315.3/6–2453
The United States Representative at the United
Nations (Lodge) to
the Under Secretary of State for Administration (Lourie)
Dear Don: Enclosed is
a letter which Secretary General Hammarskjold handed to me
today, together with the revised copy of the statement which we had
given him and which was in furtherance of the procedure agreed upon
by the State Department and the Justice Department. He discussed
this matter with me at lunch and gave me at that time his letter and
revised text.
You will see that the crux of the matter is in the language which he
has added to the last paragraph—in particular the interpretation of
“may” in the sentence reading “It is recognized that those rights
may be exercised by granting a visa valid only for transit to and
from the Headquarters District and for sojourn in its immediate
vicinity.” You will note that Hammarskjold’s letter interprets this to mean “may
only”, whereas we would, I should think, want to interpret this in a
permissive character as merely indicating one of a number of
procedures which were open to us.
I intend therefore to write him a letter, a copy of which I attach
herewith,1 which places our
interpretation on his language.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
The Secretary-General of the United
Nations (Hammarskjold)
to the United States Representatives at
the United Nations (Lodge)
confidential
United Nations, New York, 22 June
1953.
My Dear Lodge: I have now had an opportunity to
consider in detail the position of the Secretary-General in case
of a solution of the Headquarters Agreement along the lines of
your draft of points which might be included in a statement to
be made by me to the Economic and Social Council.2 I
think we need not consider our positions very far apart,
although, as I indicated in our conversation, there still remain
a few points to be settled between us.
I should state at once, and I am sure you will agree, that in
negotiating under the Headquarters Agreement I am necessarily
bound by its terms, as I of course have no authority to reach an
accord with you which would alter existing provisions of an
Agreement to which the United Nations as an Organization is a
party.
[Page 294]
Because of this limitation on my authority, the following
questions are raised in my mind when going deeper into those
aspects of the problem to which I referred when we met last
time.
Suppose that there arises in the future, along the lines of your
suggestion, a “case involving a serious problem with respect to
the admission to the United States of persons coming to the
Headquarters District” and that you “consult with me and keep me
as fully informed as possible”. Let us further suppose that in
this particular case I find myself in agreement with your
evaluation of the information provided. I am not clear as to how
our consensus as to that information “whether transmitted to me
in confidence or not” will enable me to render to the organ of
the United Nations principally concerned (whether it be the
General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, or another)
an accounting for the ensuing decision of the United States to
deny a visa—or how it would protect the United States from being
accused of taking unilateral action against the principles of
the Agreement. Our view of the facts would settle the problem
only if the Secretary-General had been given authority in this
respect.
It seems to me that either the organ concerned, or perhaps the
Government principally affected, would still be able to refer to
the fact that the right of “entry of
aliens” to the Headquarters District provided in Section 13 is
unqualified, and that only “the residence
of aliens” is properly subject to the requirement of departure
in case of activities abusing the privileges of residence.
On the opposite hypothesis, suppose that after the most earnest
consultation we could not reach an agreement either as to your
evaluation of the information at hand or else as to the adequacy
of that information. How should we get out of such a
situation?
The heart of the matter, at the present stage, seems to me to be
that in either case, whether I agreed with the information or
not, the very limited authority of the Secretary-General under
the Headquarters Agreement could not be considered as extending
to claiming before the organ concerned that the mere fact of
consultation, though carried out in the best of good faith,
should have the legal effect of authorizing an exclusion from
access to the Headquarters not authorized by the Agreement
itself.
As both the text and the history of the Agreement convince me
that I would not have the authority to negotiate under Section
21 a settlement which had the effect of amending Section 13
(i.e., which would substitute for the right of deportation a
right of exclusion, and would also substitute a prediction of
possible or probable abuse of privileges for proven “activities”
in abuse of the privileges of residence), I feel that, on the
basis of your suggestion, we should try and solve the problem by
moving closer to the technical construction of the security
safeguards in the Agreement. As you will remember, the Agreement
is
[Page 295]
express (and
Congress was no less express) in specifying that the United
States is provided with two safeguards for its security: the
right to restrict to the Headquarters District and its immediate
vicinity the visas of persons entitled to access under the
Agreement; and deportation in case any such persons abuse their
privileges in activities outside their official capacity. Having
this in mind, I offer by way of annex some adjustments to your
draft which would serve to bring it into better conformity with
the main requirements, while remaining true to the basic
principles on which we are fully agreed.
Yours very sincerely,
[Subenclosure—Annex]
confidential
[New York,] 22 June
1953.
Points Which Might be Included in Statement
to be Made by
SYG UN to ECOSOC
I and my representatives have, during the past weeks, discussed
with the Representative of the U.S. to the UN and members of his staff problems
which have arisen in connection with the application for
admission to the U.S. by persons desiring to come to the
Headquarters District. Although the discussions commenced on the
point of the legal interpretation of certain provisions of the
Headquarters Agreement and of the U.S. authorizing legislation,
it quickly became evident in the course of the discussions that
there was agreement concerning the basic principles to be
applied to the problems which had arisen, and that only matters
of procedure required detailed attention. The procedural aspects
have now been settled in a manner which in practice should
assure the mutual satisfaction of the parties concerned.
The basic principles which have been recognized are the
following: it is certain that the provisions of the Headquarters
Agreement cannot be permitted to serve as a cover to enable
persons in the U.S. to engage in activities, outside the scope
of their official functions, directed against the host country.
It is equally certain that in view of the nature of the
obligations undertaken by the U.S. as host country when entering
into the Headquarters Agreement, it must not arbitrarily and for
reasons known only to itself make decisions to exclude persons
falling within the categories set forth in Section 11 of the
Headquarters Agreement, although it clearly has the right to
deport such persons for abuse of privileges of residence under
the Agreement.
Accordingly, procedures have been devised to make certain that,
should there arise in the future any case involving a serious
problem with respect to the admission to the U.S. of persons
coming to the Headquarters District, the matter will receive the
most prompt and careful consideration at the highest levels, and
that the U.S. will consult
[Page 296]
with me and keep me as fully informed as
possible to assure that the decision made is in accord with the
rights of the U.S. Government to protect its own security under
the Agreement. It is recognized that those rights may be
exercised by granting a visa valid only for transit to and from
the Headquarters District and for sojourn in its immediate
vicinity. It is further recognized that to implement that right
the U.S. has authority to define (a) “the
immediate vicinity” of the Headquarters and the necessary routes
of transit, (b) activities outside the
scope of official functions which would constitute an abuse of
the privileges of residence, and (c) the
time and manner of expiration of the visa following the
completion of the official functions.
