Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 581
Memorandum of Discussion at the 138th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, March 25, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

March 25, 1953

Present at the 138th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Deputy Secretary of Defense (for Items 3 and 4); the Secretary of the Army (for Items 3 and 4); the Secretary of the Navy (for Items 3 and 4); the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 3 and 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (for Items 3 and 4); the Chief of Naval Operations (for Items 3 and 4); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (for Items 3 and 4); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 3 and 4); Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash (for Items 3 and 4); Captain Paul L. de Vos, USN, Joint Chiefs of Staff (for Item 3); the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

1. U.S. Position in the Forthcoming Talks With the French Ministers (NSC 124/2;² NSC 115³)

Secretary Dulles informed the Council that the basic approach of this Government in its discussions with the French Ministers would be that this represented perhaps the last chance to develop European unity along the orderly lines desired by the United States. Premier Mayer, an individual dedicated to the achievement of the European Defense Community, represented the last hope of French support for this project. If he failed, the EDC could be considered finished. Chancellor Adenauer would presumably be unable to win the forthcoming elections in Germany if the EDC went down the drain, and the German people could look forward to no relief from the limitations on their sovereignty which now exist. Secretary Dulles predicted that the result would probably be a unilateral assumption of a larger measure of sovereignty by the Federal Republic, with tacit United States and British agreement but with irreconcilable French hostility. Premier Mayer was wholly dedicated to the EDC program and was prepared to make it a matter of a confidence vote in the French Parliament.

Secretary Dulles then went on to indicate that his problem regarding the French in Europe was bound up with Indo-China. It was beyond the capabilities of France to shoulder the load represented by its commitments in Europe and its commitments in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the forthcoming conversations must try to figure out a way to end the heavy drain, both military and economic, which Indo-China represented for France. Secretary Dulles indicated that he and other American officials would explore with the French visitors a program designed to bring about a situation in Indo-China which within a year or eighteen months would substantially reduce the strain on French human and material resources. Secretary Dulles did not expect to reach any final conclusions or to make any commitments during this visit, but it was a great opportunity, since we were dealing with a man in the person of Premier Mayer who was completely frank and wholly dedicated to our objectives in Europe.

Secretary Dulles then informed the Council that he had just come from a meeting with fourteen members of Congress. He gained the impression from this meeting that these Congressmen felt that if the American people could be given reason to believe that the difficulties in Indo-China will end by the French according Indo-China a real autonomy, and if a program could be devised giving real promise of military and political success in Indo-China, the Congress would at least be open-minded in its consideration of continued United States assistance to the French in Indo-China.

In response to Secretary Dulles’ remarks, the President said that two ideas immediately occurred to him. Would it not be advisable, he inquired, to arrange for Premier Mayer to speak to the American people on the radio or on TV, and give a full explanation of the French attitude and objectives in Indo-China? Such a speech could go far to counteract the familiar belief that the French desire to perpetuate colonialism in Indo-China. Mayer could explain the lively desire of the French to get out of Indo-China and the real reasons which prevented them from doing so at this stage in the hostilities.

The President’s second-point was an inquiry whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff could profitably explore the possibilities of offering the French a preeminent command position in Europe. Such military prestige was very dear to the French, and they might be offered either the Central European command or even General Ridgway’s job. In his book, said the President, General Juin was a first-rate soldier. The President added that he was well aware that his proposal would arouse jealousies of the French in other European countries. On the other hand, he felt that we could easily protect ourselves against any dangers posed by the French taking over such a command. Whether the proposal was finally accepted by all the nations concerned, the mere fact that the United States had been behind such an offer would do much to stimulate needed French enthusiasm for the EDC plan.

Secretary Dulles agreed that the President’s proposal would certainly go far to counteract French dread that their entry into the European Defense Community would mean the loss of France’s identity and leadership on the Continent. Indeed, said Secretary Dulles, it would be very helpful if he could be given the initial reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within a day or two.

General Bradley stated that he was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could provide their opinion within the time limit suggested by the Secretary of State, but went on to say that this question was really more political than military. It therefore seemed to him that the State Department should also consider the political implications of the President’s proposal and notably the degree of opposition which we might anticipate would arise in the various European states.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Secretary of State on the U.S. position with respect to the European Defense Community and Indo-China in the forthcoming talks with the French Ministers.

b. Noted the President’s desire that the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff explore, from the political and military viewpoints, respectively, the feasibility of offering the French one of the top NATO commands.⁴

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for implementation.

[Here follows discussion of significant world developments affecting United States national security, the status of United States national security programs, and a review of basic national security policies.]

1. Drafted by Gleason on Mar. 26.
2. For the text of NSC 124/2, “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia,” June 25, 1952, see vol. xii, Part 1, p. 125.
3. NSC 115, “Definition of U.S. Policy on Problems of the Defense of Europe and the German Contribution,” Aug. 2, 1951, is in S/S–NSC files, 63 D 351, “NSC 115”.
4. For information concerning the subsequent appointment of Gen. Pierre Alphonse Juin as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe on July 3, Document 602.