Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5411 Series

No. 769
Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the Planning Board of the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 5411

Washington, March 12, 1954.

U.S. Policy Toward Italy

general considerations

1. The “cold war” loss of Italy to Communist control would result in profound political, psychological and military damage to the free world. Such a loss would:

a. Be a clear defeat of Christian-European ideology by Soviet-Communist ideology at the historic seat of the Roman Catholic church; and place behind the Iron Curtain a country whose cultural and historical influence has played a great part in the development of Western civilization.

b. Require drastic revision of NATO strategy for the defense of Western Europe, because of Italy’s important role in the defense of the southern flank and great value for control of the Mediterranean.

c. Impair Yugoslavia’s over-all contribution to Western defense.

d. Add substantial manpower, military equipment, technical skills and industrial capacity to the Soviet bloc.

e. Make possible Communist control of Italian Somaliland.

2. Up to the election of 1948, grave danger existed that Italy would fall under Communist domination. In these elections, Communism was rebuffed and a Center government established, due in part to large-scale economic aid and firm moral support from the United States.

3. From April 1948 to June 1953, Italy under De Gasperi made progress on many fronts. Communist contol of the labor movement was diminished by the growth of non-Communist labor federations. With large-scale American aid, the economy improved. Production and the real wages of those employed rose well above pre-war levels. Steps to meet basic problems were initiated in such fields as tax reform, land reform and a program for southern development.

4. Despite these advances, however, grave problems have persisted. Italy, poor in most raw materials, has one of the highest densities of population in Europe. Tax and agricultural reforms and the southern development program have proceeded slowly. Per capita income is low, and there are wide discrepancies in standards of living. About 20 per cent of the labor force is unemployed or underemployed. Labor disputes have continued. Basic feelings of insecurity among the workers and long-entrenched popular sentiments of anti-clericalism and anti-governmentalism are important political factors. The resulting pessimism and cynicism about Italy’s future have made a substantial part of the Italian population a fertile field for Communism and intensified authoritarian tendencies.

5. The Communists have built up over many years an effective machine of subversion reaching down to the block and village level. Italy has the largest Communist Party outside the Soviet bloc; the Communists and their allies, the Nenni Socialists, together control about 35 per cent of the vote. There is a distinct trend on the part of the labor and lower middle classes from the Center to the pro-Communist Left, which is the principal force of opposition to the Government. Popular support for the Communists has been furthered, and strong action by the Government has been made politically difficult, by relatively moderate “popular front” tactics, the Soviet peace campaign, popular acceptance of the Communist Party as a legitimate organization, and disunity among its opponents.

6. Since 1948 the Center government has been outspoken in its anti-Communism, improved its internal security forces and reacted vigorously to Communist threats to public order, but it has failed to discredit Communist appeals or take adequate steps to undermine the vast Communist organization. This inadequacy has in turn strengthened the forces of the Right.

7. Before the 1953 election, Italy under De Gasperi and Sforza collaborated closely with the Western Powers, particularly the United States; gave vigorous support to NATO; and early assumed a position of leadership in the movement for European integration, motivated not only by long-range security consideratons but by hope that through European unity its economic and political problems might be alleviated.

8. Italian domestic progress and international cooperation have now been jeopardized as a result of the 1953 election. The previously firm governing majority of pro-Western parties has been replaced by an unstable situation in which it is very difficult for the Christian Democrats to form a viable government. If present conditions continue, there is grave danger that a succession of weak governments will increasingly discredit the Center and strengthen the Right and Left extremes. However, the Communists and Nenni Socialists are unlikely to obtain power within the next two years.

9. Italy’s value to the West would be appreciably lessened under rightist or authoritarian regimes. Although a moderate rightist government would probably continue cooperation with the West, its domestic policies might aggravate internal frictions and ultimately strengthen the Communists. An extreme rightist government would be almost certainly authoritarian, probably ultra-nationalist and opposed to European unity, and possibly neutralist. However, even a right-wing authoritarianism would be far less dangerous than a Communist regime.

10. In this situation it is clearly in U.S. interests to give maximum feasible support to a reinforcement of center strength as broadly based as is consistent with implementation of the reforms necessary to improve basic social and economic conditions in Italy.

11. During the last five years, our policy of seeking to integrate Yugoslavia into the Western alignment has, in the absence of a Trieste settlement, placed severe strains upon our relations with Italy. The Italians maintain that our policy has improved Yugoslavia’s bargaining position and diminished its readiness to agree to a compromise solution on Trieste. This situation has delayed parliamentary consideration of EDC and negotiations on NATO facilities in Italy for U.S. use. An early Trieste solution of a kind in which the Italian Government can acquiesce is important to popular confidence in any government based on the Christian Democratic Party, and essential to achievement of Italo-Yugoslav defense collaboration.

12. Italian forces cannot be expected to make any great contribution to the defense of Europe, other than by the defense of Italy itself in collaboration with other Western forces. The defense of Italy requires continued improvement in the quality of Italian forces and continued Italian cooperation with the United States and other Western forces within NATO. Italian forces can be expected to fight effectively if at the outbreak of hostilities the United States is able, through NATO or directly, to provide effective leadership and support.

13. An Italy free from Communist domination or serious threat of Communist subversion, having a constitutional, democratic government and a healthy self-sustaining economy, and able and willing to make important political, economic and military contributions in support of the free world coalition.

courses of action

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Italian Collaboration in the Free World

27. As long as Italy continues to meet its defense obligations to the West, continue appropriate military assistance toward equipping and maintaining currently-agreed Italian forces.

28. Acting whenever appropriate with the support of or in concert with other friendly governments:

a. Support Italian participation in the movement for European integration and encourage Italy to reassume a primary role in this movement.

b. Promote strengthened Italian political, economic and military collaboration with the United States and Western Europe through such organizations as NATO, OEEC, CSC and EDC.

c. Seek to persuade the Italian Government that it is in the best interest of Italy to ratify EDC promptly.

d. Encourage the Italian Government to fulfill its NATO commitments for combat-effective forces, and to this end to maintain its defense spending consistent with its economic capabilities.

e. Continue, as appropriate, attempts to obtain Italian admission to the UN.

f. Continue efforts to bring about an Italo-Yugoslav rapprochement, particularly through an early solution of the Trieste problem of a kind which would make such a rapprochement possible.

Future Contingencies

29. In the event of an external attack against Italy, the United States should make such use of its military power as it may agree to be necessary under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.

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1. The source text was attached to a covering note of Mar. 12 from Lay to the National Security Council which indicates that the draft statement of policy would be considered by the NSC at its meeting on Mar. 25. The draft statement of policy, together with a Financial Appendix and a Staff Study, none printed, comprised NSC 5411. For a memorandum of the discussion at the Mar. 25 meeting of the NSC, see Document 773.