Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100

No. 359
United States Delegation Minutes of the Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, January 18, 1952, 3 p.m.¹

top secret

Washington, January 18, 1952, 3 p.m.

The President and the Prime Minister came into the Cabinet Room at 3: 10 p.m. On the United States side there were, in addition to the President:

• Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
• Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense
• Admiral Fechteler
• Walter Gifford, Ambassador to the United Kingdom
• Joseph Short, Press Secretary
• Charles Murphy, Special Counsel to the President
• David D. Lloyd, Administrative Assistant to the President

On the British side there were, in addition to the Prime Minister:

• Sir William Elliot, Air Marshal
• Sir Roderick McGrigor, First Sea Lord
• Sir Oliver Franks, Ambassador to the United States
• Sir Roger Makins
• Paul Gore-Booth
• Lord Cherwell
• Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet
• Mr. Colville

The President opened the meeting by saying that it was regrettable but all good things must come to an end and that included, he supposed, the Prime Minister’s visit. But we would be sorry to see him leave. The President invited the Prime Minister to bring up whatever else was on his mind.

The Prime Minister said that it has been a pleasant visit for him and that he believed it had had a good effect in placing our common problems in perspective.

The President complimented the Prime Minister on his speech before the Congress.²

The Prime Minister thanked the President and said that he had avoided the thorny thickets that might have been gone into.

The President agreed.

The Prime Minister said that on the Naval question that there was still no agreement.

The President said that he was very sorry about this, and that he had hoped that we would be able to reach agreement on this important question.

The Prime Minister said that Secretary Lovett had stated that it was only NATO that could agree to modification of the commitment to set up the Atlantic Command.

The President said this was right.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped he would not have to take the question to NATO. He said that would involve us in an open dispute; there would be lobbying on both sides among the other nations of NATO to secure adherence to our respective points of view. This would weaken, he said, the unity of our two nations and create an unpleasant situation.

The Prime Minister went on to say that a statement had been drafted on the subject of the Naval Command but that he could not agree to that.³ He was, he said, publicly committed to another position and this was of major political importance in his own country. He said that just before this meeting, he had drafted a little statement of his own which he thought expressed his views on this subject. He then read a brief one paragraph statement to the following effect: His Majesty’s Government was unable to obtain the agreement of the United States to any release from the commitment made by the predecessor Government of the United Kingdom to NATO to establish the Atlantic Command. However, there had been discussions and agreement with respect to greater flexibility in the Eastern area of command and with respect to the jurisdiction of the British Navy over the area out to the 100 fathom line around the British Isles.

The Prime Minister wondered whether this draft statement could be considered as the basis of a statement to be issued at the meeting.

The President said that he was sincerely sorry that no agreement had been reached. He felt that it was regrettable. He asked Secretary Lovett to comment.

Secretary Lovett said that we had long discussions with the British on this subject—in the nature of family talks, and we still remained of different opinions. The Prime Minister had not agreed to the statement which had been drafted at the end of the discussions and the question now was whether we could agree to the language which the Prime Minister had drafted and just now read to the meeting.

The Prime Minister said that he had written the statement just a minute ago and that it could probably be improved.

Sir Oliver Franks gave the Prime Minister’s draft to the President who read it and passed it to Secretary Acheson and Secretary Lovett.

While they were studying the Prime Minister’s draft, the Prime Minister came around the table and laid before the President a copy of a cable just received from England having to do with the Egyptian situation. The cablegram urged that no statement be issued with respect to the Egyptian situation without further consultation between the two Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.

The President assured the Prime Minister that we would make no statement on that subject without further conversations.

Secretary Acheson added that he had just declined to see the Egyptian Ambassador this afternoon.

The Prime Minister intimated that the Egyptian problem was related to Korea. He said the British had only token forces in Korea. They wanted to help all they could in Korea but that their troops were fully occupied—presumably in Egypt. He said it was of great importance that we should keep together in our policy in the Middle East.

While Secretary Lovett and Secretary Acheson continued to study the Prime Minister’s draft, the Prime Minister raised another subject. He referred to the possibility of a conference with Russia. He said he did not think that the Russians wanted such a conference and he believed that if it ever were held, it would take the form of a showdown. The result might be favorable, since the President would come to the conference with all the power of his country behind him, and that might induce the Russians to be reasonable. On the other hand, one could not be sure of this, and the Russians might not be reasonable. He did not think we should assume that in this event the conference should result in immediate war….

The President said that he was in favor of anything that would prevent war…. He referred to our broadcasting activities with respect to the Soviet Union which he said were equivalent to or exceeded the output of our broadcasting networks in this country…. With respect to a conference with Russia, the President said he did not believe the Russians wanted one. He said that his attitude had always been that he would participate in a bona fide conference. He would not go to Russia. He would see the Russians if they would come to Washington.

The Prime Minister said that in this matter he would not do anything to force the President’s hand or to make things more difficult for the President.

The President said he did not think that we should try to bring about a conference that would be a showdown. At the present time, he did not believe that a conference would be useful. In such a conference, the Russians would probably follow the line they are now taking in Paris. He did not think that they were in a conciliatory mood, especially since Vishinsky had just called our principal General in Korea, General Van Fleet, a cannibal.

The Prime Minister wondered how Secretary Lovett and Secretary Acheson were getting along with the statement.

Secretary Acheson said, with reference to the Prime Minister’s draft statement, that he had two difficulties with it. In the first place, as drafted, the statement emphasizes disagreement between the United Kingdom and the United States with regard to the Atlantic Command. In the second place, the statement was inconclusive. It raised questions as to what the next step would be. Secretary Acheson was sure that if the statement were issued in this form, we would be asked what the next step would be and he wondered what the Prime Minister had in mind on that point.

Furthermore, Secretary Acheson wondered whether this was designed to be a joint statement or not.

The Prime Minister said that it would be much better, of course, if a joint statement could be issued.

With regard to what the next step would be, he said it was not his intention to stop the planning of the Atlantic Command. The planning could go on.

The Prime Minister said that he had to make a statement on this subject. He could not stay in public life if he did not.

The President said that he wished that agreement could be reached on the statement.

The Prime Minister went on to say that he would not have entered into the agreement made by the Labor Government on this subject. He said that he could not have assented to it.

He said that the agreement to have an Atlantic Command had been worked out at a low staff level. It had not been considered at the proper governmental level before it was entered into by the predecessor government in England. He said he had discussed the matter with the Canadians on his recent visit to Canada.⁴ The Canadians felt that they were bound by the agreement made by the earlier government but they hoped, nevertheless, that the British could work out a better arrangement. He said the Canadians had emphasized that the Atlantic Command proposal was not a Canadian proposal. It had been said that they initiated it but this was not true. Furthermore, the agreement had not been taken up at the proper level but had been entered into by military officers at a low level.

Secretary Acheson asked the Prime Minister whether, if his draft were agreed to, he would want SACLANT to go forward.

The Prime Minister said that he did want the planning of SACLANT to go forward. He did not wish to bring the matter up before NATO. For one thing, he said, the United States had a better lobby in NATO than the British.

Secretary Acheson said that he thought he could propose a statement to which the Prime Minister could agree. Such a statement would begin with the fact that the Prime Minister and the President and their advisers have had discussions about the Atlantic Command. It would then make the point that both the President and the Prime Minister had agreed to recommend to NATO certain changes in the original plan, namely, an extension of British control to the 100 fathom line and greater flexibility in the eastern area of the Command.

Such a statement, said Secretary Acheson, might then continue to say that these agreed on changes were not enough to satisfy the Prime Minister; that there would be further discussions on the matter but that the Command, and the setting up of the Command, would go forward.

The Prime Minister said that he would like to see something like this drafted.

The President agreed.

The President told Secretary Acheson and Secretary Lovett to work on the matter in his office.

The Prime Minister designated Sir Norman Brook and Sir Oliver Franks.

At this moment Secretary Acheson, Secretary Lovett and Admiral Fechteler left the room together with Sir Oliver Franks, Sir Norman Brook, Air Marshal Elliot and Admiral McGrigor. These gentlemen convened in the President’s office and Secretary Acheson set out to dictate a statement along the lines he had proposed.

This drafting session began about 3:45 P.M.

The President then brought into the Cabinet Room a number of large color photographs of the Potsdam Conference showing all the principals and advisers seated around a table.

The Prime Minister autographed these pictures at the request of the President. He complained that the picture showed only the back of his head.

The President said that he would send to the Prime Minister some other pictures showing more of the features of the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister thought it was a shame just to show his bald spot but he said he was indifferent as to whether the other pictures showed him in full face or in profile.

After this incident, and while the drafting group was in the President’s office, the President and the Prime Minister had a friendly and informal off-the-record talk.

These notes will set forth the main features of this off-the-record talk, but only for the President’s use. They will not be furnished to the Departments except with the President’s approval.

The President began by saying that he had gone to Potsdam and he knew that the Prime Minister had gone to Potsdam with the kindest feelings in the world toward the Soviet Union and with a sincere desire to reach agreement. He said the first warning of the Russian attitude had come when an Allied General had come in from Romania and described what the Russians were doing in that country.

The President then referred to the action of Tito threatening Trieste and the Prime Minister recalled that the President had been “very stiff” with Tito about that.

The President then recalled the ultimatum, as he called it, with respect to Russian troops in Iran. He then continued by saying that the Russians had broken nearly all the agreements made at Potsdam and all those made at Yalta.

The Prime Minister agreed.

The President concluded that while he still wished to reach agreement with the Russians, he was not going to give the world over to them, not so long as he was President.

The Prime Minister expressed approval and said that he would not do anything to force the President’s hand or make difficulties for him in dealing with the Russians.

Lord Cherwell said that with respect to the broadcasting activities which the President had referred to earlier, that the people of Russia were sympathetic to us but that they did not have sufficient receiving sets. Lord Cherwell said that he understood that there was a set in each village but that it was under official control and that the people had to listen to the programs that the set was tuned to. He thought that we should consider the possibility of dropping a lot of little receiving sets for private use.

The Prime Minister agreed with these ideas and then referred to the question of air warfare with the Soviet Union. He said that he had been impressed by the plans which had been shown to him this morning by the United States Air Force. He wondered if the Russians were making as careful an analysis of the problem of strategic bombing as we were. He said he hoped the Russians were doing so, since this would impress upon them the gravity of their own situation.

. . . . . . .

At this point, in order to hear better and converse more easily, the Prime Minister moved around to the President’s side of the table and occupied the chair next to him.

The President said that it had been very courageous of President Roosevelt to devote resources and funds to the atomic bomb when it was only a gamble. He said that it would cost $2,600,000,000 before the first explosion.

. . . . . . .

The Prime Minister said that he was stressing the production of fighter planes in England. He said that was their principal problem—to have enough fighter planes to protect the base. They had some need for strategic bombing units in the British defense organization but not a great deal.

The President brought up the question of the cost of producing airplanes. He pointed out that a bomber costs twenty times what it used to. He said it was a terrible burden on a country to have to produce this kind of weapon.

The Prime Minister agreed.

Lord Cherwell chimed in to say that in the last war they had figured that a bomber was good for only about fifteen sorties. At present prices, this was an awful lot to pay for fifteen sorties. It was as much as a destroyer.

The President said it was as much as a battleship.

Lord Cherwell commented on the inaccuracy of bombing generally. In 1939, the Royal Air Force said they could bomb very accurately but in practice and under combat conditions, their misses were fantastic.

The President commented on the general inaccuracy of bombing, and the high speed and great cost of modern planes.

The Prime Minister said that he was asking his military people to draw a clear-cut line between improvisability and the lack of improvisability. He was asking them to concentrate on the production of things which could not be improvised or built in a short time. He was asking them to put emphasis on building Centurion tanks and jet fighters.

Lord Cherwell said that he had been having some interesting conversations with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary of the Army said that forty per cent of his procurement was of vehicles.

The Prime Minister said the military always try to have lorries, trucks and cars produced well in advance, when those are the things they could get most readily. He wanted them to concentrate on long-range items.

The President said that the amount of transport required to carry on modern warfare, as in Korea, was fantastic. He said that for every division in line, there had to be a full division of equipment in the pipe line at all times. The stuff was just shot away and wasted as it reached the front. He said the amount of traffic going to the front was fantastic.

The President continued saying that one of the most interesting things about the Korean operations was the fact that all of the sixteen or eighteen nations were getting along so well together. This meant additional problems for the supply line. We had to use different kinds of food for the different national units. Special things for the Mohammadans and plenty of roast beef for the English.

The Prime Minister said that he had never seen any meat eaters like the American Army.

The President said that this defense effort presented an awful problem for the national budget. He said that 77 per cent of the budget was military in nature or had relation to the possibility of war, and that was a real strain on the country.

The Prime Minister said it reminded him of the saying of Cromwell, that sometimes there is a choice between being and well being for a nation. At this time, for England, it was a question of being. They would have to put their effort on that.

The Prime Minister said that in Canada recently, he had been talking to the Canadian Minister of War who had just come back from Korea (Mr. Brook-Claxton?). This gentleman said that he did not think that the Chinese really wanted to reach a truce now.

The President said that he was afraid that might be the case but we had to go through with the negotiations. He said that the losses of the Chinese have been terrible; that we had killed a million of them and that by million he did not mean just casualties but actual men killed. He said this kind of a loss was a real blow to any nation.

The Prime Minister agreed. He said those forty to one losses which the Chinese suffered were terrible. They had been mowed down and reduced to a rubble or a pulp. However, he thought that the shock of these losses had now worn off. The Chinese have been negotiating for sometime and they were now thinking of themselves as dealing with us as military equals, haggling over points and forgetting the disadvantage they suffer under.

Lord Cherwell added that they apparently were planning to incur similar losses elsewhere.

Referring again to atomic energy, the Prime Minister said that he understood the Canadians were making great progress in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The President said we were too. He said the future was full of possibilities. It was just like the days when the Wright brothers had flown their kite down at Kitty Hawk. No one could then have foreseen the future of aviation.

There followed some reminiscences about the early planes with the elevator in front. Lord Cherwell said he had flown in one.

The President said “Hap” Arnold had landed one on the White House lawn in the days of President Taft.

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Colville to find out how much longer the drafting group were going to take.

The President said that he was enjoying the talk and was in no hurry. He said he had had no chance before really to sit down and talk with the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister agreed, but said that they had had a good talk on the Williamsburg and that was a truly memorable evening.⁵

Mr. Colville came back and reported that the drafting group needed about another thirty seconds.

The Prime Minister asked the President if he expected to get any rest soon.

The President explained that he had the Budget Message to send up. This was the last of his big messages. Then he had six or seven special messages to the Congress to prepare. He said he hoped to get down to Florida for two weeks in March.

The Prime Minister thought that would be nice. He inquired whether the President always took the Williamsburg to Key West. The President said he did. He added that when Mrs. Truman and Margaret came, they always wanted to take the Williamsburg to Cuba. He said that he, as President, could not go to Cuba. If he went anywhere, it always upset the apple cart. He recalled his trip to Brazil and Mexico.⁶

He said it had created great crowds in the cities in those countries. He said that in the summer of 1950, he had been planning to make a trip to Chile to return the visit of the two Chilean Presidents to this country and that he had hoped to go from there in the battleship Missouri to Australia and New Zealand—countries which he had always wanted to see.

The Prime Minister was appreciative of this idea.

The President said that he did not suppose that now he could ever make such a trip.

The Prime Minister said that he had never been east of Calcutta—that he had always hoped he could go to the Far East before he died. He said he particularly wanted to see Japan. He said he thought it must be a wonderful country with the mountains and the color and the big volcanos.

The President said he would also like to come to England.

The Prime Minister said, well you must come then.

The Prime Minister added that they were through electioneering in England now, that the people were tired of it. He said it was a great strain when an election could be called at any time. It was like walking under a tree with a jaguar on the limb waiting to pounce. But he thought they were through for a while.

The President said that this was going to be a very political year here. In England elections only take two months, here they take most of the year.

The Prime Minister pointed out the people seem to enjoy the excitement.

The President said he thought they did.

The President said that in the last campaign, he had traveled 31,700 miles. He had estimated that he had talked to seven million people and that he had been seen by seven million more. This was in addition to the radio audiences of twenty-five to thirty million.

The Prime Minister was very much interested in “canvassing” on such a large scale. He said that he had never made a house to house canvass in his constituency. He had stuck to making speeches from the public platform. He asked about the train and the President’s schedule during the campaign.

The President went into detail about back platform speeches and the frequent speeches at night meetings.

The Prime Minister was very much impressed.

The President said he had put his staff to bed but he himself had gained five pounds.

The President recalled the Prime Minister’s visit at the time of the Fulton College speech,⁷ and the way the Prime Minister had taught him how to play poker.

The Prime Minister apologized for his peculiar brand of the game. He said that he thought playing cards was a very good way to get your mind off your problems and to relax, but that it was not as good as painting. He said painting was the best way to get your mind off your troubles, even if you were only painting a jar on a table. He recommended it, if you like painting.

At 4:15 p.m. the drafting group came back into the Cabinet Room and the meeting resumed.

Secretary Acheson read the agreed draft statement (a copy is attached to these minutes).

The Prime Minister said, “I agree.”

The President suggested issuing the statement as a joint statement by the President and the Prime Minister from the White House Press Room immediately.

The Prime Minister thought this would be fine since it would reach England in time for the morning papers.

The Prime Minister then said to Admiral Fechteler that he had not met the Atlantic commander. He said that he was not altogether sure who it would be but he had heard Admiral McCormick mentioned.

Admiral Fechteler said that it would be Admiral McCormick and that he would pay his respects to the Prime Minister as soon as he took over the command.

The Prime Minister said that he would be glad to see him and that the admiralty would turn out to greet him with full honors.

After one or two pleasantries, the meeting adjourned at 4: 20 p.m.

The President shook hands with all the members of the British delegation there present and wished the Prime Minister bon voyage.

The Prime Minister said goodby to everyone there on the American side and shook their hands.

[Attachment]

Statement Agreed by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill⁸

Washington, January 18, 1952.

The President and the Prime Minister with their advisors have had several discussions relating to the arrangements about the Atlantic Command recommended by NATO and accepted by the late Government of the United Kingdom. As a result of their discussions they agreed that His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government would recommend to NATO certain alterations in the arrangements designed to extend the United Kingdom home command to the 100 fathom line. They also agreed on the desirability of certain changes which would provide greater flexibility for the control of operations in the Eastern Atlantic. These changes however do not go the full way to meet the Prime Minister’s objections to the original arrangements. Nevertheless the Prime Minister, while not withdrawing his objections, expressed his readiness to allow the appointment of a Supreme Commander to go forward in order that a command structure may be created and enabled to proceed with the necessary planning in the Atlantic area. He reserved the right to bring forward modifications for the consideration of NATO, if he so desired, at a later stage.

1. The minutes were dictated by Lloyd. For Secretary Acheson’s brief but colorful recollection of this meeting, see Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 601–603.
2. For the text of Prime Minister Churchill’s address to a joint session of Congress on Jan. 17, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 28, 1952, pp. 116–120.
3. The statement under reference here is that which Churchill tore up before entering the meeting; see the editorial note, supra.
4. Regarding Prime Minister Churchill’s visit to Ottawa, see Document 357.
5. For records of the dinner on the S.S. Williamsburg on Jan. 5, see Documents 329 and 330.
6. President Truman visited Mexico City in March 1947, and Rio de Janeiro in September of the same year. For a report on his address to the closing session of the Inter-American Conference at Rio, Sept. 2, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. viii, p. 78.
7. Mar. 5, 1946, at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri.
8. Released to the press on Jan. 18.