765.00/11–3053: Despatch
No. 757
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State
No. 1164
- Subject: Memorandum of conversation between the Ambassador and Mario Scelba on November 27, 1953
Last night1 I had a talk with Scelba, ex-Minister of the Interior, and asked him what the CD Party had decided to do about the “news” about the recount of the contested ballots. He replied that all the ballots had not yet been counted, and until they had been the results remained uncertain and it would take a long time to count them. I said we already knew that on the recount, up to now, they were 300,000 ahead. He replied that all that could be claimed now or for that matter later was a “moral victory,” which it would do no good to claim, as the results could not be made effective unless all parties consented and that this consent could never be obtained from the present parliament. I then suggested that the announcement of even a “moral victory” would be helpful. At first he did not think so, then later he said that in fact he intended to claim a moral victory “for the sake of my own conscience” when the Bill for the repeal of the electoral law was debated on the Floor. I said it was discouraging to think that the CD Party was so weak it could not profit by its own victory. He laughed that one off. I then asked him how he estimated the situation about the increase of the pro-Cominform Left. He replied that the growth of the left was “not a matter of grave concern” as there was a “safe anti-Communist majority in the parliament.” I replied that there was such a majority if one lumped all the parliamentary forces right of Nenni together, but that this mathematical lumping could not be effectively translated into political action, or for purposes of legislation, since there was no political cohesion, no real coalition, among these “anti-Communist” groups, and that until an effective coalition could be made, or a majority achieved by the CD, there was reason to be concerned, since the C.P. could then exercise in many matters, the balance of power. He said that this was true, but that the [Page 1641] Communists “could always be held if it should ever become necessary.” The time had not yet come when it was really necessary, and in any event it was politically dangerous to attack the Communists until “one is prepared to make the attack a total attack,” as this would only produce a reaction favorable to the Left. He said “a lot of things would have to change,” and the Center would have to grow much stronger before it would be safe to make the attack. I found it absolutely impossible, altho’ I tried to pin him down with innumerable questions, to get him to suggest any situation in which “the total attack” would be safe. (i.e., they had not attacked in ’51 and ’52 because they thought the C.P. was growing weaker. Now they could not attack because it was growing stronger, etc.) The essential consideration was a stable government. Pella’s Government was not stable—because of the Trieste question. On the other hand, it had been stabilized—by the Trieste question. Here, he said that the Oct 8 decision had “definitely come too late.” He had personally informed Eden in January that if something were done about the question, De Gasperi could easily have won the elections. Now the Government would have to have a “victoire eclatante” on the question. He defined this as the solution that Dulles had presented when he was in Rome in the Spring. Now you could not make predictions about Pella’s Government as it could fall on the Trieste question next year, even in January. He would not answer who might take Pella’s place—“there are many good men in the Party.” Even if Pella fell, new elections were impossible without real satisfaction of the Trieste question because the Left would then win. I reminded him that he had said initially there was a “safe majority against the Left,” if things ever got close, and he said there would be no need anyway for elections if Pella got a victory on Trieste, because he could make hay on this issue for many months. He said the US was too concerned about communism—“Italians have many resources,” “there was nothing to worry about” (except Trieste), “Italian democracy will survive,” etc. I then told him that public opinion was getting discouraged about Italy’s inability either to pass EDC, etc. or to handle the Communist question, and he said we should continue as we had in the past to help Italy and to trust the Center and support it, because although it was weak just now, it was still potentially very strong.
He spoke with placating good humor, but he was consistently evasive, on the score of whether the CD Party would move Left or Right if Pella fell, always giving the strength of the CP. as an excuse for everything the Government could not do, while firmly insisting the CP. was not at all to be feared.
In closing, he said that he did not think for a minute that the US would desert Italian democracy. This would bring about the very [Page 1642] thing we feared—turn of Italy towards the C.P. He repeated we should continue to trust and aid, and Italian democracy would handle the Communist problem in its own way.
A most baffling, futile and disconcerting conversation. However, it left me with the firm impression Signor Scelba had no real emotions or convictions on the score of Communism. And was concerned largely with one thing: being, if possible, in a position to survive, if necessary, in either camp.
- Luce apparently drafted this memorandum of conversation on Nov. 28.↩