all available funds and existing laws and taxes cannot be increased. “Actually,” he added, “for political reasons the govt must have the courage to reduce certain taxes affecting artisans, skilled workmen, and similar categories who are now paying more than they should.” The Minister of Finance has assured him that there are no other visible sources of funds. So far as unemployment goes, all present projects can do no more than take care of the annual worker increment. He added that he could not see how the basic unemployment problem was to be faced without increased aid. He again stated that if he could guarantee work to all, he would not hesitate to outlaw the Communist Party, but that violent action against the party is impossible without the proper economic climate.
The Ambassador again spoke of congressional reaction, and the probability if not certainty that Congress would want assurances that Scelba’s own debt, after having received large grants in aid, might not be replaced by a less vigorous govt which would renounce or slow down anti-Communist action. To this, Scelba stated that aid should not be thought of wholly as grants, but could include loans which would in the long run be no burden to the American taxpayer. Regarding the problem of his govt’s stability, he stated that any govt which begins strong action against the Communists will gain in strength by so doing, that his govt having embarked [Page 1722] upon this course, no future govt could renounce the struggle. He added that he regretted this in a personal sense because it might well mean that he himself would be engaged in the struggle for a long time and any period of repose might be sometime away.
Before close of conversation Scelba stated he had been surprised to learn from Vanoni that the surplus matter was not going well. He stated that Vanoni on return from Washington had conveyed impression all points were largely settled for allocation to Italians of sum of ninety million dollars. Scelba troubled to hear from Ambassador that she understood that except for possibly thirty million dollars worth agricultural surplus, discussions with Vanoni had been largely tentative. (Comment: Vanoni has been trying hard since his return to give impression that he alone brought home the bacon.)
Scelba re-emphasized delicate and confidential nature of the questions he raised particularly fundamental differences with Vanoni and requested that these matters be discussed only with highest U.S. authorities.
In view of Scelba’s strong reservations about Vanoni plan any discussion by U.S. officials with Italians regarding that plan as such should be most reserved such as not giving any encouragement to his plans as outlined in Tousfo 543, Dec. 27.
- Document 794.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- This conversation, which took place on Mar. 3, is described in Document 770.↩