Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/9–853: Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, September 8, 1953—2 p.m.

Coled 47. Limit distribution. Adenauer’s magnificent victory¹ should enable us to create situation forcing French Government to present EDC for ratification this fall. We should immediately consult with Aldrich, Conant, Dillon, Hughes and other Ambassadors on tactics we might follow to bring this about. Would suggest that at Luxembourg meeting² reports be made as to how results of German election have affected ratification prospects in countries involved. Am leaving for Germany tonight to see Conant and Chancellor. Our first problem, assuming ratification debate in French Assembly this fall, is to begin immediately to help resolve those remaining conditions French Government has explicitly or implicitly established to ratification of EDC treaty.

1. On Saar problem, believe Chancellor should as soon as practicable negotiate at Laniel/Bidault level. A French-German agreement on Saar may be very difficult if Quai d’Orsay officials instead of Cabinet Ministers are responsible for negotiations and also if they persist in their efforts to base treaty for European political community on coalition rather than on supranational approach.

2. Special provisions for support costs for French forces in Germany within Framework of EDC could be time-consuming negotiation. German EDC delegation should be prevailed upon to make concrete proposals giving French forces a status for nine months along lines of that foreseen for French in contractual agreements. An understanding on related problem of support costs for British and United States forces for a period of nine months after implementation of EDC treaty will probably also have to be reached before EDC treaty can be ratified.

3. German EDC delegation should submit immediately concrete proposals to EDC interim committee on organization and procedures insuring efficient receipt of end-item aid destined for EDC forces of German origin from first day EDC treaty goes into effect.

4. Draft bilateral agreement between United States and EDC on end-item assistance is substantially completed. We believe it preferable to delay final agreement until we have obtained concrete proposal from EDC interim committee on how end-item assistance, particularly that destined for forces of German origin, is to be handled during immediate period after ratification.

5. Understanding on conditions of protocol for UK association with EDC has been substantially reached but still needs to be drafted in final form. Before protocol is actually signed, we may need to take final position on question to making duration of NATO treaty identical with that of EDC. Now that British support for immediate ratification of EDC treaty firmly established, I believe it might be useful for us to explore means of bringing our combined influence to bear on early resolution of questions which might impede ratification or implementation of EDC treaty.

6. Failure in negotiations to create European political community could jeopardize prospects of French ratification. Nevertheless it may be inadvisable to press for any concrete agreement on European political community until unequivocal support of French Cabinet for a treaty based on a strong executive with supranational powers is brought to bear on Quai d’Orsay officials conducting negotiations.

7. Major obstruction to ratification continuously stressed by French should now be eliminated by agreement of United States to provide additional help to French in meeting burden of war in Indochina. It should be possible in these negotiations obtain definite commitment from French Government (if advisable expressed in written instrument separate from Indochina statement) that they will proceed with vote on ratification this fall. French Government should appreciate that United States administration cannot obtain necessary support from Congress in finding later funds for Indochina if further procrastination by France prevents creation and implementation of a firm European policy. Also a pledge of this sort from French Government, written not oral, would strengthen hand of EDC proponents in Cabinet against any possible later malingering in Quai d’Orsay.³

Bruce

1. National elections were held in the Federal Republic on Sept. 6 as a result of which Adenauer’s Christian Democrat Union won a clear majority of the seats in the Bundestag with 45.2 percent of the votes cast. Further documentation on the elections is presented in volume vii .
2. Reference is to the European Chiefs of Mission meeting at Luxembourg reported in telegram Colux 3 from Luxembourg, Sept. 20, p. 808.
3. In telegram 1090 from Paris, Sept. 16, Dillon reported that during the course of a 45-minute talk with Bidault the previous day the French Foreign Minister had stated that Adenauer’s victory was the necessary stimulus to going ahead with European integration, including EDC. “He is now convinced,” Dillon added, “that France should ratify EDC prior to the end of the year, and he is prepared to devote his full time to accomplishing this result.” All was dependent on a Saar settlement “but Bidault said that he got on well with Adenauer, and he was confident that there would be no difficulty in his working out a European settlement with Adenauer”. Bidault’s position, Dillon observed, “is a dramatic change of front as far as tactics are concerned. While he has always maintained his support for EDC, he has never before given a date for ratification” (740.5/9–1653).