ODA files, lot 62 D 225, “Committee 4”
Memorandum by Edward P. Noziglia of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs to the Deputy Director of That Office (Robbins)
Analysis of Problems Expected to Arise in the Fourth Committee of the Ninth General Assembly1
In Committee Four specific problems are often less important than the underlying issues they reflect. Thus, while an agenda item may appear to refer to a procedural matter, the real issue may be a question of principle such as the extent of the powers of the General Assembly to deal with non-self-governing territories. Moreover, the importance of the items on the agenda of Committee Four may lie more in their cumulative effect than in the intrinsic significance of any one of them.
In the light of the above general comments ODA has selected five items from the agenda of Committee Four, both as characteristic of the problems expected to arise in that Committee and as among those likely to present the greatest difficulty for the United States. Similar difficulties may also arise concerning such perennial problems as the granting of oral hearings to petitioners from trust territories, the possibility of referring the question of administrative unions to the International Court, the question of the association of non-self-governing territories in the work of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and the problem of whether or not to consider certain non-self-governing territories resolutions as “important” questions within the meaning of Article 18.
[Page 1412]1. indian proposal
Illustrative of the volatile problems which will be considered by the Fourth Committee and in which we have particular interest is a possible move by India to refer to the International Court of Justice the question of the legality of our holding nuclear tests in the Trust Territory. This would strike at the basis of our atomic weapons testing program.2
Should the Indians raise the question of the legality of our tests in the Trust Territory, we will not oppose discussion; we will, however, make every effort to defeat any proposal referring the question to the Court. We believe that under the Charter and under our Trusteeship Agreement, approved by the Security Council, we have a clear right to conduct these tests in the Trust Territory.
2. Participation of Trust Territory Inhabitants in Work of Trusteeship Council
This question represents one of the efforts of the majority of non-administering Members to extend the functions of the United Nations—in this case by increasing the direct contacts between the Trusteeship Council and the inhabitants of trust territories. Whether the proposal involves seating a representative of the inhabitants at the Council table or various alternative means of direct contact, the result would be a tendency on the part of the non-administering Members to equate the views of individual inhabitants with those of the responsible governments (i.e., the administering authorities) and possibly to weaken the prestige of the administering authorities in the territories. At the Thirteenth Session of the Council, a Syrian proposal, which would have increased direct contacts through visiting missions, petitions, and oral hearings was defeated by a 6 to 6 vote, all the administering authorities voting against. The Syrian representative then indicated he would introduce his proposal in the Assembly.3
Thus, we will probably be faced in the Fourth Committee with the Syrian proposal, which in its present form is unacceptable to all the administering authorities. The position of the United States is particularly difficult because we have always held that, while we were opposed to any form of separate representation for the inhabitants on the Council, we also believed that ways could be found within existing Charter arrangements for increasing the participation of trust territory inhabitants in the work of the Trusteeship Council. The United States will have to decide whether to put forward a moderate [Page 1413] proposal of its own, or to attempt to obtain modifications in the Syrian proposal so as to render it acceptable, or to join the other administering authorities who will doubtless prefer to oppose it outright. The Soviet bloc will probably not play an active role, but will presumably vote for the Syrian proposal, as they did in the Council. Inasmuch as trusteeship matters require a two-thirds vote in plenary sessions of the General Assembly, the United States and other moderate members might succeed in obtaining the elimination of the objectionable features of the Syrian proposal in the final voting, if despite our efforts it is adopted by the Fourth Committee. We would thus hope to secure a moderate Assembly resolution which would encourage increased participation of the inhabitants of trust territories in the work of the Trusteeship Council without derogating from the responsibilities of the administering powers or unduly complicating their task.
3. togoland problems
There will be two items on the Assembly’s agenda relating to Togoland. The Togoland unification problem is inscribed by virtue of Assembly Resolution 750(VIII) which, inter alia, requests the Trusteeship Council to report on certain steps leading to the unification of the trust territories of British and French Togoland. There will also be an item on the future status of British Togoland. This item, whose inscription has been requested by the United Kingdom and by the Trusteeship Council, relates to a document submitted by the British indicating that they wish to terminate their trusteeship over British Togoland, that they consider that this territory can achieve the objectives of the Trusteeship System through integration with an independent Gold Coast, and asking the General Assembly to consider means of determining the wishes of the inhabitants.
These two items reflect two conflicting tendencies that exist both within the two Togolands and in the United Nations. The first is that the two Togolands should be unified; the second that British Togoland should be integrated with the Gold Coast. While there is increasing evidence that “integration” is favored by a majority in British Togo-land and is gaining support in the United Nations, a majority in the Assembly has for some time favored “unification”. It will not be easy to get the Assembly to reverse its direction, particularly when some Members will regard it as a disguised form of annexation of a trust territory by a British dependency. Moreover, a number of Members have regarded the unification issue as a form of pressure on the less politically advanced administration of French Togoland and they will be loathe to give up this weapon.
Since the British have recognized the right of the General Assembly to satisfy itself as to the wishes of the inhabitants of British Togoland, including the possibility of a UN-supervised plebiscite, the question of [Page 1414] the future of British Togoland may not in itself arouse heated controversy in the Fourth Committee this year. However, there may well be sharp controversy over efforts to deal with French Togoland on a similar basis and in particular to introduce UN machinery for determining the wishes of the inhabitants. The French would presumably oppose such action.
Thus the United States problem will probably be to try to assure that the Assembly devises machinery for determining the wishes of the inhabitants of these two territories in a manner flexible enough so that the French can be induced to accept it. As in most Fourth Committee questions, the most influential proponents of extreme or doctrinaire proposals will probably be some of the Arab-Asian states rather than the Soviet bloc. There are some indications, however, that India, often a leader of the former group, may take a moderate position, thus leaving hope that the Fourth Committee may be induced to avoid doctrinaire extremes on this question.4
[Page 1415]4. South West Africa5
The Fourth Committee will be called upon to consider a report on conditions in South West Africa prepared by the Committee on South West Africa (Brazil, Norway, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay) pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 749A (VIII). Since the Union of South Africa does not recognize any right on the part of the United Nations to examine conditions in that territory, to say nothing of making recommendations on it, discussion on this report is likely to increase the tension between it and the United Nations. The Union might refuse to participate in Fourth Committee debates on South West Africa and will probably not recognize the legality of any Assembly recommendations on the administration of the territory. Such actions might extinguish any spark of hope, which the United States has tried to help keep alive, for negotiated solution to the problem of South West Africa.
The United States continues to base its position on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and cannot, of course, condone the Union’s refusal to accept that opinion. We will therefore make clear our adherence to the principles in the Court’s opinion while at the same time trying to tone down UN condemnation of South Africa or intervention in its affairs so as to leave open an avenue of eventual cooperation. The United States is, however, likely to play a minor role in the Fourth Committee debates on this matter.
5. cessation of the transmission to the un of information on non-self-governing territories
As at the Eighth Session, the question of the cessation of the transmission of information on certain territories under Article 73(e) of the Charter will undoubtedly be a difficult item. This question, as much as any, brings strong feelings into play on the colonial problem and results in a rather firm line being drawn between administering authorities and non-administering Members. The chief issue connected [Page 1416] with the problem of cessation concerns the part the General Assembly plays in the decision to cease reporting. Whereas the major colonial powers maintain that they alone can make the decision to cease reporting on a territory and that the Assembly can only take note of that decision, the great majority of non-administering Members insist that a territory must be reported on until the General Assembly decides otherwise. Thus, at the Eighth General Assembly a resolution calling upon the Netherlands to resume transmitting information on Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles and a resolution which approved the United States decision to cease transmitting information on Puerto Rico, both explicitly stated that the final decision with respect to reporting under Article 73(e) rested with the General Assembly.6
At the Ninth Session the Assembly will again consider the item of the cessation of the transmission of information on the two Netherlands territories on the basis of information on the Round Table Discussions between the Netherlands and the territories to be furnished the Assembly by the Netherlands Government. It may be expected that the Latin American Members will view this item in the light of the anti-colonial action taken at the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas. The other cessation item on the agenda will concern the communication of Denmark relative to its decision to cease reporting on Greenland.7 As a result of recent constitutional changes Greenland has become an integral part of Denmark with rights equal to other parts of the realm. This is the first case of the complete integration of a former colony with the metropolitan country which the Assembly will actively consider. It is not possible to predict whether the majority of the Assembly will consider that this constitutes a full measure of self-government. The debates during the Puerto Rican item indicate that some non-administering members will recognize a full measure of self-government only in the form of independence.
While the United States is not directly involved in either of these items and is sympathetic to the position of the Netherlands and Denmark it is quite likely that we will be drawn into active participation in the discussion on them. Unlike the other administering authorities we recognize a wide power of the Assembly to discuss, express its views and pass recommendations on this subject. At the same time we recognize that the administering authority alone has the right to determine the constitutional position and status of territories under its [Page 1417] sovereignty and that it alone can make the decision to cease reporting on a particular territory.
A subsidiary problem concerns the membership of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.8 As a result of its decision to cease reporting on Greenland, Denmark will no longer be a Member transmitting information under Article 73(e) of the Charter and therefore will not continue on that Committee as an administering Member. The Committee will thus have only seven administering Members. Of these seven, Belgium did not participate in the 1953 session of the Committee and there has been no indication that it intends to participate at the forthcoming session. At the Ninth Session the terms of two non-administering Members, Ecuador and Indonesia, will expire. If the principle of balanced membership of the Committee is to be maintained, a point on which the administering authorities will undoubtedly insist, only one non-administering Member will be elected to replace these two. This may occasion some differences of opinion as to the geographical distribution of seats on this Committee. If the Assembly fails to take action on the Greenland item or if it requests Denmark to resume reporting on the territory, it conceivably could be urged by some Members that Denmark remain a Member of the Committee.
- On Sept. 22, the Department of State sent a circular instruction to 61 diplomatic missions and consular posts, describing in some detail all the items on the agenda of the Fourth Committee at the impending Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly (CA–1995, Sept. 22, 1954, not printed, file 320.14/9–2254).↩
- For documentation on this subject, see pp. 1477 ff.↩
- Unpublished documentation regarding the events described here is in file 350. A useful position paper on the subject was prepared for the U.S. Delegation to the Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly, not printed (IO files, Doc. SD/A/C.4/128, Sept. 11, 1954).↩
-
The Delegation position paper is in IO files, Doc. SD/A/C.4/127, Sept. 11, 1954. The following section is extracted from this paper.
“United States Position
- “1. The Delegation should, in consultation with the United Kingdom Delegation, support the British proposal that the General Assembly ask the Trusteeship Council to determine the best method of ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants of British Togoland as to the future status of their territory. The Delegation should also favor according the Council a high degree of flexibility in working out such procedures.
- “2. If it is proposed that the Council also formulate procedures for ascertaining the wishes of the French Togolanders, the Delegation should support such a proposal. It should, however, seek to assure that the Council is accorded a high degree of flexibility in working out the procedures, and, in this connection, should consult with the French Delegation.
- “3. The Delegation should take the position that until the views of the inhabitants of British Togoland (and possibly French Togoland) as to the future status of their territory have been ascertained, the Assembly should take no further steps leading towards the unification of the two territories.
- “4. There would be a reasonable case for postponing oral hearings on Togoland questions to the Fifteenth Session of the Trusteeship Council which will presumably deal in more detail with the next steps to be taken in the two Togolands; nevertheless, if it appears that a majority support granting hearings to representatives of legitimate Togoland groups in the forthcoming session of the Fourth Committee, the U.S. Delegation should vote for the granting of such hearings.”
In the “Comment” section that followed the paper referred to the June 1954 elections, as follows:
“Some preliminary indication of the wishes of the inhabitants of British Togoland are to be found in the results of the elections held in the Gold Coast and Togoland in June 1954. In Togoland the candidates of the Convention Peoples Party, and others favoring integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast, won a majority of the seats from the Trust Territory. However, in the south where the Ewes are the dominant group the results were not clear, and the electorate appeared to be fairly evenly divided between candidates favoring integration with the Gold Coast and those favoring unification with French Togoland. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that both the integrationists and the unificationists in British Togoland seek the attachment of French Togoland in some manner to the Gold Coast. Unificationist leaders say that they would favor federating a unified Togoland with the Gold Coast; while the slogan of the C.P.P. is ‘unification through integration’.”
The paper commented further on this situation vis-à-vis the political situation in French Togoland:
“Any consideration of the future of British Togoland also brings up the question of the future of its French counterpart. Early in 1954 the French announced some steps to increase the participation of inhabitants in the government of the Trust Territory and to expand the electorate. However, even with the implementation of these reforms political advancement in French Togoland would be considerably behind that in the Gold Coast and British Togoland. Moreover, there are indications from petitions and other sources that the French have been using strong-arm methods to suppress unificationist and nationalist movements. The French position on a possible UN plebiscite or other form of consultation with the inhabitants of French Togoland on their Territory’s future status is not known, though it is assumed that they will oppose any form of consultations which did not adequately safeguard their interests.”
Further relevant documentation, published and unpublished, is in the ODA files, lot 62 D 225, “Togoland”.
↩ - For documentation on this subject, see volume xi .↩
- Published and unpublished documentation on the Netherlands item is in the UNP tiles, lot 58 D 742, “Cessation of Transmission of Information by the Netherlands” and ODA files, lot 62 D 182. The delegation position paper on the subject, not printed, is Doc. US/A/3700, Sept. 29, 1954 (IO files, lot 71 D 440). There is a file of mostly unpublished documentation in ODA files, lot 62 D 225, “Surinam/Netherlands Antilles”. For documentation on Puerto Rico, see pp. 1427 ff.↩
- Published and unpublished documentation on the Greenland item is in the UNP files, lot 58 D 742, “Cessation of Transmission of Information by Denmark (1954)”. The delegation position paper, not printed, is in the IO files, lot 71 D 440, Doc. US/A/3703, Sept. 29, 1954.↩
- Published and unpublished documentation on this question is in the UNP files, lot 58 D 742, “Committee on Information 1954 Report of Rapporteur, etc.” The delegation position paper, not printed, is in the IO files, lot 71 D 440, Doc. US/A/3707, Oct. 4, 1954.↩