Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

CFM files, lot M 88, box 169, “Churchill–Eden Visit”

No. 470
Memorandum of a Meeting of Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Eden at the Department of State, June 26, 1954, 10:30 a.m.¹

secret
CEV MC–4

June 26, 1954, 10:30 a.m.

Participants:

• United States

  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Ambassador Aldrich
  • Mr. Sturm

• United Kingdom

  • Mr. Anthony Eden
  • Sir H. Caccia
  • Mr. W. D. Allen
  • Sir Roger Makins
  • Mr. R. H. Scott
  • Mr. M. G. L. Joy

Subject:

• Indochina

The Secretary stated he intended to ask Mr. Eden questions about his document entitled “A Southeast Asia Settlement”² and asked Mr. Eden what he thought the settlement was likely to be.

Mr. Eden replied that his estimates had altered since the change in the French Government. Although Mendes-France might have had to set himself a thirty-day time limit for reasons of domestic politics, as far as Geneva is concerned announcing the thirty-day limit was a mistake. Yesterday Eden sent Mendes-France a warning referring to the recent stiffening in Communist terms and advising the French Premier not to let the enemy make use of the time limit he has set upon himself.

Under Secretary Smith referred to the recent blandishment of the representatives of Cambodia and Laos by the Communists at Geneva.

Mr. Eden said we can only wait and see if the Communists modify their position, which now is tending to be very stiff. Mr. Eden said that Prime Minister Nehru replied to a query saying that he had not invited Chou En-lai to New Delhi, but that the initiative had been Chou’s.³ Mr. Eden warned Nehru regarding the following two points:

1. If there is any serious revival of military activity in Indochina, that will abolish the hope of an agreement at Geneva.

2. The Viet Minh have to remove their forces from Laos and Cambodia.

Nehru replied that he had these points in mind in connection with his forthcoming conversations with Chou. Nehru added that he would wait to see what results the military talks have in the next few days.

The Secretary said that there appeared to be nothing much we could do now to strengthen the French. The President’s letter to President Coty⁴ did suggest that we were ready to undertake further talks with the French regarding intervention if they wished. The French have never taken the question of our intervention seriously but did want the possibility of such intervention to exist as a card for their use at Geneva. In our letter to President Coty, we thought it was best to wipe the slate clean and make a fresh start to take account of the change of government and the altered military position in Indochina. It now seems to us that much greater forces would be required if we were to intervene in order to offset deterioration in the political situation, the military posture, and declining morale. In other words, the old terms were obsolete and we wished to be free of them. Mendes-France has not intimated that he wants to have such talks. We assume that he will wait out his thirty days.

Mr. Eden said that the President had read President Coty’s reply⁵ to the Prime Minister and himself. To Under Secretary Smith, Mr. Eden said that the only other thing of importance that he could think of since their last meeting was Chou En-lai’s interview with the Canadian Ambassador.⁶ There appears to have been a marked stiffening of Communist attitudes in the last 48 hours.

The Secretary asked Mr. Eden his views on a partition versus elections in Vietnam.

Mr. Eden said that from our point of view, a partition would be better since we would save something thereby. However, the word “partition” must not be used. With elections we would risk everything.

Under Secretary Smith remarked that early elections would result in a Communist victory.

Mr. Eden remarked that he liked Mendes-France. They had never met before. Mendes-France may be a good negotiator. Mr. Eden then asked the Secretary what were his views on elections versus partition in Vietnam.

The Secretary replied that de facto partition creates problems, particularly if it must be guaranteed. However, from the point of view of results in the area, it may be better under present circumstances. However, a year from now, if it were possible to reestablish morale, provide an effective government and obtain the support of the people, elections might be somewhat more desirable. However, under almost any circumstances elections would lead to coalition and eventually Communist take-over, as for example in Hungary.

Mr. Eden said he imagined the French preferred elections to partition.

Under Secretary Smith said that the French wished to avoid elections as 75 percent of the votes would go to the Viet Minh.

The Secretary said he wondered what the French attitude would be toward that portion of Vietnam which they had not surrendered. Their ability to save it from the Communists depends on a greater French readiness to withdraw and to permit the Vietnamese to build up their own military and economic forces. A partition which permitted the French to continue to dominate South Vietnam would create a position not easy to hold owing to encouragement that would give to subversion. The degree of continuing French presence is intimately connected to the resistance which can be built up to Communist pressures from the north. In this respect Mendes-France is inclined to be more clean-cut in his dealings with the Vietnamese than the preceding governments.

Under Secretary Smith said that Mendes-France wants the expeditionary corps returned to France. Eight months ago Mendes-France said that if the decision were his, he would discharge all colonial administrators. Mr. Eden agreed that in order to strengthen the area the best thing is for the French to get out, but that is very difficult under present circumstances, particularly since it would cause them difficulties in Morocco. Under Secretary Smith said he thought Mendes-France would change policies and relationships but that French withdrawal will be gradual.

The Secretary said that he was concerned that many loyal elements would be abandoned in a partition of Vietnam. He referred particularly to the Catholics in the North. Such factors as these must be taken into account in guaranteeing any line in Indochina. The Secretary asked Mr. Eden if the dual system mentioned in his “Southeast Asia Settlement” was designed to appeal to India and Burma.

Mr. Eden replied that there was much talk of guarantees at Geneva. The Communists would like to have guarantees plus a veto through collective action. Some other system not subject to the veto is preferable from our point of view. If the agreement were broken under that system, individual reaction would be possible.

Mr. Allen remarked that reaction at Geneva should be better to an across-the-board settlement which would engage the responsibility of Communists and non-Communists alike.

Mr. Eden said he did not think the Communists would accept the proposal he had in mind but their rejection would put us in a not too bad position and would strengthen the appeal of a Southeast Asia pact to the Asians themselves.

The Secretary queried whether Mr. Eden felt that if this system were worked out, US participation were vital. When Mr. Eden replied in the affirmative, the Secretary said it is difficult for us to undertake guaranteeing a Communist success in North Vietnam. Our principle is that while we must accept the fact of Communist domination in large parts of the world, we do not believe in guaranteeing it anywhere. A guaranteed European settlement dividing East and West would be contrary to our policy. Communist domination is an evil which we must accept temporarily. In Korea, for example, we would not urge President Rhee to move north nor would we guarantee Communist control of northern Korea. While we might not right a wrong by force, we will certainly not perpetuate it by force.

Mr. Eden said that his idea was to keep something worse from happening.

The Secretary replied that we would be favorably disposed to the proposition of guaranteeing a line against Communist aggression.

Mr. Eden said, “That may be the answer.”

Mr. Eden inquired whether the Secretary felt the moral issue still entered the picture if the less bad of two alternatives were chosen.

The Secretary agreed that the balance of forces is such that reunification of Germany and Korea and freeing of Austria is not now possible but we cannot be expected to guarantee Communist control of what they now hold. While neither we nor Adenauer will attempt to reunite Germany by force, no more will we guarantee its division.

Under Secretary Smith said that if free elections were held in Vietnam now, the Viet Minh would probably emerge with a large majority. For that reason Molotov and Gromyko have proposed elections in lieu of partition.

Mr. Eden said that he had been searching for some arrangements in which the Asians would join us in saying to the Communists, “Thus far and no farther”.

Under Secretary Smith said that the Communists would never agree to an acceptable international control formula for elections.

The Secretary said that the Communists would not accept such controls, even though they would win in Vietnam, because of the implications of this step for Korea and Germany. We can assume that if the French stand firm on the issue of free elections, the proposition will collapse of itself.

Mr. Eden said that something might be worked out along the lines indicated by the Secretary. We should have a plan ready for the time with the Communists will come up with their proposal. The Secretary’s idea of a non-aggression concept as applied to this area should be explored by the UK and the United States.

The Secretary said that the formula suggested last December for Germany might be considered in this connection.⁷ Referring to Article II(4) of the UN Charter, we could say that we accepted the settlement not because we like it, but because we were unwilling to upset it by means of force.

Eden said, “Let’s look at that.”

Under Secretary Smith said that this procedure would commend itself to Asians.

The Secretary said that if a de facto settlement divides Vietnam, why should not what remains after this division be guaranteed by a collective defense system?

Sir Harold Caccia replied that there was no profound philosophy back of this but at Geneva it appeared that these areas would be neutralized behind a political line.

The Secretary said that we need to give thought to whether Laos and Cambodia and parts of Vietnam can develop viable non-Communist governments if they are not given substantial help from the outside. In other words, the degree of neutralization or demilitarization, affecting military training missions, equipment and advisors, was very important. If these elements were excluded, it is doubtful that these governments could survive.

Sir Harold Caccia said that Chou recognized the validity of some military elements in Laos and Cambodia, including perhaps a very restricted number of French.

Under Secretary Smith said that while there are very few French cadres in Laos and Cambodia, the Communists have insisted upon the provision of no more arms from outside except for restricted defense. We should take the same line for agreements (1) and (2) of the Eden document, but the line should be political and if it were violated the military would decide where the fighting should take place.

Mr. Eden agreed that the defense line should be the political line, but where should it be drawn? That depends on what comes out of Geneva. He did not exclude from the defense provisions those parts of Indo-China which might be salvaged.

Sir Harold Caccia added the qualifying remark: Even though these areas cannot be turned into a defensive position.

Sir Roger Makins inquired about an enclave in the delta.

Under Secretary Smith said that any enclaves which remained would be short-lived and unfortunately would not enter into a permanent political settlement.

Sir Harold Caccia said that if anything was salvaged in South Vietnam, we would have to consider what would bring the secondary pact into operation. Would subversion, for example, do this?

The Secretary replied that in his view this line would not cover internal subversion but he would be glad to consider another view of this matter.

Sir Harold Caccia said that it would be extremely difficult to define the terms of a violation of a defensive line: Assume, for example, that the Communists win elections.

Mr. Eden remarked that we would have to work to improve the lot of those persons remaining outside Communist zones and to hope that things would work out. All this depends on what settlement is reached at Geneva.

The Secretary inquired whether, if there were no Indochina settlement at Geneva, the UK would wish to give thought to saving parts of Vietnam.

Mr. Eden replied that he did not believe the people of Vietnam were with us and that consequently a great effort would be required. Laos and Cambodia are different. Moreover, those two countries could be taken to the UN. If Laos and Cambodia, for example, appealed to the UN and the appeal went well that would be a good basis for future action in the area.

Under Secretary Smith said he believed Mendes-France’s immediate goal was to gain acceptance of the Thakhek–Dong Hoi line.

Mr. Eden inquired whether Mendes-France would be willing to abandon part of Laos.

Under Secretary Smith said that he would, partly because of the difficulty of defending the long border and partly because the Communists will hold fast to Northern Laos.

Mr. Eden said that he had been disturbed by the staff paper of the five power military talks which had indicated abandonment of so much of Laos.⁸

The Secretary left the room briefly at this time. General conversation in his absence touched upon Communist fear of US bases in Laos and Cambodia, a fact which gives us some bargaining power; French intention not to attempt to hold in the delta; what we can do to stiffen the French at this time; and French fears that the US and the UK will disassociate themselves from a Geneva settlement.

In reply to a question regarding “C. Proposed Action”,⁹ Mr. Eden said that the five power discussions had been all white. If the talks proposed in the paper were not all white, we would be faced with the difficult problem of how many, and which, others.

Under Secretary Smith said that we might be able to continue as at present, adding political advisers, without advertising our talks.

The Secretary re-entered at that point and reported his conversation with Ambassador Bonnet, who brought him two messages from Mendes-France.¹⁰ One of these messages mentioned regrouping of military forces and said that the French would try to hold an enclave in the North and to neutralize the Catholic provinces of Bui Chu and Phat Diem.

Mendes-France would like the communiqué on the Eisenhower–Churchill talks to say that a failure of the Geneva Conference would aggravate the international situation.

Mendes-France indicated also that there would be objections from elements in Vietnam about any settlement reached and repeated his hope that we would help sell this to the Vietnamese.

The Secretary continued by saying that there would be more headaches in attempting to develop the five power talks into a political conference. The Philippines and Thailand were already seriously irritated by the purely military talks. Our troubles would become almost unbearable if the five power talks became political.

Mr. Eden suggested that perhaps the US and the UK could talk among themselves, plus possibly the other members of ANZUS. Mr. Eden said that the details that might be discussed were the terms of a formal engagement and who invites whom.

The Secretary said that he thought it was best to proceed on a bilateral basis. The French are preoccupied with other things but their views can be obtained on an ad hoc basis. We already know the views of Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. Eden said that he would much prefer this, adding that we could tell Casey what is going on.

The Secretary said that these talks did not have to be publicized.

Mr. Eden replied that we should consider whether they should or should not.

The Secretary said that would depend. We might say that matters had been discussed by the heads of governments and as an aftermath the details were to be discussed at a working level with the objective of putting flesh on bare bones.

He added that under C, paragraph 3 should be eliminated, since at some point we must consider Indochina.

Mr. Eden said that both sides should prepare draft terms of reference covering what the study is to do.

Mr. Robertson asked Mr. Eden’s position on the international control commission, in particular whether Mr. Eden still wished the Colombo powers to take on this job.

Mr. Eden replied in the affirmative, adding that one Communist state and “one of ours”; Sweden, Switzerland or Norway, might be added. The Communists for their part might suggest: Poland or Norway plus three of the Colombo powers.

Mr. Robertson inquired why we had to accept a Communist satellite state.

Mr. Eden replied that his position so far was that the Colombo powers should accept supervision.

Mr. Robertson asked why we should dilute this type of control commission. The idea of entrusting supervision to the Colombo powers has great appeal to the Asians.

Mr. Eden replied that the Communists have already rejected the proposal of the Colombo powers plus two others. He said that for himself he was all for fighting the Colombo proposal through since it was much the best solution.

Sir Harold Caccia queried whether we should stick on this issue if there was agreement on everything else.

Mr. Robertson said that the control commission is a very powerful element, particularly since it may be concerned at some time with supervising elections.

Mr. Eden said that recently he had written off the question of a control commission altogether, saying that this was a matter for the French. However, he now agrees that we should stick to the idea of the Colombo powers. He will do everything possible to encourage the French to adhere to this position and if we are unable to make any progress on these lines we shall confer again.

1. Drafted on June 28. The meeting took place in the Secretary of State’s office.
2. Infra.
3. Chou En-lai, on his return to China from Geneva, began a visit to India on June 25.
4. For the text of President Eisenhower’s letter to French President Coty, June 18, 1954, see Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, pp. 990–991.
5. For the reply of President Coty, dated June 23, 1954, see Department of State Bulletin, July 5, 1954, pp. 13–14.
6. Not further identified.
7. For documentation on the various proposals on Germany, raised during the negotiations which led to the Berlin Conference, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 722 ff.
8. See the report of the Five-Power Military Conference, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 554.
9. See the paper on Southeast Asia, infra.
10. Regarding Secretary Dulles’ meeting with Ambassador Bonnet on June 26, see telegram 4852 to Paris, June 28, vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 1755.