Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 491
Memorandum of Discussion at the
205th Meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday,
July 1, 19541
eyes only
Present at the 205th meeting of the Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (Items 1–4); the Secretary of Commerce (Item 5); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 1–4); the Federal Civil Defense [Page 1134] Administrator (Items 1–4); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (Item 4). Present for Item 1 only were the Acting Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; Mr. Robert C. Sprague, NSC Consultant; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; Messrs. Walters and Hall, NSC Special Staff; Lt. Col. George P. Curtin, USA; Lt. Col. William S. Fultz, USA; Lt. Col. James Bothwell, USAF; Lt. Col. George R. Doerr, USAF; Capt. Thomas P. Wilson, USN; and Capt. Edward E. Grim, USN. Others present at the meeting were Assistant Secretary of Commerce Anderson (Item 5); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Elbert P. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Naval Aide to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1 and 2, continental defense and significant developments affecting United States security.]
3. Conversations Between the President and the UK Prime Minister
Secretary Dulles said that the most significant action with respect to Southeast Asia had been the formulation of a joint US–UK position regarding a settlement in Indochina. This joint position had been communicated to the French Government and basic instructions with regard to this position transmitted to our representatives at Geneva. In general this position indicated what we would be willing “to respect” by way of a settlement. In substance, Laos and Cambodia would be left as free and independent states with the capability of maintaining their integrity. Likewise, approximately half of Vietnam would remain non-Communist south of a line drawn approximately along the 18th parallel. In the course of defining this joint US–UK position, differences of view had emerged. The US had hoped to produce a definite agreement with the UK not to accept anything less favorable than this position. Churchill and Eden, on the other hand, had merely wished to state a hope that the French wouldn’t settle for anything less than this position. A compromise had been reached, but complete agreement was not achieved and we will continue to take a stiffer line than the British.
[Page 1135]With regard to the German problem the important decision was that the US and UK would prepare all the necessary parliamentary procedures required to implement the contractuals in the absence of French ratification of EDC and in the absence of French ratification of the contractuals. The thought here had been to get ourselves legally lined up to carry out this course of action if the French Parliament should adjourn without having ratified EDC.
Secretary Dulles indicated that Mr. Eden at last realizes that there is no really satisfactory alternative to EDC, and he will make every effort to see that it is achieved.
There had been differences between the US and the UK on the issue of rearming the Germans in the absence of EDC. Indeed, there had been differences on this issue between Churchill and Eden. The latter was very strongly opposed to the recreating of a strong national German Army. Sir Winston, on the other hand, quite strongly supported this proposal. The compromise of these differing views appears in paragraph 6 of the Minutes.2 The President commented that Mr. Eden put particular stress on the danger of reviving a German General Staff.
In answer to a question, Secretary Dulles explained the German point of view regarding rearmament in the event that EDC failed. The Bonn Government was perfectly willing to accept the same limitations on its armed forces as were imposed on the other NATO members, but it would refuse to accept limitations which applied to Germany alone. Accordingly, said Secretary Dulles, it will not be practical from our point of view to try to induce Germany to accept an inferior position in NATO, as Mr. Eden and other likeminded statesmen wished.
The President pointed out that this was Chancellor Adenauer’s position. Agreeing with the President, Secretary Dulles said that Adenauer did not desire a separate national army for Germany, but he was also opposed to singling out Germany for a special and inferior military status.
With respect to the general statement of principles issued by the President and the Prime Minister at the conclusion of the conversations,3 Secretary Dulles said that it indicated some progress along the lines advocated by the United States on the issue of colonialism. There was likewise some progress with regard to our position on the unacceptability of treaties which would compel peoples and nations to permanent Communist servitude. Secretary Dulles said he wasn’t sure whether the British realized the full import of these words. They meant that while the United States would not [Page 1136] attempt to break such treaties by resort to armed force, we would not allow ourselves to be bound, for example, to take up arms against Rhee in order to protect North Korea should the armistice be broken.
In the area of atomic energy matters, nothing of great significance had transpired.…
With regard to the basic attitudes of the US and the UK, differences had emerged, said Secretary Dulles, which it was essential that the US take into account in the future. Such alternative courses of action for the United States suggested by Mr. Sprague in his report on continental defense—namely, to build up a very high order of defense against Soviet atomic attack, or resort to preventive war, or build up conventional forces and arms to match Russia’s—were none of them open to the United Kingdom. Since, therefore, they can find no answer to the terrible threat of atomic attack, they feel compelled to promote the idea of peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. This feeling is widely shared both by the other free countries of Western Europe and by the free Asian states. US policy must plainly recognize and take account of this fact.
Dr. Flemming inquired of Secretary Dulles whether there had been any progress during the conversations with regard to a regional grouping for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communism. Secretary Dulles replied that there had been progress, and that joint conversations on the subject would start this week.4 The British had initially proposed to reactivate the Five-Power staff conversations,5 but we had opposed this proposal. Thereafter, agreement had been reached to pursue this subject by means of a series of talks. The first of these, among the ANZUS powers, had already taken place. It would be followed by subsequent conversations with the Philippines, Thailand, etc. The position of the French in this situation was extremely difficult to understand since, in effect, the French had “gone underground”. Mendès-France was plainly trying to pressure the United States to urge the Associated States to agree to whatever settlement the French made with the Communists in Indochina. We had refused to be party to this.
The National Security Council:
Noted an oral report by the Secretary of State on the results of the conversations between the President and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
[Page 1137][Here follows discussion of items 4 and 5, economic guidelines for fiscal year 1956 and East-West trade controls.]
Deputy Executive Secretary
- Drafted on July 2.↩
- See Document 485.↩
- Supra.↩
- For documentation on the work of the U.S.–U.K. Joint Study Group on Southeast Asia, see vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 600 ff.↩
- See the report of the Five-Power Military Conference, ibid., p. 554.↩