Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 339

No. 485
Agreed Minute on Germany and EDC¹

secret

[Washington, June 27, 1954.]

The President and the Prime Minister have today agreed that;

(1) Failure of the French Assembly to ratify EDC before recessing for the summer would create an extremely difficult situation in Germany and threaten the position of the Chancellor.

(2) In such event, it would be necessary in the interest of retaining the alignment of the Federal Republic with the West promptly to take such steps as were open to them to restore to the Federal Republic the measure of sovereignty contemplated by the contractual agreements.²

(3) Such restoration of sovereignty should be accomplished in a fashion which would as little as possible militate against ratification by France of the EDC in the fall.

(4) Until the French Assembly has in fact recessed without favorable action, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom should maintain in full force their public and private support of EDC. They should discourage any public discussion of alternatives.

(5) The action contemplated in (2) above will require parliamentary action in the case of those who participate. For this reason, parliamentary authorization should be sought prior to recess for the summer. The U.S. and U.K will approach the French Government with a view to explaining their purpose in obtaining parliamentary authorizations to place the contractuals into effect, if necessary, in the absence of a concurrent coming into force of the EDC Treaty or French ratification with contractuals. French participation or acquiescence should, however, be sought.

(6) Concurrently with the action necessary to place the contractual agreements into effect, at least as regards the U.K., U.S. and Germany, provisions should be made in agreement with Chancellor Adenauer that Germany will defer for the time being the unilateral exercise by Germany of the right to rearmament.

(7) In the event that the French refuse to participate in the foregoing course of action, they should be told that the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom were resolute in their determination to place in effect, in so far as their relations with the Federal Republic were concerned, the provisions of the contractual agreement to the maximum extent practicable.

(8) The Chancellor should be consulted as appropriate in placing the above program in effect with a view to securing his views and cooperation.

(9) Experts from the United States should meet in a matter of days with British experts in London with a view to working out the legal, procedural and chronological aspects of the program described above.³

(10) In the event that the French Assembly before recessing should reject the EDC Treaty, there would then exist all the greater reason to proceed resolutely and expeditiously with the above program. In addition, it would then be necessary for the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, together with their partners in NATO, urgently to consult regarding alternative measures for securing a German defense contribution.

1. The source text was attached to a cover sheet which indicated that it had been agreed by Dulles and Eden at their meeting on June 27 (see Document 478) and that it was circulated within the U.S. Delegation as CEV MEMO–6a.
2. For documentation on the contractual agreements signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.
3. For documentation on the work of the Anglo-American Study Group on Germany, which met in London during July 1954, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 997 ff.