Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

751.5/3–2553: Telegram

No. 580
The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Paris, March 25, 1953—11 p.m.

Polto 1839. Personal Draper to Wilson, Dulles and Stassen; copy to Dillon.¹ On behalf of SRE I should like to present following views on certain aid aspects of pending French negotiations:

1. There are still many uncertainties about feasibility and costs of French proposals for their NATO build-up which we and international staff are attempting to clarify as part of AR process. Until further progress has been made I urge that nothing be said which commits US with respect to aid in relation to NATO build-up or with respect to force goals themselves. For example, do not consider 18 divisions for 54 as goal US can endorse. More detailed message this subject being despatched.

2. If there are broader policy considerations which appear make it necessary say something to French about aid related to NATO effort, preliminary view here would be against increasing budgetary support aid to France in 54 above 53 level, or for increasing present 53 level in order to achieve further NATO build-up. Grant of $125 million more in 53 in particular would create most serious difficulties with other NATO countries and would appear impossible to justify to ourselves, in advance of positive action of French on EDC.

3. If found necessary to say something about end item aid, believe programming for end-item deliveries to French NATO forces has been in general on substantially higher scale in relation to present size of forces and any reasonable prospect for future buildup than most other NATO countries. Would therefore, urge no commitments for increases in end item programs until over-all NATO situation can be reviewed as result AR.

4. This of course, does not exclude additional aid to France, designed to help meet her problems in Indochina. Believe strongly any such additional aid should be related directly to additional effort in Indochina and not be shifting of burden there from France to US. Before making any commitments for such additional aid, if sizeable, suggest US should be reasonably satisfied that additional effort involved is of character and magnitude to give prospect bringing Indochinese hostilities to conclusion in not too distant future. Agree fully with second point of Washington 4907 to Paris of March 19.² Might it not be useful for special high level US military team to visit Indochina to review with French adequacy of proposed actions in order that US may be fully satisfied on this point?

Draper

1. Ambassador Dillon was in Washington to attend the meetings with Prime Minister Mayer and his advisers during their visit from Mar. 26 through Mar. 28.
2. This telegram summarized Paris working-level discussions on Indochina; for text, see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 416. The second point of this message emphasized the sense of urgency with which Washington viewed the Indochina situation.