Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

611.41/1–852

No. 345
Memorandum of Conversations, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)¹

secret

[Washington,] January 8, 1952.

Subject:

• Churchill Talks

Participants:

• Ambassador Bonnet
• Mr. de Juniac
• Assistant Secretary Perkins
• Mr. G. M. Godley

Ambassador Bonnet called at his request last evening to inquire regarding the Churchill conversations and asked if I could indicate to him the general tenor of the discussions and review briefly what had transpired.

I told the Ambassador that we were of the opinion that the principal purpose in Mr. Churchill’s coming to this country was to become personally acquainted with the American leaders and, probably more important, to increase Great Britain’s prestige both in this country and throughout the world. He had been out of touch with world events for the last five years and he desired to establish the same kind of personal relationships that he had maintained during the war. We did not believe that Mr. Churchill was seeking any specific agreements or conclusions and we anticipated that the conversations would be quite general and broad. Yesterday’s two sessions with the Prime Minister and his private talks with the President appeared to have confirmed these beliefs and the conversations so far had been quite general.

The first subject of yesterday morning’s sessions had been raw materials, particularly steel.² The Prime Minister indicated that the United Kingdom needed steel and that she might be able to help us out in our shortage of nonferrous metals. It was agreed that Mr. Wilson and Lord Cherwell would pursue this matter further with United States and United Kingdom experts and some hope was expressed on our side by Mr. Wilson that we might be able to help the British out.

Mr. Churchill also said that the United Kingdom was not seeking economic assistance for internal purposes. He admitted however that the defense effort was causing grave economic difficulties and that his Government would not be abashed to accept aid for defense which was a common responsibility of the West.

The other subject discussed in the morning was the streamlining of the NAT Organization, the appointment of a Director General, and the assembly of non-military NATO groups in one capital. The British indicated in this connection that they would be very glad if all the civilian NATO organizations were in London and we for our part indicated that Paris might be preferable. This matter was not settled and it was agreed that it would be the subject of further study by appropriate British and American officials. At this point Ambassador Bonnet interrupted to inquire whether the personality of the Director General had been agreed upon, to which I replied that only the question of the creation of a Director Generalship had been discussed and that the person to fill the job had not been mentioned. I also said that there had been no discussion of the terms of reference and this matter would probably have to be worked out by all the deputies.

Yesterday afternoon’s session dealt with only two subjects, namely the rifle and SACLANT.³

Discussion of the rifle indicated that there had been considerable misunderstanding on both sides regarding this matter in that both sides were under the impression that the other desired its weapon to be adopted as the standard NATO rifle. The Prime Minister pointed out that this was not the British position in that they had a large number of their .303 weapons that could not be presently scrapped and we pointed out the same with regard to our M–1. It was agreed that both sides would continue the research on a basic rifle and that it was necessary for the West to come up with the best possible weapon for eventual NATO-wide standardization.

The discussion regarding SACLANT was fruitless. Neither side was able to convince the other of its position and unfortunately Mr. Churchill did not seem to grasp the necessity of a unified command structure. He kept referring to the World War II situation when each navy had its own commander in its area who worked well together. If there were any disputes they would then be referred to “their chiefs” who settled the matters among themselves. One interesting thing was the fact that Mr. Churchill did not seem to object to an American being in command of a greater part of the North Atlantic in that we had the majority of the ships in that area. He just did not, however, see the necessity for one complicated command structure.

This evening I continued the discussions with the Ambassador and informed him of the day’s conversations. The morning session opened with discussion of the Middle East.⁴ The first subject was Egypt and it was pointed out that there were two problems connected with that country, namely the Sudan and the Middle East command. It was generally agreed that nothing could be done at present with regard to these two items and the situation should simmer for a while. Turkey was discussed for some time and it was agreed that after Lisbon,⁵ Turkey should be brought more actively into Middle East command discussions. With regard to Iran, Mr. Churchill indicated the principal problem there was the question of the price to be paid for the oil. Both he and Mr. Eden expressed interest in continued exploration of a possible solution through the International Bank.

The Far East was then discussed and General Bradley briefed Mr. Churchill on the entire Korean campaign. This took considerable time in that the General described the first retreat, first advance, the second retreat and the second advance. There was also considerable time devoted to bringing the British up-to-date on the Armistice talks and the point was made that Vishinsky’s recent maneuver to have the Armistice talks transferred to Paris seemed to be an attempt to drive a wedge between the Allies and to achieve other advantages through broadening the scope of the talks. Southeast Asia was then discussed and it was agreed that the situation there is very serious. Both Mr. Churchill and the President recognized the great efforts being made by the French in Indochina and the fact that the load she was carrying in Southeast Asia bore a direct relationship to possible efforts which she might make in Europe. Mr. Eden mentioned Malaya, pointing out the efforts the British were making there and the economic importance of that area to the United Kingdom. Ambassador Bonnet interrupted at this point to inquire whether any decisions were taken as to Southeast Asia, to which I replied in the negative, pointing out that while everyone recognized the seriousness of the situation, no one had any ideas as to possible solutions.

The conversation then shifted to Formosa and Mr. Churchill said that he warmly applauded our action in protecting the Chinese Nationalists of Formosa, pointing out that we just could not permit the slaughter of over 300,000 Nationalists who had fought on our side both during the last war and since then. Mr. Churchill also said that if he had been in the government, he would not have recognized a Communist China and if they had been recognized, he would have broken relations when Chinese forces entered the Korean war. As it is now however, there is no occasion to break relations.

In the afternoon⁶ the conversation reverted to raw materials and the American side was able to indicate that we would be willing to supply more steel to the United Kingdom and the British indicated that they thought more tin could be sent to this country. It was agreed that during the last three quarters of this year we would receive 15,000 tons of aluminum from Canada which we would repay in 1953. Mr. Churchill then spoke about copper and nickel and said he thought it should be possible for the Commonwealth to assist us in these two items. This discussion became inconclusive however when he pointed out that the nickel came from Canada and the copper was still underground in Africa.

The European Army was the next subject on the agenda and Mr. Churchill expressed concern regarding the present setup of the European Army. He stated however that a European Federation is essential and that therefore he would do everything possible to support the European Army and would speak to Belgium and Holland on this point. There was considerable discussion of the relative merits of such a European force and Mr. Churchill pointed out that what is really required is the will to fight which can best be maintained by supporting the national spirit. We pointed out that in Korea the troops had certainly shown a will to fight even when they were small national units.

Both the Americans and the British agreed that it was essential to get Germany into the European Army. Ambassador Bonnet of course expressed considerable interest in this portion of the conversation and asked several questions on what would be done with the Benelux countries. I pointed out that it was agreed that we and the British would coordinate our discussions with the Benelux and would seek to overcome their objections to the present area of agreement between France, Italy, and Germany. The Ambassador appeared to be quite pleased with this information.

In concluding the meetings, the question of the strengthening of NATO was again raised and the location of the non-military NATO defense bodies was again inconclusively discussed.

The Ambassador thanked me for this information and asked if he were correct in his assumption that the meetings had been not only cordial but also successful. I told him he was quite correct and that I had the very distinct impression that there exists between our leaders and the present British Government a better meeting of minds and comprehension than previously. Although it was quite apparent that the present British leaders suffer from lack of information on the developments of the last five years, they are nevertheless much more practical and less doctrinaire than their predecessors. This was indicated for example by Mr. Churchill’s welcoming of our defense of Formosa and his views on the recognition of Communist China.

1. Drafted by Godley. The conversations took place at the Department of State on the nights of Jan. 7 and 8 following the conclusion of talks with the British on those days.
2. For a record of the morning session of Jan. 7, see Document 333.
3. For a record of the afternoon session on Jan. 7, see Document 337.
4. For a record of the morning session on Jan. 8, see Document 340.
5. For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, held at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.
6. For a record of the afternoon session on Jan. 8, see the United States Delegation Minutes, supra.