765.00/12–2253
No. 758
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (Gruenther)1
noforn
Dear General: Not the least of the President’s great foreign policy objectives is the peaceful liberation of Central Europe from Soviet domination. We all know that will take time. But it would indeed be a scandal—a very tragic scandal—if long before that objective could be achieved Italy, a great Western European nation should, by peaceful and “democratic legal procedures” slip behind the Iron Curtain, thus becoming the first NATO member candidate for liberation.
The plain hard fact is that if there is not soon a reversal of the present trend of the voters towards Communism (especially the young voters of military age) in a few years Italy will be a satellite of Soviet Russia.
I know that you are aware that the Communist vote, the Communist influence, the Communist grip on all Italian institutions has been slowly but steadily increasing here. But, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, you must be especially concerned to realize that we are now reaching the danger point in Italy—the political [Page 1643] point-of-no-return for Democracy. The military potential of Italy is in danger of ceasing to be secure for the NATO Powers.
It appears obvious to us here that if this trend is not reversed and the “balloon goes up” during the next few years, Italy, with its vast and still increasing numbers of Communists who exercise great influence if not complete control of vital sections of the nation’s life, such as Communications, Press, and Transportation and Industry, will have severe difficulties in fighting on our side.
I repeat, if this situation is not changed, in the event of hostilities with Russia within the next few years, we can at worst expect civil war here, or at best a defense force cruelly hamstrung by its need to dissipate most of its efforts guarding its Communications.
Should a Communist government come into peacetime power with a coup d’état, as it did in Czechoslovakia, it is highly likely that the armed forces would support it, because there would not then exist any other “democratic alternative.”
There is a tendency on the part of the average Italian (and American) to discount the Communist vote as merely the “little man’s” expression of dissatisfaction concerning economic conditions and the failures of his present Government. Both we and the Italians have constantly tried to reassure ourselves that the 37% of the people who voted for the Kremlin Left in this election are not to be identified with “hard-core” Communism, or considered loyal followers of the C.P. apparatus. This dangerous underestimation and oversimplification has already led to too much wishful thinking, lethargy and indifference. Communism continues to thrive, and will continue to do so as long as the government here takes no action, and Italians go on “enjoying Malenkov’s lulling climate of “distensione” and peace talks.
Even after we have considered all the relevant, political arguments, excuses and reasons (including Trieste) given by the Government here for not taking action against the mounting strength of the Left, we know that the Government has been complacent. Indeed, we must believe this is so, because if the Government had done all it could do and Communism still could not be stopped, we would then have to face the brutal fact that Italy is probably lost.
But the Italians, I dare believe, can stop it themselves, especially with a few assists from the USA, and—the reason for this letter— from NATO.
I have learned here from Italian Government sources, as well as from our own people, that there have been several attempts to bring the problem of Communism in the NATO countries before the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Danes, I am told, made one such attempt in the Spring of 1952. The position of the [Page 1644] U.S. at that time was that it was unwise for the North Atlantic Council to deal with the problem of Communism.
. . . . . . .
At that time, the Italian Government representatives also considered that NATO action in this area of political warfare should be an integral part of its activities.
Subsequently, the former Italian Prime Minister, De Gasperi, also endeavored to obtain action in this field at the NATO meeting in the Spring of 1953. In fact, he made a strong statement before the North Atlantic Council with respect to the need for common action and decisions in dealing with the Communist problem. Mr. De Gasperi has indicated to members of my staff in the past that he felt that NATO action would be most useful because it would lay a foundation upon which the Italian Government could take action against a Communist apparatus without being charged with attacking legal party institutions in Italy for partisan political reasons. But no action was taken on this because of the opposition of the British, the U.S. concurring.
Whatever Italy’s unwillingness to face Communist facts in other fields, it is definitely true that they have endeavored to obtain NATO support and pressure for action against Communism in NATO fields. The Government therefore has a case when they say to me that if NATO is satisfied with a Communist-infiltrated LOC, why should we complain, at an Embassy level, that they do not take strong steps to combat Communism domestically.
I cannot help but feel that the time has now come (if indeed it is not overdue) for NATO to take the lead in urging the governments to put their houses in order by actively opposing their Communist parties.
I would therefore be greatly interested to learn from you what prevents NATO policy from expressing the strong view to the Italian Government that it must take active measures drastically to reduce the threat of Communism— .…
Italy, under an American Supreme Commander, is building up an army with the aid of hundreds of millions of American dollars. I do not need to tell you the appalling shock it will be to Americans if, in the course of the next two or three years, that Army should then either be immobilized by “neutrality”, disorganized by civil strife, or swung forcefully in behind the forces of the Kremlin.
[Page 1645]I shall be most grateful to you for any thoughts or recommendations you might consider useful in dispelling this haunting and unhappy concern of our Embassy.
With cordial personal regards,
- Copies of this letter were sent to Secretary of Defense Wilson and Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash. A copy of this letter was also transmitted by Nash to Merchant as an attachment to a memorandum of Dec. 23. (765.00/12–2353) Also attached to Nash’s memorandum was a memorandum by Maj. Gen. G. C. Stewart to Nash, dated Dec. 16, in which Stewart described a conversation he had on Dec. 7 in Rome with Luce, in which she expressed many of the same ideas as in this letter, and a memorandum of conversation between Nash and Maj. Gen. James G. Christiansen in Paris on Dec. 15, in which Nash queried Christiansen regarding Luce’s views on the Communist situation in Italy. (765.00/12–2353)↩