L/UNA files, “Human Rights—Conventions and
Treaties—1949–1965”
Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Phleger) and the Assistant Secretary
of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)
to the Secretary of
State1
confidential
[Washington,] February 18, 1953.
- Subject:
- United States Policy Regarding Draft International Covenants on Human
Rights
Since the meeting in your office last week,2 we have discussed further with Mrs.
Lord3
the problem of a change in United States policy toward the Human Rights
Covenants. The memorandum which is attached has been prepared in the light
of these discussions. It sets forth arguments for and arguments against a
change in the policy of support for the Covenants. It then goes on to
suggest three possible courses of action which might be followed if a
decision is made to change the policy which this Government has pursued up
to the present time. These courses are considered in terms of their
effectiveness in accomplishing a change in United States policy with the
least damage to our public position at home and abroad.
When a decision is reached on the question of basic policy and on the course
to be followed if a change in policy is decided upon, we expect to work with
Mrs. Lord further on the preparation of a general
policy statement for her to make in the Human Rights Commission at its
forthcoming session in Geneva.
If a decision is made to change United States policy toward the Covenants, it
has occurred to us that it might be useful to include in a letter of
instructions to Mrs. Lord prior to her departure for
Geneva the following elements: (1) a recital of United States efforts for
several years on drafting the Covenants in the Human Rights Commission,
which has been proceeding under instructions from the General Assembly; (2)
a statement of our view that codification of human rights in the Covenants
is not an appropriate and effective way of furthering the observance of
human rights throughout the world at the present stage in international
relations; (3) an authorization to the United States representative to put
forward methods other than the Covenants for appropriate action through the
United Nations to further the goals proclaimed in the Declaration of Human
Rights; and (4) statements of the importance attached by this Government to
the pursuit of human-rights goal through appropriate procedures in the
United Nations and of wholehearted support for suitable steps to this end.
In the event of a decision to change existing United States
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policy toward the Covenants, the change
would presumably be foreshadowed if not announced in your testimony before
the Senate committee holding hearings on the Bricker
amendments to the Constitution. It is, therefore, our thought that you might
wish to make a public release of the letter of instructions to Mrs.
Lord before her departure. Public indications of a
changed policy, in the hearings on the Bricker
amendments and in a letter to Mrs. Lord, could be
helpful in reassuring large numbers of people in this country about United
States participation in the United Nations and could prepare the ground for
Mrs. Lord’s work at the session of the Human Rights
Commission by making it clear that her actions in Geneva stem from
instructions given by the highest authorities in this Government.
[Attachment]
[Washington,] February 17, 1953.
United States Policy Regarding Draft International
Covenants on Human Rights4
i. should present united states policy in support
of the draft covenants be changed?
A. Arguments For:
- 1.
- It seems unlikely at the present stage in international relations
that the observance of human rights throughout the world will be
furthered by means of international agreements which lack real
enforcement provisions. At the present time progress can best be
made, not through the imposition of legal obligations, but through
means of public discussion and persuasion.
- 2.
- It is highly problematical that even the Covenant on Civil and
Political Eights can gain the consent of the U.S. Senate to
ratification.
- 3.
- It is by no means clear that a significant number of countries
whose existing standards in the human rights field would be affected
by the Covenants, would ratify them and actually give effect to
their provisions.
- 4.
- The Covenants, once adopted and in force among some states, could
work to the disadvantage of United States interests, whether this
country became a party or not. The Covenants would be a source of
propaganda attack on positions taken by the United States and on
conditions within this country. The Covenants might contain
provisions
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on economic
self-determination and the right of nationalization which would be
detrimental to United States interests in certain areas
abroad.
- 5.
- Continued United States effort in support of the Human Rights
Covenants might appear, at least to some observers and critics in
this country, as inconsistent with the Administration’s policy on
civil rights in the United States, where the emphasis is now on
persuasion as against any new federal civil rights
legislation.
- 6.
- The Covenants are under attack by large and important groups in
this country such as the American Bar Association and a number of
members of the U.S. Senate. For the administration to press ahead
with the Covenants would tend to keep alive and strengthen support
for the Bricker amendments to the
Constitution.
B. Arguments Against:
- 1.
- The United States has believed that continued friendly relations
among nations depends in part upon the observance of human rights
throughout the world, and that the draft Covenants will be a means
by which progress may be made in this field. The United States has
therefore for several years supported the idea of incorporating
basic civil and political rights in a binding international
instrument. A change in position now would be difficult to
explain.
- 2.
- Sentiment in other countries, especially those of Latin America
and the Middle and Far East, strongly favors the Covenant. United
States support for the Covenants has helped in our relations with
those countries, which together have a majority in the General
Assembly. To withdraw support from the Covenants would have a marked
negative effect on these relations.
- 3.
- To withdraw support from the Covenants would be interpreted by at
least some other countries as a step backward in the world effort to
promote universal observance of human rights. Countries unfriendly
to the United States, particularly the Soviet bloc, would be
presented with a propaganda weapon for use in the cold war, which we
could expect them to exploit particularly in under-developed
areas.
- 4.
- Withdrawal of United States support of the Human Rights Covenants
will not necessarily prevent their completion. United States
interest requires that the final texts of the Covenants, in the
event that they are accepted by some countries, be in as
satisfactory a form as possible. United States efforts to this end
will be less effective if we have withdrawn support from the
Covenants.
- 5.
- A considerable body of organized opinion in the United States
favors support for the Covenants.
- 6.
- The Covenants would not increase federal power over the states in
the human-rights field. The United States has been insisting on the
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inclusion of a
federal-state clause in the Covenants, by which the existing
federal-state relationship would remain the same.
II. in the event of a shift in united states policy
away from active support of the covenants, the problem of how best
to implement the new policy must be considered. there are a number
of possible courses for giving effect to such will suggest three
varying and represenative possibilities, giving the arguments for
and against each.
A. The United States would invite United Nations Members engaged in
drafting the Covenants to take stock of their efforts and consider
whether long experience has not shown that it is difficult or impossible
to produce mutually satisfactory instruments which will at the same time
operate effectively to promote human rights; the United States would
express its view that now is not the propitious time for seeking the
codification of human-rights standards in such general form as the
Covenants, that a greater degree of general acceptance of goals in this
field must be achieved before the time will be ripe. The United States
would urge that the United Nations give attention and emphasis to means
other than the Covenants for making progress toward the goals set forth
in the Declaration of Human Rights; the United States would suggest
consideration of such means as (i) a human-rights rapporteur designated by the Human Rights Commission to survey
and report on the progress being made in the different countries, the
results of his study to be discussed by the Commission with appropriate
attention to special problems and systematic denial of rights; (ii)
periodic reporting by member governments, with the assistance of
national advisory groups, on forward steps being taken in their
respective countries, such reports to be discussed as appropriate by the
Human Rights Commission; (iii) the provision of advisory services,
through a panel designated by the Human Rights Commission, to countries
desiring what amounts to technical assistance in the human rights field.
In view of the instructions given to the Human Rights Commission by the
General Assembly, and in view of the likelihood that other members of
the Commission would wish nevertheless to proceed with work on the
Covenants, the United States would continue to participate in the work
of drafting despite its general position on principle expressed
above.
1. Arguments For:
- (a)
- This would be a wholly candid position, making a clean break with
the past where experience has led the United States to conclusions
different from those held by this Government four or five years
ago.
- (b)
- The position would have maximum influence in drawing support away
from the Bricker amendments.
- (c)
- It comprises elements of positive policy which would minimize the
difficulties to be anticipated, in a change of basic position, from
other countries and from the United States groups particularly
interested in human rights policy.
- (d)
- By continuing to participate in the drafting process, the United
States would retain some measure of influence over the texts of the
Covenants, perhaps preventing the inclusion of provisions which
would be detrimental to American interests.
2. Arguments Against:
- (a)
- Work on the Covenants might well continue despite the change in
United States position, with resulting instruments less satisfactory
than those which might be anticipated if the United States continued
its policy of support for the Human Rights Covenants.
- (b)
- Reporting, either by a rapporteur or by
member governments, on human rights developments in the different
countries might facilitate propaganda charges against conditions in
the United States.
- (c)
- This position would most clearly express our opposition to the
Covenants, and for that reason would, in comparison with
alternatives II.B. or II.C. below, accentuate the disadvantages of a
change in policy referred to in part I of this memorandum.
B. The United States would state its opposition to the Covenant on
Economic and Social Rights, arguing our view that these rights must be
furthered in other ways; the United States would reserve its position
altogether regarding the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the
United States would express willingness to continued to participate in
drafting, with the hope that the latter Covenant might eventually emerge
in acceptable form.
1. Arguments For:
- (a)
- In stating frankly this position, the United States still would
not be opposing stubbornly the will of the majority and would
continue to cooperate in their drafting efforts.
- (b)
- The United States would be able to exercise influence toward
securing relatively satisfactory Covenant texts, particularly in the
case of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- (c)
- This position would to some extent serve to reassure the groups in
the United States most strongly opposed to the Human Rights
Covenants.
2. Arguments Against:
- (a)
- This position might be interpreted by other countries as implying
a patronizing attitude on the part of the United States, an attitude
especially resented by the less developed countries.
- (b)
- United States influence in the drafting process would be
relatively less than in the past, with the possible result of
frequent American defeats in voting.
- (c)
- This position would lack elements of positive and constructive
policy in the human rights field, such as could help the United
States Government, which are of importance to other countries and to
the groups in the United States particularly interested in the
promotion of human rights.
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C. The United States would continue to participate in the work of
drafting the Covenants; the United States would refrain from asserting
leadership in the work, and would actually follow a course calculated to
delay, if not prevent, the completion of the Covenants. The United
States would pursue this course as perhaps the first stage in carrying
out a new policy, to be followed later by announcement of a change in
position and by pursuit of a course such as that indicated in II.A. or
II.B. above.
1. Arguments For:
- (a)
- The above course of action might soften the propaganda
disadvantages to the United States of a change in policy toward the
Human Rights Covenants.
- (b)
- Lack of positive leadership by the United States might make it
more difficult to reach agreement on the final texts. Eventually,
therefore, other countries might be persuaded that the whole idea of
concluding the Covenants is not a practical undertaking at the
present time.
- (c)
- The United States might find it easier, after a period of
expressing repeatedly its dissatisfaction with the progress in
drafting the Covenants, to announce and follow a basically changed
policy
2. Arguments Against:
- (a)
- The above course of action would readily be sensed by other
delegations as indicating a basic change in policy. Charges of
duplicity and ad faith might then be added to charges of
unfriendliness to the United Nations human rights programs.
- (b)
- Failure of the United States frankly to state its basic policy
change at the outset would make it more difficult for the United
States to gain adherence later to positive programs in the human
rights field which this country might decide to put forward
- (c)
- The tactic of veiled and gradual withdrawal of support for the
Covenants would have only minimum effectiveness in diminishing the
prospects of the Bricker amendments [sic].