Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

ODA files, lot 62 D 225, “US Representative in the Trusteeship Council”

Memorandum by the United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council (Sears)¹

[New York ?,] August 18, 1953.

• Subject:
• United States Policy on Colonial Issues

Last spring, Secretary Dulles, following his journey to South Asia find the Near East, emphasized two points in connection with colonial issues.²

1. He said that our colonial policy had become “unnecessarily ambiguous” and that it would be far better to maintain a “frank and open” disposition and not to attempt as a tactical matter to keep Arabs and Asiatic countries guessing.

2. He also stressed the “orderly development of self-government”, and warned that “the Kremlin uses extreme nationalism to bait the trap by which it seeks to capture dependent peoples.”

The following conclusions are based on the above two points:

Obviously, we cannot support extreme colonialism any more than we can support extreme anti-colonialism since both are made to order for communist exploitation. This means that we must take a middle ground position as there is no other choice. But the trouble has been that we have been taking this middle ground position without any enthusiasm, even almost apologetically, when there appears to be no reason for such an unconfident approach. The contention is that because we must enlist allies from both sides of the colonial question, we are thereby required to carry water on both shoulders. But that is not so. The middle ground position is right because it is the only position that is always damaging to Soviet operations. This being the case, we should come out and say so and give our reasons affirmatively.

Up to the present our policy, publicity-wise, appears to be putting too much emphasis on the material as opposed to the moral approach. In so doing we overstress our NATO alliance with colonial powers which makes it look as if our traditional interest in political liberty has been weakened. It has dwelt too much on the mechanics of defense while somehow failing to get across with equal emphasis the reasons why we build for defense. Perhaps we have assumed too much that most other peoples are equally conversant with the true nature of the danger of international communism, but unfortunately many of them are not, and this should be corrected. We, therefore, should change our emphasis from the material side of defense to the moral issues behind the necessity for defense. We should emphasize not how we get defense so much as why we must have defense, why communism is so repugnant to national freedoms everywhere. After all, communism and its global objectives are the Root Evil, so we should stress first things first, after which we shall find that our policy can free itself of all of its so-called “policy conflicts” and become entirely clear.

The threat of world communism being what it is, we should stress the point that the continuing efforts of the Soviets to take over one small nation after another represents a policy which constitutes the greatest and only important road block to the ultimate achievement of a secure independence by any dependent or newly-liberated people.

With this in mind, the basic American approach to all colonial problems becomes quite simple to define. It is that:

“Ever since our own war for independence we have been traditionally dedicated to the idea of political liberty for all people. Unfortunately, this policy is now threatened by the known strategy of the Soviet Union, which is to infiltrate and ultimately stamp Kremlin control on every nationalist movement it can reach. In order to counteract this strategy the United States should—one, encourage any action which will help to decrease communist influence in colonial areas, and two, oppose any action which will help the communists to sow the seeds of discord.”

In order to carry out this approach, it is suggested that our representatives take the following line in discussing colonial issues with members of the United Nations:

Our representatives should point out that the necessity to combat the infiltration of Soviet influence into colonial situations deserves top priority in every country which sincerely desires to promote constructively the independence of others. Unless this is done there can be no secure independence for any people struggling to attain their freedom, even though the threat of Kremlin control over their affairs appears to be only in the distant background.

A warning of what communist imperialism is like as seen through its “peoples’ governments”, is sharply demonstrated by the brutal manner in which it suppresses popular disturbances in its satellite “colonies” in Eastern Europe. Administration of this sort is colonialism in its most objectionable and repressive form. Colonialism is sometimes defined as the forcing of one nation into an inferior status by another. In that case the people of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia might well be asked “just how inferior can a people get?”

Since the object of American policy is to prevent the Soviet subversion of nationalist movements and the liquidation of nationalist leaders, it should seek all the support it can gather to discourage the prolonging of overdue autonomy as well as the promotion of premature independence, because communist influence thrives on both extremes.

Our policy must be to promote orderly progress toward self-government. But “orderly progress” does not mean the kind of progress that is geared to the leisurely pace of pre-war colonial policy. It must recognize that a speed-up is necessary; that the growing intensity of nationalist movements will cut short the time which might otherwise have been used to accomplish the orderly development of dependent territories into self-governing nations. If communist agitation is to be prevented, the imperative necessity of today is to recognize and to provide outlets for popular pressures rapidly enough to stop communist-supported, extremist groups from seizing control of these nationalist movements.

While there is no common remedy for the relief of tensions which build up among peoples in widely differing stages of development, our policy in almost every case can and should be to encourage the enlargement of colonial training programs by the drafting of very greatly increased numbers of the local citizens into the various fields of education in the art of government. This, at least, will increase the size of responsible elements within the community and reduce the opportunities for extremists and communists to begin their operations.

Finally, so that our basic position on issues arising out of colonial relationships may never be misunderstood, our spokesmen should emphasize the simple formula by which we are guided. This is that we are traditionally dedicated to the idea of political liberty while the Soviets are equally dedicated to the idea of ultimate Kremlin control.

Consequently, in view of the Soviet Union’s known intention to take over every nationalist or independence movement it can reach, we will do all in our power to encourage any action which will decrease their influence and will oppose any action which will help them to sow the seeds of discord.

1. Mason Sears, of Massachusetts. Sears assumed this position on June 15, 1953. The position had been vacant since the resignation of Francis B. Sayre, June 1, 1952; Sayre had held the position from the beginning of U.S. participation in the Trusteeship Council in 1946.
2. For documentation on the Dulles visit to the Near East and South Asia, May 1953, see volume ix .