FE files, lot 55 D 388, “United
Nations”
Memorandum by the United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs (Bacon)1
secret
[Washington,] April 29, 1953.
- Subject:
- Reconsideration of “Package” Approach to Membership Problem
Attached is a draft of a memorandum on the membership question which UNP is sending to Mr. Hickerson today. As indicated in a
[Page 942]
memorandum earlier this week,
Senator Lodge is understood to
be interested in reviewing the possibilities for a “package” approach to the
membership problem. Although a letter from him giving his views had been
expected, there have been delays in the preparation of the letter in New
York. UNP is accordingly proceeding with a
study of the question in view of the urgency of the matter. Both Ambassador
Lodge and Secretary
Dulles are planning to be
away after this week so that if any decision is to be reached on the
question at this time it will have to be by Friday.
The draft memorandum has accordingly been given by UNP to the Geographic Bureaus for informal study and
comment.
So far as FE is concerned the draft memorandum
presents the following main problems:
- 1)
-
Korea: Are we prepared to consider proposing
in a second step of the negotiations that Korea’s admission be
postponed until some specified future time—such as the achievement
of unification; the conclusion of the political conference on a
Korean settlement?
- 2)
-
Indochinese States: Would FE similarly be prepared in a second
step of the negotiations to accept postponement of the admission of
the Indochinese States to some agreed future date—such as the
conclusion of hostilities in the general area, etc.?
- 3)
-
Outer Mongolia: Is FE prepared, after the initial proposal has been
rejected, to accept an arrangement including Outer Mongolia if such
inclusion is the price of the arrangement?
Membership for Japan is provided for in both steps 1
and 2 of the UNP
draft. The effort to include Spain which is not at present a candidate may
be questioned. Certainly FE might object if
its inclusion appears likely to render a package proposal unacceptable. The
omission of Switzerland which, like Spain, is also not a candidate is not
explained in the draft.
In view of the urgency of the problem I am circulating the draft to the three
Offices immediately and shall get in touch with you as soon as I have the
comments.
[Attachment]
Draft Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of General
Assembly Affairs (Taylor)
1. Problem
[Washington,] April 27, 1953.
There is a strong feeling among United Nations members that the
seven-year membership stalemate should be broken. A special committee
will shortly study the entire membership problem. The present moment may
be suitable for a determination by the United States of its definitive
program or policy toward the problem.
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Twenty-one states—16 non-Soviet and 5 Soviet-controlled—must be
considered for admission. Of these, all but the Federal Republic of
Germany and Spain have applied. All fourteen non-communist* applicants have been
vetoed by the USSR while the five
Soviet candidates† have never received seven Security Council votes.
The USSR has proposed, as a single
“deal”, the admission of its five candidates and nine of the non-Soviet
applicants (all but Japan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia). While this proposal has not been adopted, it is generally
recognized that—unless a number of states were to remove their
objections to Latin American suggestions for circumventing the veto—the
only possibility of a complete solution would be through Big Five
agreement to include practically all states, Soviet and non-Soviet.
However, we must expect that unless the Chinese Communists remain in the
“aggressor” status, attempts will be made to include the seating of the
Chinese Communists in any general membership arrangement.
The alternative to a general membership agreement would be to permit
non-members to participate in the General Assembly. This would not be a
really satisfactory solution for the non-member states but must be
offered to friendly applicants if their admission cannot be achieved.
The essential question, therefore is: Are there terms on which it would
be desirable for the United States, during the next few months, to
promote Big Five agreement for the admission of a number of new
members?
II. Possible approach to negotiation
of membership agreement
The following approach to Big 5 negotiations would depend upon prior
assurance from the UK, France and a
reasonable number of other states that they would oppose any efforts to
include the seating of Chinese Communists as part of a membership
settlement.
- 1.
- Our initial position might be to indicate that, in our view, the
membership problem is the admission of twenty states (including
Germany and Spain but not Outer Mongolia) and accordingly to suggest
Big 5 agreement to (a) admit all fourteen
non-Soviet applicants and the four European satellites (not Outer
Mongolia), and (b) not to use the veto to
exclude any future applicants. The United States might later agree
to Outer Mongolia if this will serve our objectives.
- 2.
- Although we would consider any suggestions for the admission of
fewer states, no such plan would probably be workable or
satisfactory to us. In any discussions of this problem, our
objective should be to secure some agreement in principle that would
provide for all 16 of our candidates even if not all were admitted
immediately. Thus, we might accept postponement of the admission of
the Republic of
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Korea, the
Federal Republic of Germany, the three Indochinese states and
possibly Spain, if terms for their subsequent admission were agreed
to and if the USSR accepted all
other states we favor.
- 3.
- Should the Soviet Union offer less than the above, we would have
to consider whether to reject the entire arrangement or,
alternatively, to support the admission of states upon which
agreement is possible and press for the broadest possible
participation in the General Assembly of any states we favor which
are not admitted.
III. Discussion
The approach suggested above would represent the distance to which the
United States might go in an effort to reach agreement on the membership
problem. It would require concessions which the Soviets have never been
willing to consider. In fact, Soviet agreement to Korea, Japan, Germany,
the Indochinese states and Spain may well depend upon prior political
settlements. If agreement is impossible, there may be political
advantage in offering an arrangement as suggested above and in having it
rejected by the USSR.
Perhaps the most serious questions would be the implications for the
Chinese representation problem. A Korean armistice would make it
increasingly difficult to maintain support for excluding the Chinese
Communists. These difficulties would probably be increased by seeking a
membership settlement through agreement. Therefore, it is believed
necessary before seeking such a settlement to obtain firm assurances
from the UK, France and others that they
will oppose efforts to link the seating of the Chinese Communists to the
membership problem.
The Soviets will doubtless insist on Outer Mongolia’s inclusion in any
agreement. Thus, we should not embark on negotiations unless we can, if
necessary, ultimately accept Outer Mongolia in return for all the
rest.
