740.5/7–2153
Memorandum by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs (Wolf)
EDC Ratification Prospects and Consideration of Alternatives
As to the prospects for EDC ratification, our attitude continues to be cautiously optimistic. As of this writing, the chances appear good that the Dutch will ratify in their lower house before the summer recess. The Belgian parliament is scheduled to convene early after their summer recess and to ratify in September. France continues to be the major question mark, but there are several favorable signs. Dutch and Belgian ratification, if it occurs, will be very helpful. The Laniel Government imposed only three conditions on ratification, only one of which—the Saar—should cause any real difficulty. The other two, British association with EDC and signature of the French protocols, should not cause any real delay. No one knows, of course, with any certainty what will be the effects of the four-power talks in the [Page 799] fall; however, if things go as we want them to, the talks should provide a clear demonstration that Soviet intentions are basically unchanged. In this case, EDC ratification should acquire a new impetus, with the chances good for entry into force by the end of the year.1
As to alternatives to the EDC, there has been consideration of possible alternatives in the National Security Council2 and in the Department, but all such exercises have come back to the same conclusion: that there is no really good alternative to the EDC. Three general types of alternatives have been considered, each of which has been rejected for different reasons. First, German national armed forces in whatever form are certain to be more objectionable to the French than the EDC. If we were to attempt to bull through German rearmament unilaterally, the net increase in European defence potential would be substantially reduced by the negative French reaction. Second, any plan for the neutralization or unification of Germany, whether armed or not, would entail sacrifices and risks out-weighing any possible gains. It would deny German strength to the West and open up the whole of Germany to Soviet subversion. Finally, the alternative of falling back on a “peripheral strategy” is a counsel of despair which has such obviously serious consequences for our long run security that no thought can be given to it while there is hope of making Europe secure.
Present policy, therefore, is not to consider any of these alternatives at this time, because there is nothing to be gained by considering these clearly less desirable alternatives to the EDC. To do so will arouse suspicions and fears among our friends that we have written off the EDC. If, however, some event should take place which made it clear that EDC is not coming into being or will be long delayed, we will then be faced with a crisis situation in which we must decide among the less [Page 800] desirable alternatives in order to see what we can do to obtain our basic and long range objectives. Whatever solution is worked out will have to be based on the principle of voluntary French-German collaboration in a united Europe. The first choice, but one which is likely to be more unacceptable than the EDC to the French would be immediate German membership in NATO. Failing this, the U.S. should immediately begin negotiating in the light of the emergency situation then prevailing to make new arrangements for German participation in Western defense.
The EDC continues to have strong support from the President, the Secretary, the Under Secretary and everyone else responsible for it. Pentagon spokesmen have also continued to hold the line for the EDC, although frequently being rather outspoken about the delay in ratification. As far as I know, Defense is not doing any planning on EDC alternatives. There is, of course, at lower levels in the military establishment a good deal of impatience over delay and dissatisfaction with the alleged unworkability of the EDC.
This is the situation as it now stands. If there are any changes, we will keep you informed so that you can take account of it.
- The EDC Treaty was not finally ratified by any country in 1953, though it passed the lower houses of both the Netherlands and Belgian parliaments.↩
- At its 159th meeting on Aug. 13, the National Security Council, after making amendments, adopted the statement of policy in NSC 160, “United States Position With Respect to Germany”. The President approved the amended statement that day, and it was issued as NSC 160/1 for implementation. NSC 160/1 stated that the EDC was a vital ingredient in the national policy toward Germany as it “is designed to harmonize three aims:(1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2) the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West”. NSC 160/1 proceeded to note that “various factors, and especially French and Italian hesitation” had delayed ratification, and added “The United States should support with all available means the creation of the European Community and the ratification of the EDC Treaty. No satisfactory substitute for this solution has yet been found.” If and when it became clear that the EDC could not be realized or would be indefinitely postponed, NSC 160/1 recommended as a preferable course West German membership in NATO, but observed that French concurrence for this course of action seemed, at the moment, “unlikely”. The Financial Appendix to NSC 160/1 did presume ratification of the EDC by Nov. 1, 1953. Further documentation on NSC 160/1 is presented in volume vii .↩