Editorial Note
Two basic public statements of United States colonial policy were made in the autumn of 1953: one by Secretary of State Dulles entitled “The Moral Initiative”, in a speech before the Congress of Industrial Organizations at Cleveland, Ohio on November 18, 1953 (Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 741–744); the other by Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, entitled “The World’s Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America”, in an address made before the World Affairs Council of Northern California at Asilomar, California, on October 30, 1953 (ibid., November 16, 1953, pp. 655–660). Both statements reflected the concern of the new Administration with “communism—the new colonialism”, indicated by Sears.
In his speech of November 18, the Secretary of State placed his discussion of the colonial question in the setting of a general discussion of United States foreign policy. There were three main areas of global struggle between liberty and despotism: the home front, the free-world front and the captive-world front. “On the free-world front the colonial and dependent areas are the field of dramatic contest. Here the policies of the West and those of Soviet imperialism come into headlong collision.” Dulles developed quickly the theme that it was inevitable that the 19th-century colonialism of the Western Powers “would be transitory and self-liquidating”; but that international communism in mapping a strategy for world conquest had “hit on nationalism as a device for absorbing the colonial peoples.” As a result the Western Powers including the United States were faced with “a [Page 1167] task of infinite difficulty and delicacy” in responding to the rising tide of demands by colonial peoples for independence. “There are some who, having just gained political independence, already stand close to losing it in the way the Communists planned. Some non-self-governing peoples, if they won today what the extremists demand, would find that they had fallen into the Communist trap.” To those who might feel that the United States was exercising too much restraint in its colonial policy the Secretary of State responded that “Zeal needs to be balanced by patience.” He cited three examples of “orderly evolution” from colonial status to independence—Indochina, the Sudan, and the Philippines—“despite the obstacles that communism has created”.
The Byroade speech of October 30, 1953 was devoted in its entirety to the United States attitude on the colonial question. In the introductory section of his lengthy talk Byroade briefly described and quickly established the legitimacy of demands of dependent areas of the world for freedom from foreign domination—“Western colonialism of the old type”. He then rang the alarm-bell. Just at this time when the 19th-century colonial order was disappearing a new form of imperialism had “begun to extend a clutching hand to every quarter of the globe. I am referring to the new Soviet colonialism. This new colonialism is more subtle and more poisonous than the old, because it often masquerades under the guise of nationalism itself. …” The whole thrust of the lengthy speech that followed was to establish the valid conditions for United States colonial policy, for the withdrawing colonial powers, and for the peoples of the emerging new nations, to make “the real choice today” which “lies between continued progress toward self-determination and surrender to the new Communist imperialism.” It was the well-established policy of the United States that all colonial peoples should be assisted in an orderly and resolute manner to attain self-government or independence under circumstances which would enable them to maintain their independence on an equal basis with the free nations of the world. This policy reflected a deep-rooted feeling on the part of the American people against alien rule of any people against its will. Byroade listed five considerations as to why in the United States interests the progress of dependent areas toward independence should be orderly and evolutionary: (1) Hasty withdrawal of the colonial power would invite internal disorder and external aggression, (2) the United States wanted independence to be real and to endure, (3) independence would not automatically be a “cure-all” for the perplexing problems of Asia and Africa, (4) the strength and stability of certain European nations—the colonial powers, “our allies”—would be adversely affected by a disorderly retreat from imperial status, and (5) it was important that the political development of the emerging nations be sufficiently advanced so that [Page 1168] they would be able to assume the burdens of statehood in their responsibilities toward the international order. Byroade devoted a large part of his speech to the application of these general principles of United States colonial policy to specific problems confronting the colonial powers and/or the United States in Africa south of the Sahara and in French North Africa. Finally he noted the dilemmas confronting United States policy in the Near East and South Asia, as observed by himself and the Secretary of State in the personal visit of Secretary Dulles to 13 countries of the area in May 1953 (for documentation on the Dulles trip to the Near East and South Asia, see volume IX) and as commented upon by Dulles after his return: “When disputes arise between the Eastern nations and our Western allies, we often find ourselves in sympathy with both sides.” He cited the intractable Suez dispute between Egypt and Britain as an example. “In all differences of this nature, our fundamental problem is to lessen suspicion and encourage agreement between the Eastern and Western powers. By every word and action of our Government, we should make it clear that the old colonial relationship is dead and that it will stay dead. At the same time, we should encourage a better understanding of the possibilities inherent in a new relationship based on voluntary cooperation among independent nations.” Earlier, in the context of his remarks about the situation in French North Africa, Byroade had put it somewhat more matter-of-factly: “It is no secret that these problems confront America with a dilemma. The present situation therefore calls frankly for a middle-of-the-road policy which will permit us to determine our position on practical issues on their merits as they arise. …”