Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 773
Memorandum of Discussion at the 190th Meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday, March 25, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

March 25, 1954

Present at the 190th Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Acting Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 5); Mr. Slezak for the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Acting Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 3, 4 and 5); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 3, 4 and 5); the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Brig. Gen. Barksdale Hamlet, Department of Defense; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follows discussion of items 1–5.]

6. U.S. Policy Toward Italy (NSC 5411;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 24, 1954³)

After Mr. Cutler had thoroughly briefed the Council on the content of the draft policy paper and staff study on Italy, he pointed out the lengthy comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which had only been received late on the previous afternoon. They had two main areas of criticism of the present draft. In the first place, they believed that the report did not give sufficient emphasis to the strategic importance of Italy in the defense of Western Europe. Secondly, they felt that the courses of action proposed in the present draft to meet the contingency of a legal take-over of Italy by the Communists, did not really face up to the grave problem which would be presented by such a take-over. As for the remaining points raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Cutler suggested that nearly all could be accepted by the Planning Board with the possible exception of the JCS proposal as to the effect on Yugoslavia of the loss of Italy to Communism. Mr. Cutler then called upon Admiral Radford to discuss the main objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the present paragraphs 1, 12 and 31.

Admiral Radford explained that the Joint Chiefs had gone to unusual lengths in their criticism of this report. They were not only moved to do so because of their anxiety over the possibility that Italy might go Communist, but also because they believed that the Italian policy paper overlooked the importance of Italy in the context of a larger area. Furthermore, in several instances, of which the Italian paper was one, the Joint Chiefs did not believe that the policy statements faced up to all the unpleasant contingencies which faced the United States. That is, said Admiral Radford, some of our papers simply don’t answer the 64-dollar question of what the United States is prepared to do in the event of a Communist take-over of important democratic states. A Communist take-over of Italy, continued Admiral Radford, might very well destroy the whole NATO strategy. In general, said Admiral Radford, it seemed to the Joint Chiefs that the United States had about reached the point, with respect both to Europe and to the Far East, where it must decide to take much greater risks if it was to be successful in retrieving the situation and preventing further dangerous advances by the Communist bloc.…

. . . . . . .

Secretary Wilson attempted to point out his own view that we were not spending our money in Italy very wisely, but the President interrupted him and suggested that in the first instance the Council should listen to the Secretary of State, in whose bailiwick the issue raised by Admiral Radford clearly belonged.

Secretary Dulles, referring to the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their paragraph 8 with regard to the necessity for the United States to take greater risks of being involved in global war to stem the growing power of the Soviet bloc, stated that the Joint Chiefs had raised a most significant issue and had provided a most significant statement of proposed U.S. policy. In many respects, Secretary Dulles said, he was disposed to subscribe to their position, but it was necessary to consider various qualifications and difficulties. There was not a single other country in the world ready at the present time to join us in carrying out the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore, before we could possibly apply this recommendation to any specific country or locality, there was an immense educational job to do to induce both our allies and our own people to understand the reasons which invited us to assume greatly increased risks of becoming involved in general war rather than to see other portions of the free world fall into the Soviet orbit. As a specific example of the point he was making, Secretary Dulles referred to the British attitude of appeasement toward the Communists in Southeast Asia despite their concern for Malaya, which was the best revenue-producing area in the British Commonwealth. In summary, Secretary Dulles described the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement as something to work forward to rather than to accept at the present time, since it would require a backing from the people and the Congress of the United States and from our allies which it does not now have.

The President expressed agreement with the point of view of the Secretary of State, and said that if the United States alone attempted to carry out this recommended course of action, we would at once lose every ally we had. The problem therefore needed a great deal of thought.

The Vice President commented that while he realized the force of the arguments advanced by Secretary Dulles, it was nevertheless wise to look at the other side of the coin. If we only follow those courses of action that our allies and a badly-informed American public permit us to follow, we will ultimately be completely lost.

. . . . . . .

The President then reverted to the question which had been asked by Secretary Wilson, the answer to which had been interrupted by the President’s desire to hear Secretary Dulles’ views. Secretary Wilson then explained that he intended to suggest, by his questioning of the wisdom of the way we were spending our money in Italy, that if Italy were to go Communist by legal means all the vast store of military supplies which we had poured into Italy would be added to the supplies of the enemy. Accordingly, he recommended a “real fresh look” at what the United States was doing in Italy.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed NSC 5411 in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in the reference memorandum, and comments by the Secretary of State.

b. Referred NSC 5411 back to the NSC Planning Board for reconsideration in the light of the above discussion.

[Here follows discussion of other items.]

1. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Mar. 26.
2. See Document 769.
3. Reference is to the memorandum transmitting to the NSC the Mar. 23 memorandum from Radford to Wilson, supra.