751.5 MSP/7–2152
No. 530
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by
the Acting Chief of the Policy Reports Staff of the Executive
Secretariat (Kitchen)
Mr. Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense, telephoned the Secretary this afternoon and said that Ambassador Bonnet had spent one and a half hours with him (presumably this morning) and had, in effect, charged that the United States Government had welshed on the agreement made with the French at Lisbon.
The Ambassador repeatedly stated that Secretary Acheson and Mr. Lovett had not only promised additional Indochina-type offshore procurement, but also, in a letter to Bidault, had indicated that the United States could pick up a great deal more direct offshore [Page 1230] procurement. Mr. Foster said he had told Bonnet that this was completely contrary to anything we had promised the French.
The Secretary said that, of course, what happened at Lisbon was on record. Mr. Foster said that letters which Ambassador Dunn had written to Pinay (or Schuman) also substantiated our position. He added that, as a matter of fact, the situation was pretty good and actually went beyond the earlier expectations of the French, although Bonnet had declared, in his conversation with Foster, that this “means the end of the French Cabinet, EDC—everything!” and that he would so have to report to Mr. Acheson. Mr. Foster had told the Ambassador he could not argue the point, neither would he accept that it was our responsibility. Foster had stated he would do everything he could if Bonnet believed there was a way of picking up anything approaching 623 million dollars worth of offshore procurement. Foster added he was disturbed by apparent leaks in the French press which put this problem on our doorstep.
Mr. Foster said that during their talk Bonnet got out Bidault’s letter of March 6 to Mr. Lovett,1 started to translate from it, and stopped when he apparently realized that Bidault’s letter and Mr. Lovett’s response did not prove his point.
Foster remarked that what Mr. Pleven wants is another $440,000,000 which the latter says France can well produce, and which consists of the military orders the French Government had previously placed and now find beyond their budgetary capacity to carry. This amount is well above any commitments we have made. Mr. Foster commented that he thought the French would like to go back to bilateral deals and want considerably more than their just share. They are getting 35 to 40 percent of the total offshore program as it is. We may be able to purchase, “in our own interest and for our own account”, an additional 25 to 50 million dollars worth of military equipment, but nothing comparable to the amounts the French desire. He said it boiled down to the fact that the French were in political difficulties and what we could do about it he was not quite sure.
The Secretary said we would get hold of the papers in question, in preparation for Ambassador Bonnet’s call.2