Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

ODA files, lot 60 D 257, “US–UK Colonial Policy Talks, July 26, 1954”

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Dependent Area Affairs

confidential

[Washington, undated.]

US–UK Colonial Talks Held in the Department of State July 26–27, 1954¹

• Participants:
• United Kingdom:
• Mr. Bourdillon, Assistant Secretary of State for the Colonies
• Mr. Ramsbotham, United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations
• Mr. Gidden, United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations
• Miss Salt, British Embassy
• Mr. Balmer, British Embassy
• United States:
• Mr. Wainhouse, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs
• Mr. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs
• Mr. Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs
• Mr. Gerig, Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
• Mr. Utter, Director, Office of African Affairs
• Mr. Raynor, Director, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs
• Mr. Robbins, Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
• Mr. Jamison, Deputy Director, Office of Regional American Affairs
• Miss Bacon, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Allen, United Nations Adviser, Bureau of European Affairs
• Mr. Feld, Officer-in-Charge, West, Central & East African Affairs, Office of African Affairs
• Mr. Withers, Acting Officer-in-Charge, Trusteeship Affairs, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
• Mr. Ross, Acting Officer-in-Charge, Non-Self-Governing Territories Affairs, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
• Mr. James Barco, United States Mission to the United Nations
• Mr. Runyon, Office of Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs
• Mr. Fensterwald, Office of Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs
• Mr. Spiegel, Office of Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs
• Mr. Hamilton, Office of Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs
• Mr. Strong, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
• Mr. Noziglia, Office of Dependent Area Affairs
• Miss Hill, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs
• Mr. Mangano, Office of United Nations Political & Security Affairs.

The following is a summary of the significant points of view exchanged between the United States and the United Kingdom during the Colonial Policy Talks held on July 26–27, 1954.²

Review of the attitude of “blocs” in the United Nations on colonial questions, including consideration of diplomatic action on particular issues; possibilities of bringing about a larger bloc of moderate opinion.

The UK informed us that it intended to make approaches to the Latin American countries, as it had in the past, for the purpose of gaining wider understanding and support among these countries for British colonial policy and to develop a greater “bloc” of moderate opinion in the Fourth Committee. In these approaches the United Kingdom stressed (1) that its colonial policy was not imperialistic but that it was dealing with problems (of economic and social development) which in many respects were not too different from those which the Latin Americans had to face domestically and; (2) the underlying concept of the Commonwealth, i.e. a fraternity of free peoples which makes a large contribution to world stability. We were also told that the United Kingdom planned to announce its recognition of the new Guatemalan Government that afternoon (July 26). The United Kingdom told us further that they had had some success in lobbying with members of delegations other than those who sit in the Fourth Committee and that during the forthcoming session of the General Assembly they planned to approach heads of delegations on specific items. They might also follow the procedure of making direct approaches to foreign offices of members on certain items. With respect to the Arab-Asian bloc little prospect was seen for moderating the views of this group. A UK representative (Gidden) stated his opinion that India’s influence in the Fourth Committee might be on the wane because of Mrs. Menon’s undignified behavior at the Eighth General Assembly and also because India’s assumption of leadership was resented among the Arab-Asians. The United Kingdom, we were told, was consistently working through the Commonwealth “network” to “improve” India’s attitude toward the colonial problem. In general, however, the United Kingdom had not found Commonwealth ties to be effective in the colonial field. With respect to the possibility that the Soviets might moderate their very doctrinaire approach to colonial questions and thereby develop influence among the non-administering members of the Fourth Committee, Mr. Gidden thought that their attitude at the Fourteenth Trusteeship Council discussion of the nuclear tests in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands indicated that they hadn’t changed much. He pointed out that the Soviets could have caused trouble had they supported the Indian resolution which was not too different than their own. In response to our question whether it would be useful to point to the various manifestations of Soviet imperialism in the Fourth Committee the British replied that it was their policy not to focus attention on Soviet statements in the Fourth Committee and that they thought such references would be out of order in the Fourth Committee. They had, however, found that references to Soviet imperialism in other Committees could be made with good effect.

We told the United Kingdom that we had made a general approach to the foreign offices of Latin American countries on colonial problems prior to the last two sessions of the General Assembly but that we felt that the “free-wheeling tendencies” of some Delegations partially nullified the effect of advance approaches to Ministries of foreign affairs. We had not decided whether we would make a general approach this year.

Review of the basic principles motivating our respective attitudes to colonial questions in the United Nations

The United Kingdom told us that their basic policy with respect to United Nations activities in the colonial field had not changed. Although they opposed the existence of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, they had cooperated with it to the extent of having an educational expert on their delegation to the last session and planned to bring an economic expert to the forthcoming session. They thought that there was a great danger that if the emotional attitude of the Fourth Committee got out of hand it could prejudice the development of sound, democratically oriented governments in the colonial territories. Their position that Article 2(7) precluded the discussion of internal political affairs in territories was firm and unchanged and would be pursued even at the risk that British colonial achievements would not be fully advertised and appreciated. Mr. Gidden expressed doubt that too many members of Committee Four had the interests of the indigenous inhabitants at heart and he believed that their real motive was to extend the supervision of the United Nations over non-self-governing territories. Members of the United Nations did not suffer from a lack of information he said, but from a doctrinaire approach to colonialism and he thought they would seize upon any opportunity to discuss the internal affairs of a territory not to praise but to criticize.

During a review of progress and plans for political development of the British colonies in the various areas of the world the United Kingdom was asked to divulge the circumstances under which it would cease transmitting information on a particular territory to the United Nations. We were informed that United Kingdom policy is not to cease reporting on a territory until the case for self-government is so clearly made that there can be no question about it. The United Kingdom did not expect this policy to weaken the case of other Administering Authorities who might cease transmitting information on territories before independence was achieved because this policy would not be admitted publicly. In fact, the legal position of the United Kingdom was the same as that of the Netherlands, i.e. that when a territory gains complete control of its internal affairs there is no longer a requirement to transmit information on it.

We reviewed the basic attitudes motivating our participation in United Nations colonial activities and stated that in our view the question of the timing of the various steps which must be taken in the transition from a dependent to a self-governing status is of vast importance. Such steps must be taken fast enough to meet the reasoned and legitimate demands of the dependent peoples, while at the same time not exposing them to Communist infiltration or to outright aggression. If progress were too slow the danger of Communist exploitation of the legitimate nationalist movements existed; if premature self-government were granted the danger of Communist subversion or aggression would be increased. We stated that in the United Nations we would continue to exercise our influence toward moderation and we hoped that other Administering Authorities would avoid taking too negative or too rigid positions with respect to proposals which may be made. We hoped that without sacrificing principle, a degree of flexibility and moderation in debate might help contribute to an improved atmosphere in the Fourth Committee and to an increased possibility of achieving moderate action. We also urged the United Kingdom to review its position of not disclosing more fully to the United Nations the significant achievements it was making in developing self-government in its colonies in the hope that an understanding of this development would make UN members less critical of British colonial policy.

Cyprus³

We were told by the UK that for security reasons Cyprus must remain British for the foreseeable future. In this connection the following points were made: (1) with the withdrawal from Egypt and the Suez Canal importance of Cyprus to United Kingdom increases; (2) United Kingdom cannot count indefinitely on a friendly Greek Government; (3) possibility exists that United Kingdom’s enemy may not be Greece’s enemy and; (4) there are limitations which would make the idea of leasing bases on the island impractical. Another factor which had to be considered was the reaction of the Turkish population of Cyprus and of Turkey to any change of sovereignty. The Turkish inhabitants of the island were quite content with the present situation.

We were told that in 1948 a liberal constitution had been offered to the Cypriots but that it was rejected by the Communist and Nationalist Parties who adopted Enosis. That constitution had not been withdrawn but had been left open for the people to accept. The British Government had now decided that the situation of no constitutional progress must be ended and that a modified constitution would be enacted. While this constitution would have some more advanced features than that of 1948, it would not be as liberal as the latter in that the unofficial members of the legislature will be in a minority. The modifications in the constitution were necessary because under the provisions of the 1948 constitution the Communists are strong enough to be able to take control of the government. It is the United Kingdom view that despite Enosis agitation Cyprus was a stable territory, but that external pressure might cause difficulties. Although there had been “sounding out” of sections of the population on the proposed constitution the people had not been consulted on its provisions. The United Kingdom emphasized that they would point to this constitution as a first step in constitutional development which must be given an opportunity to succeed.

The United Kingdom considers that the Cyprus questions would be the “touchstone” of their participation in the Ninth General Assembly. Their attitude on all other questions as well as their ability to be of assistance on such questions would depend on whether or not this item were inscribed. Because they viewed the discussion of political affairs in Cyprus by any Committee of the General Assembly as a violation of Article 2(7) of the Charter they would not condone the inscription of this item on the agenda. In their view discussion in the United Nations would only exacerbate the situation and would present the Soviets with an opportunity to take advantage of what would be made to appear as a NATO weakness. After being urged by us not to adopt such a drastic position as that of non-participation, the British stated that perhaps it was too early to talk of that in as much as they hoped to be able to prevent inscription. However, after stressing their legal arguments in the General Assembly’s General Committee, the British intended to inform the members of the plenary that if the item were inscribed on the agenda Her Majesty’s Government would have to consider seriously whether participation in the Committee that discussed it would be profitable, and that if the General Assembly adopted this precedent whereby any Member could require a discussion of the domestic political affairs of another, the United Kingdom would have to make an “agonizing reappraisal” of its policy of “going along” with United Nations activities in the colonial field.

The British were told that Greek initiative to put this item on the agenda would put us in a “tough spot”, and that we had not as yet formulated a position on the question of inscription. The British expressed the hope that they would be informed of our position as soon as it was reached.

Role of UN Secretariat

It was generally agreed that lobbying by the United Nations Secretariat to influence General Assembly action through drafting statements, resolutions, etc. was undesirable. It was suggested that the installation of the new Assistant Secretary General might provide the opportunity for an informal approach on this question.

Future Composition of Committee on Information

Whereas the British would prefer that the balance be maintained between administering and non-administering members when Denmark withdrew from the Committee they had not taken a position of principle on the question of parity of membership. They did not think there was a chance that Belgium would participate in the work of the Committee and furthermore believed that the criticism leveled at Belgium for its position of non-participation was insignificant.

Application of the two-thirds voting rule in Plenary Assembly to questions affecting non-self-governing territories

The United Kingdom expressed the view that Madam Pandit’s ruling at the Eighth General Assembly to consider all non-self-governing territories items as unimportant and thus subject to adoption by a simple majority vote was unfortunate. They believed, however, that a different President might improve the situation. They thought it best to rely on ad hoc determination of “important” questions to which the ⅔ majority would apply rather than seek to establish separate categories of such questions by resolution or otherwise.

Togoland

The United Kingdom expressed appreciation for the initiation taken by the United States Delegation at the Fourteenth Session of the Trusteeship Council with respect to the United Kingdom plan for the future of British Togoland. They hoped that the General Assembly would adopt a procedural resolution recommending their plan to the Trusteeship Council. The UK did not believe that their plan for the termination of the trusteeship agreement for British Togoland would create any difficulties for French Togoland vis-à-vis the United Nations.

We told the British that we would continue to assist them on this question.

India’s proposed move to have General Assembly seek ICJ opinion on the legality of United States nuclear tests in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

With respect to India’s avowed proposal to have the General Assembly request the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legality of our nuclear tests in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, we told the United Kingdom that while we could see no way of preventing General Assembly discussion of the item, we felt strongly that it was to our best interests not to have a request made of the ICJ. The United Kingdom Representative stated that they would continue to assist us on the Trust Territory issue, but they frankly admitted that it would be difficult for them to appear in very strong opposition to a member of the Commonwealth. In reply to our statement that we would consider as very serious any wavering of our allies’ support on a matter that was so vital to the security of the free world, the United Kingdom representative stated that the United Kingdom would support our position on this item as he hoped we would support the United Kingdom on Cyprus.

1. Arrangements for these talks, in continuation of the earlier 1950, 1951, and 1952 rounds, had been effected in a series of meetings between officers of the Department of State and the British Embassy, extending over a period of some months (320 and 700.022 files).

2. The British Embassy submitted a proposed agenda to the Department on July 13, 1954, not printed (memorandum entitled “Tentative Suggestions from H. M. Colonial Office for Bilateral Talks on Colonial Questions in the United Nations to start Monday, July 26, 1954”, attached to memorandum of conversation dated July 13, 1954, not printed, file 700.022/7–1354). There is printed here the final agenda, dated July 26, revised in accordance with U.S. suggestions for additions (indicated by italics). There also was prepared a Department of State position paper for each agenda item, none printed.

   Part I

   “1. Review of the attitude of ‘blocs’ in the United Nations on colonial questions, including consideration of diplomatic action on particular issues: possibilities of bringing about a larger bloc of moderate opinion.

   “2. Review of the basic principles motivating our respective attitudes to colonial questions in the United Nations.

   “3. Possibility of discussion in the Fourth Committee of the political affairs of particular territories:

   (a) Cyprus

   (b) Kenya

   (c) Central Africa

   (d) Greenland

   (e) Surinam

   (f) Tunisia

   (g) French Morocco

   “4. Togoland.

   “5. Attitude to be taken with regard to Report of Committee on South West Africa.

   “6. Future composition of Committee on Information.

   • “(1) Possible withdrawal of Denmark
   • “(2) Future Belgian participation

   “7. Application of the two-thirds voting rule in Plenary Assembly to questions affecting non-self-governing territories.

   “8. Participation of indigenous inhabitants in the work of the Trusteeship Council (Syrian resolution, Doc. T/L.458), and other United Nations bodies, including question of granting oral hearings.

   “9. Development of intervention in colonial and domestic matters in Committees other than the Fourth Committee.

   “10. Self-determination.

   “11. Chairmanship of Fourth Committee.

   “12. India’s proposed move to have General Assembly seek ICJ opinion on the legality of United States nuclear tests in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

   Part II

   “13. Review of current and future developments in the major colonial territories—West, East and Central Africa; Malaya, the West Indies.”

   (USUN files, Dependent Areas: Conferences; the indicated position papers are in the same file.)

3. For documentation on Cyprus, see volume viii .