Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

751.5 MSP/7–2452: Telegram

No. 531
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

secret
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Paris, July 24, 1952—3 p.m.

529. Personal for Perkins. Strictly limit distribution.

1. In commenting on démarche made July 21 by PriMin Pinay in company Pleven and Schuman (mytel 466, July 22¹), I believe it shld be recognized at outset that we are now in presence of probably most critical and delicate situation in France–US relations since beginning of North Atlantic Alliance. As I know Wash is fully aware, polit implications of problem of financing France def production are so far-reaching and so involved with other aspects of our Eur policy, that any decisions taken at this time will have a marked effect on plans and objectives of US and our Eur partners for some time to come. Consequently, I feel it hardly nec to urge that formulation of US reply be given most urgent attention at highest levels in light these factors.

2. In view limitations resulting from the very heavy Congressional cuts in FY 53 MSP request and the urgent competing demands for the funds finally voted, we are naturally not in position to recommend that Wash reconsider Pleven May 6 request with view to authorizing purchase of additional items. You will note from French July 21 memo transmitted mytel 486, July 22,² that French Govt has now dropped its request for several items, and particularly stresses importance it attaches to reconsideration of Nord 2501; certain types of armament, including Panhard reconnaissance car; Delahaye jeep; Ford truck; Sea Vernon; 57 mm ammo; and mine-sweeping gear; at a total price of $296.1 million. If none of these items is considered by US experts to be a milit requirement of sufficiant priority to warrant OSP out of limited funds available, we assume there is no question of going beyond decisions already taken.

3. Thus if no additional OSP from FY 53 funds of May 6 items beyond that envisaged in Def 913168³ is possible, I urge that decision to this effect be communicated to us as promptly as possible. I feel that, if possible, US reply shld be clearly based on ground that limited funds which are available to us after Congressional cuts make impossible the procurement of the balance of the items contained in May 6 request.

4. When I saw Pleven this morning on another matter, he asked whether I had any news for him re OSP. I told him that I had no instructions, but indicated I thought picture looked gloomy. He replied that if US answer to Pinay aide-mémoire is to be negative, he hoped US position wld be clearly based on reduction of appropriations and consequent unavailability of funds. He said a reply in these terms wld assist him before Parl, but that if reply went into the merits of French production program, his position wld be wholly untenable. OSP situation, he said, is not just serious but “disastrous” and the direct consequences can flow from it if no reasonable solution is found.

5. I have asked for telecon at 10 a.m. Wash time today to discuss matter further.⁴

Dunn

1. Document 528.
2. See footnote 5, ibid.
3. See footnote 1, Document 526.
4. No record of this telephone conversation has been found in Department of State files. For a summary of the conclusions reached during this conversation, see telegram 451 to Paris, infra.