740.5/9–1554: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State 1
1096. Be Embtels 1056 September 11, and 1078 September 14.2 [Page 1195] Events of immediate future should throw considerable light on Mendes’ sincerity. When talking with him on September 13 we had not yet seen report of Eden–Benelux talks and were unaware how far British were prepared to go re Brussels Treaty and were therefore concerned at extent to which Mendes seemed to be putting his eggs in British basket. Our feeling was that if he were sincere in seeking practicable alternative to EDC, certainly British participation would be major element in securing acceptance by French Assembly. It seemed on other hand that if he were insincere, he might well be laying groundwork for another Brussels meeting like his last one, i.e., if Britain would not go as far as French desire in new arrangement with France and Germany, he could again say in effect, “I knew what was essential for Assembly approval and did my best to get it but no one would help me”.
Jebb states Eden had mentioned Brussels Treaty to Massigli just before his departure and Massigli had stated Mendes was thinking along similar lines. So far indications are therefore that he is acting in good faith. If by chance he is not, this should quickly become apparent during his talks with Eden.
Principal question is whether Mendes will accept German membership in NATO as well as in Brussels Treaty. At first view French politicians will undoubtedly consider latter as modification of little NATO concept and will grasp it as alternative rather than supplement to former as Schuman did with EDC. However, events since 1950 and uncertainty as to French and other European policies in future make it more important than ever that Germany be in framework where it is directly linked with US, an advantage which other great advantages of EDC make us willing to forego temporarily but which could hardly be foregone in favor of Brussels Treaty.
In any event French acceptance will depend primarily upon provisions for limitation and control, whether embodied in NATO mechanism, revised Brussels Treaty or elsewhere.