Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, “1916–1952”

No. 361
The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Eisenhower)

top secret
personal and eyes only

Washington, January 24, 1952.

Dear Ike: Several things happened during Churchill’s visit to this country which may be of interest to you either because of the direct position taken or by the implications his comments carried to his listeners.

. . . . . . .

He was received with great warmth publicly and was treated with the most courteous attention.

There is no use ducking the fact that the P.M. accepts NATO in theory but in actuality does not believe in it in a military sense.… The only thing that he warmly supported was the necessity for the German divisions and he admitted that the position taken by Germany, France and Italy was a tremendous step forward in a support of the European Defense Force.

When pressed to be of assistance in getting the Benelux group to move more rapidly in support of EDF, the Prime Minister said that they would do what they could but that they could not provide pressure by themselves in joining EDF on the same basis as that proposed for the other Continental members.

There was no doubt whatsoever in anyone’s mind that he will loyally and effectively contribute British units. It was clear, however, that he does not accept the EDF principle which the unregenerate old fellow referred to as “a sludgy amalgam”.

The SACLANT problem: he asked us to “release him from the obligation of the late government” as he considered the program unworkable and unnecessary down-grading of the British. We pointed out that the proposal for the set-up orginated in August 1949 with the British Chiefs of Staff and then was followed by a similar proposal of the North Atlantic Ocean Planning Group whose report the British Government accepted and which caused his statement in opposition, in I think, December 1950. In addition, we explained that we had no authority to release the British from anything; that we were a member of NATO as they were and he would be within his rights to refuse approval of SACLANT and to make some better suggestion.

His own military staff, as as well as Pug Ismay, were completely against him on his position and it must have been an infuriating, but not altogether new, experience for him. Certain adjustments in the details were readily agreed to but the final step was too much for him to take prior to his visit to Ottawa. While there he talked to the Canadians about it who were good enough to send us a message¹ saying that they were standing firm and they knew he would return to battle and employ “every guile, trick of debate and every emotional plea with his vast repertory”. He finally gave way at the last meeting² and the matter was, I think, satisfactorily settled.

You are familiar from press reports of his plea for a contribution of U.S. troops in the Suez Canal mess. He referred to it as a “token force” and his request was promptly refused. The reaction in Congress to this part of his speech was anything but good and the Press referred to the Four-Power proposal as a logical settlement which the British were inclined to overlook. I think this was unjust as the P.M. actually pressed the Four-Power approach and would obviously welcome it.

Dean, Brad³ and I discussed the Iranian problem with the P.M. and Eden Sunday evening following his arrival and we told them quite frankly how maladroit we thought their handling had been.⁴ The P.M. did not take much part in it, but he was clearly astonished by some of the facts we brought out notably that we had the thing settled except for a ten cent differential during Mosadeq’s visit over here and that the British turned it down and fundamentally hoped to throw Mosadeq’s government out and thereby get a better deal. Anthony got a little irritated at the beating he took from Dean, but I think that they are both aware for the first time of how gavely we regard the situation and how important it is that this oil and especially aviation gas be denied the Russians.

In general, I have a feeling that a considerable amount of education is going to have to be done to overcome his tendency to live completely in the past and to forget or underestimate the enormous changes which have occurred since the war in the rest of the world.

There is every reason to believe that Britain will live up to her commitments to the defense of Western Europe within the limits of her capacities but it seems to me that what is needed is the fanning of the flame of faith in NATO on the part of the British in general and the Prime Minister in particular.

With kindest regards,

Yours ever,

Bob L

⁵

1. Not further identified.
2. See Document 359.
3. Presumably a reference to Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. For a record of this meeting, see Document 332.
5. On Jan. 28 General Eisenhower replied that his reactions to the attitude and condition of Churchill were almost identical with Lovett’s, but added that the Prime Minister still had appeal to great sections of Europe and that the United States should do its best to have him “booming” on the things which seemed necessary for security and tranquility. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, “1916–1952”)