611.00/4–1653: Telegram
No. 592
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the
Department of State1
5518. Re Deptcirtel 1030, April 15.2 Since text President’s address was carried by AFP ticker this morning, we gave copies to [Page 1346] Bidault and Parodi, and to Burin des Roziers for Mayer, before luncheon, explaining points made in reference telegram to them. Mayer is dining tonight off record with principal French journalists and we are told he will give maximum support to United States views.
They considered substance and tone excellent. They were entirely satisfied with and really appreciative of statements on Indochina. They welcomed Korea and Austrian Treaty as initial tests of Soviet sincerity. Bidault was impressed by potentiality of final point on use of resources for suitable purposes. He and Burin both stressed importance of linking progress toward arms reduction agreement with progress toward German unification. In this connection, they noted with approval word “concurrently” in introductory paragraph on arms reduction.
Burin amplified last point, which he stated he had discussed with Mayer and Bidault at length on ship returning from United States, along following lines: If there should be four-power talks on Germany as result, for example, of Soviet acceptance in near future of 1952 Western proposals,3 Russians might either propose or accept one of three different arrangements.
One would be on Austrian pattern with Berlin as capital of unified Germany and some form of continuing four-power control and occupation. This would be solution most apt to be favored by Russians and least acceptable to West.
Second would be unarmed neutralized area with withdrawal of all military forces.
Third would be establishment of uncontrolled sovereign government as result of free elections which would probably be Socialist and which would mean “starting all over again” with respect to EDC or any other form of German armament.
Latter two would be extremely dangerous for West in absence of military equilibrium between East and West through arms agreement or other means.
Burin commented that putting Soviet sincerity to test would greatly facilitate French ratification of EDC if Soviet insincerity were clearly demonstrated in near future. He feared however, that any four-power talks looking toward settlement on Germany or other comprehensive questions might be dragged out and prevent ratification for very long time.
In largely extemporaneous speech which Bidault made at American Club this noon just after reading President’s speech, he stated that Soviet sincerity could not yet be either accepted nor possibility [Page 1347] of its existence dismissed, that new agression in Laos spoke louder than words, that goodwill and good faith were essential ingredients to solution of any problems and that Western courage, resolution and unity were more important than ever.
- Repeated to London and Bonn.↩
- This circular telegram contained the text of President Eisenhower’s speech which was to be delivered on Apr. 16 before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. See footnote 3, Document 590.↩
- For text of the tripartite note to the Soviet Union of Sept. 23, 1952, under reference here, see vol. vii, Part 1, p. 324.↩