Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

765.00/5–2052: Telegram

No. 725
The Ambassador in Italy (Bunker) to the Department of State¹

secret

Rome, May 20, 1952—9 p.m.

5067. Fol discussions May 25 election prospects which are becoming, particularly in Rome, test-of-confidence in De Gasperi’s center coalition formula for natl govt:

Bickering, apparent lack of purpose and self-confidence and jockeying for short-term advantage continued (Embtel 3275 rptd info Paris 480, London 322²) to be impression Demo Parties gave public through most of pre-campaign negots for electoral alliances. At last moment, however, center coalition was resolidified in crucial centers (and after slow and unimaginative start in campaign itself Demo Parties are gaining punch and momentum). April 21 proposal of Don Sturzo (Embdes 2588 May 6³) for combined anti-Commie list in Rome including even neo-Fascist MSI and Monarchist (PNM) elements tested center coalition by fire. Fact of its having been directly inspired by Pope was evidence of virtual panic over probable results Rome. In withstanding Sturzo proposal, Democratic Parties noticeably drew together. Another effect of proposal, however, was to make Rome more than before test of center’s continuing ability to hold natl working majority against both Commies and right.

Opposing thesis for which Catholic Action Chief Luigi Gedda has become symbol, wld be opening of center ranks to “better elements” of right on natl scale.⁴ Danger in this idea wld be risk of forcing minor parties into ineffective opposition and possibility they wld break up as polit forces became polarized with “anti-Fascism” even driving some left-center elements into Commie arms. Foregoing is oversharp statement of alternatives as realities wld blur issues and force accommodation and compromise but De Gasperi’s present formula of liberal, mildly anti-Fascist democracy based on parties emerging from liberation period is being put to real test.

Emb believes center alliance will pull through in Rome but with plurality of 50,000 votes or less as compared with 320,000 in 1948. Outside of Rome, judging from election results in scattered southern cities in 1951, center can expect to hold only about 4 of 10 largest cities where elections being held this year (Embdes 2279 March 28, 1952⁵). They may expect to lose some 40 percent of their 1948 vote and see one-half to two-thirds of this lost strength shift to MSI and Monarchists, causing strikingly increased rightist totals. Leftists (including front lists) can be expected to gain 5–20 percent on mainland and up to 40 percent in Sicily over 1948. CD losses in south unlikely to be compensated for even in part by minor party gains except in Rome where Liberals will pick up strength.

If Rome saved, however, national polit catastrophe will be averted even if Naples and other cities lost. Such govt losses cld credibly be explained in part as fols:

1. Naples is shipping-magnate Lauro’s (PNM) bailiwick and his followers promising everything from new soccer stadium to special past ration in return for votes. Rightist victory (or leftist one by dispersal) cld be explained as “bought” by Lauro’s millions.

2. Palermo, Catania, other Sicilian cities will almost surely be saved from Commies because linking not provided for and leftists do not have change for victories from dispersal of non-Commie vote. While negotiating with right after elections to form city councils will be hard, it will cause few crisis-feeding headlines.

3. Absenteeism is understandable considering centralized structure Ital state and fact local admins have very limited power. Anti-Commie propaganda notwithstanding, Stalin cannot ride to power in local elections and it is difficult to convince Ital voter, who knows better, that he will. Real crisis is psychological one affecting polit and church leaders’ faith in themselves, in De Gasperi, and in center. This psychological crisis is hard to project to voter when leftists are talking about street-car service.

4. There are unfavorable technical considerations including fact army (mostly non-Commie) cannot go home to vote, etc.

5. There is shift of working class voters to cities either by natural population movement or by Commie manipulation of registration laws. In 1951, leftist vote actually decreased slightly if total throughout area in 1948 and 1951 compared, while in cities it increased with few exceptions up to 20 percent.

6. Excluding Rome, only one-third of Ital population, practically all in south, is voting. Southern neo-Fascism and Monarchism is largely special, “local” phenomenon caused by fact south never experienced severer aspects Ger occupation or [garble] republic, saw Amer Army as invader, had closer ties with African Colonies and received refugees and suffered econ damage when Colonies lost, had Monarchist tradition, and have social structure which discourages moderate or “progressive” polit thought. Next year with Milan other great northern cities, CD Veneto, traditionally Socialist Po Valley and historical republican strongholds in picture, southern “rightist resurgence” will be in far different perspective.

Foregoing assumes Rome can be held. If De Gasperi lost capital to leftists, election cld no longer be passed off as “local” and Demo voting losses wld have surpassed anything above cld explain. Even staunchest supporter of center wld have to admit continuing viability of present coalition doubtful. Crisis might bring natl elections this fall, radical govt reorganization (possibly but not probably with De Gasperi stepping aside) or postponement natl elections (which leading from weakness wld be even more dangerous and unpopular) from 1953 to 1954.

Whether Rome won or lost, explanations and justifications given above can only partly account for drop in popular support for CD which is sure to be expressed. Much of this loss is inevitable, the result of erosion from long encumbency and fact that CD in 1948 was largely shelter against Red cyclone and many votes were not actually its own. CD Party spectrum ranges from industrial barons to socialist visionaries with all shades between. De Gasperi is criticized for improvisation and lack of purpose, but if he carried out resolute and uncompromising polit line, he might no longer be able to hold party together. His job and his genius have been balancing and placating forces which remain in party largely because they find machinery which can still get them elected, find power, and find opportunity for patronage. If De Gasperi resolutely denied them all this, they wld desert and Demo margin is not such that they can be scorned. Result is, however, that public also begins to regard party only as vehicle for dispensing patronage. Party also suffers from lack of capillary organization bringing contact with people. Civic Comite achievement in organizing countrywide support of CD, at local level thereby filling void, has made it too easy for party to do little or nothing between elections. CD leaders realize this sitn and make sporadic efforts to correct it but so far without success. (This detachment of CD from people is shared by minor parties. To some extent whole group of Demo politicians live in little world of liberation-period-anti-Fascism, which no longer finds real popular response, of personal antagonisms and interests and of artificial issues and principles which have little relation to everyday needs and interests of people. CD with practical responsibility of govt, is probably less guilty of this than others.) On policy level CD has displayed lack of follow-through in anti-Commie fight during past year or two which brings criticism from Conservatives and some left-center elements within and outside party. (Present plans for laws against both left and right (Embtel 5018 May 16, 1952⁶) may quiet some of this criticism.)

On the other hand, solid achievements of govt are many as Ital public is not completely unaware (in spite of CD failure to publicize them effectively). Furthermore, alternatives have disagreeable features which are all too plain.

Whether or not Rome lost, extremist gains—which are certain— will jolt De Gasperi’s govt. Left (and probably also right) will almost surely beat drums for immediate polit elections on basis that govt and Parliament no longer represent majority of voters. De Gasperi will almost surely try to broaden base of govt, hoping to bring Liberals and PSDI back in. (Romita has said privately “defense of democracy” will be his overriding consideration after elections and PSDI might enter govt in this basis without calling new party convention.) De Gasperi may also bring in right wing of own party which presently is not represented (Embdes 2401 April 9, 1952⁷). He will also turn to revision of law for natl elections to provide linking, single member districts or some other modification which wld re-enforce center margin.

Bunker

1. Repeated to Paris, London, Belgrade, Trieste, and the Consulates in Italy.
2. Document 722.
3. This 14-page despatch analyzed the negotiations among the democratic parties in March and April regarding possible alliances in the May 25 elections. (765.00/5–652)
4. In airgram A–822, Feb. 14, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Italy that it was issuing a series of Periodic Reporting Guides in order to provide an indication of some of the current topics of interest to the Department. One of the six topics listed in this airgram, the first in the series, concerned the appointment of Gedda as head of Catholic Action and whether his appointment meant that the Church would support Catholic Action in preference to the Christian Democratic Party and whether it would have any effect upon a possible Catholic modus vivendi with the extreme right. (124.655/2–1454) Copies of subsequent Periodic Reporting Guides sent to the Embassy in Italy, dated June 23 and Sept. 19, 1952; Feb. 24, 1953; and Mar. 24, 1954 are in file 124.655.
5. This three-page despatch surveyed the prospects in the southern local elections. (765.00/3–2852)
6. Telegram 5018 discussed the implications of additions to the Penal Code which the Cabinet had approved on May 13. The additions included a 1–3 year prison term, a fine, and a 5-year bar to holding office or voting for anyone engaging in activities threatening democratic, constitutional institutions, or defaming a member of Parliament, or threatening or exhalting violence as a political method when danger to citizens’ political and civil liberties might result. (765.13/5–1652)
7. This despatch analyzed the program of the right wing of the Christian Democratic Party submitted to De Gasperi by 74 CD Senators and Deputies in a lengthy paper entitled, “Problems of the Hour and Government Action”. (765.00/4–952)