Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

765.00/12–1554: Telegram

No. 794
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State¹

secret
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Rome, December 15, 1954—noon.

2218. For Secretary—limit distribution. In view of your forthcoming meeting Foreign Minister Martino,² believe following message supplies important background for conversation.

A. In long meeting with Prime Minister Scelba December 11, he stressed importance of message he wished me to convey to US Government. He began with usual statement viz. that Italy is major Communist battlefield of free world; that if Italy goes Communist entire western defensive position in Europe and Africa would be jeopardized; that only possible political battle force in Italy is existing four-power coalition; and that anti-Commie battle now being fought by coalition cannot hope succeed without US aid participation in Italian government economic plan which would give his people hope for future.

Scelba then pressed hard this suggestion similar to one he proposed to you at Milan:³ the best way develop such plan was for US send soon to Italy top level expert enjoying confidence President Eisenhower to discuss planning with Italian Government at topmost level, i.e., with Scelba. Prime Minister believed that only in this way could a concrete plan with real political appeal to Italian people be developed, as people would have no faith in any Italian plan which did not clearly carry the support of US.

I then pointed out to Scelba that an economic plan for Italy is already in existence, i.e., the “Vanoni 10-year plan,” which is about to be presented Italian Council of Ministers, and will presumably be put on agenda OEEC Ministerial Meeting in January. Therefore I did not quite understand his insistence on a different approach, namely that US expert come to Rome to initiate planning with government. Scelba than stated he feared OEEC approach will prove politically ineffective as Vanoni plan would undoubtedly fall in hands bureaucrats Washington and Paris where he indicated it might be watered down, kicked around and pass out of the Italian political limelight, thus losing its impact on the people. He repeatedly insisted US experts must come to Italy as Italian people were under no illusion that any significant aid could be expected from any other country, and this meant OEEC approach would not be taken seriously by public opinion. However, Scelba would not object to any plan produced as result bilateral conversations US and Italy being subsequently submitted OEEC.

B. My comments:

1. Foregoing position Prime Minister probably represents Scelba maneuver prevent Vanoni who while DC Deputy has strong Socialist economic leanings from taking big economic play away from Scelba Government. Scelba rightly understands politician who emerges with successful economic plan could become biggest man in Italy in view crucial importance unemployment and under-employment this country, and that he Scelba can keep political spotlight on himself only if he seems to be initiator of such planning. In my view Scelba is eager not to scrap Vanoni plan per se but to hijack it for political reasons, namely (a) Scelba may fear that US attention given to Vanoni plan may make it easier for CD’s to drop him from government helm after Presidential election in May, and to substitute Vanoni in preparation for ultimate Fanfani Government; (b) Scelba’s anti-Communist campaign requires collateral forward economic movement if he is to retain his own position as leader of quadripartite; (c) Scelba might like without dotting eye have public gain impression he has US economic backing precisely because of progress he has made in anti-Communist struggle.

2. I believe that there is much to be said Scelba views and that a flat rejection of his proposal would be unwise in view of serious efforts he is making in anti-Communist field, and his real necessity strengthen his own political position.

C. Recommendations:

1. There are two possible ways dealing with Scelba’s necessities. (a) Invite Scelba Washington and after economic discussions there, offer Scelba suggestions of some kind which would provide him with excuse or reasons before his public opinion to alter Vanoni plan into Scelba plan; (b) Accept Scelba’s suggestion send important expert with political flavor to Italy to recreate atmosphere similar Dodge Mission to Tokyo.⁴

2. Latter approach would present serious disadvantage of putting us in position of having directly to support Italian Government efforts eliminate unemployment with unknown cost in US additional aid.

3. Embassy strongly urges first alternative: Visit to Washington.

Believe Scelba visit could (a) provide Washington opportunity discuss Italian economic problems; (b) provide Scelba opportunity to convey impression on return that he has developed in conversations new approach to unemployment problem, which would then become not individual Vanoni but Scelba Government approach; (c) enable us to hand over to Scelba certain assistance already scheduled for Italy this year, e.g., surplus farm products under PL 480, as well as commitment on specified amount OSP in Italy. All this Scelba could bring home as his bacon.

4. Outstanding advantages US foregoing proposal are as follows: Scelba’s visit Washingon would accrue to his government all political benefits from concrete attempt his part deal at top Washington level with economic problem while US would not at this time hope to provide any new aid or assistance over and above what is presently contemplated.

In conclusion, Embassy fully aware Scelba’s proposal would constitute considerable change in present approach now linked with submission of fairly well publicized Vanoni ten-year plan to OEEC, and would create problem of how Vanoni plan would be dealt with in Paris in January. However, believe that Scelba can handle Vanoni–OEEC question if Washington visit is in offing.

Luce

1. Repeated to Paris.
2. John Foster Dulles was planning a trip to Paris for the North Atlantic Council meetings of Dec. 17–18; he left Washington on Dec. 14.
3. Scelba’s suggestion was described in Document 777.
4. Joseph M. Dodge, President and Director of the Detroit Bank, headed a special financial mission in Japan for General MacArthur.