Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

CFM files, lot M 88, box 169, “Churchill–Eden Visit”

No. 471
Paper Prepared by the British Delegation¹

secret

[Washington?] June 25, 1954.

A South-East Asia Settlement

A. If an agreement is reached at Geneva, there might be:

(1) an international agreement to uphold an Indochina settlement; and

(2) a collective defense agreement to deter and, if necessary, resist renewed Communist aggression outside Indo-China.

As regards (1):

(a) Such an agreement is desirable:

(i) in order to commit the Communists in writing to maintain the agreed status quo in Indo-China; and

(ii) in order to associate as many Asian States as possible with the maintenance of that position.

(b) The agreement should be open for signature by as many South and South-East Asian States as possible and by Australia and New Zealand, in addition to the states participating in the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

(c) The commitments to be undertaken by the participating states would require further study; insofar as any action is provided for, it must be individual and not only collective as the Communists are likely to demand.

(d) An advantage of agreement (1) would be to make agreement (2) more readily acceptable to the Asian States.

As regards agreement (2):

(e) This agreement should be limited to those states willing to accept specific commitments to take military action in the event of renewed Communist aggression outside Indo-China.

(f) Its purpose should be:

(i) to deter such aggression by making clear that it would be met by prompt and united resistance and would involve the risk of general war and

(ii) to provide machinery for effective defense co-operation in the area and for the protection in particular of Burma and Siam against Communist infiltration and aggression.

B. If no Indo-China settlement is reached at Geneva only a collective defense agreement on the lines of (2) would call for consideration. Further consideration would also have to be given to possible action in regard to Indo-China, for instance, to save Laos and Cambodia.

C. Proposed Action

(1) A planning study of this whole question should be undertaken immediately by the Five Power Military Conference, to which political representatives should be added for the purpose.

(2) This study should embrace both:

(a) the question of the agreements to be concluded (as indicated in (1) and (2) above) in the event that an acceptable settlement on Indo-China is secured at Geneva; and

(b) the question of the agreements to be concluded regarding action to be taken outside Indo-China (as indicated in (2) above) if no Indo-China settlement is reached.

(3) The study should not, so long as the Geneva Conference is continuing, deal with action to be taken in regard to Indo-China itself in the event that no agreement is reached at Geneva.

(4) The purpose of the study should be to prepare agreed recommendations for submission to the Five governments on the nature of the committments to be undertaken in each of the contingencies in paragraph (2) above, the states to be invited to adhere to each of the various agreements contemplated, the timing of such invitations, etc.

1. This paper was handed to Secretary Dulles by Eden during the meeting at the White House on June 25 (see Document 468), and was discussed at the meeting in the Secretary’s office on June 26 (see CEV MC–4, supra). It was circulated as CEV MEMO–5 in the records of the U. S. Delegation.