Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, United Nations Affairs, Volume III

330/6–1053

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pacific Settlement Affairs (Stein)¹

secret

[New York?]June 13, 1953.

• Participants:
• Ambassador Lodge, USUN
• Mr. Ross, USUN
• Mr. Babcock, USUN
• Mr. Bechhoefer, UNP
• Mr. Stein, UNP

Chinese Representation in the Security Council

Opening the discussion, Ambassador Lodge referred to his conversation with Sir Gladwyn Jebb in which the latter considered the United States opposition to the seating of the Chinese Communists as “illogical”; Ambassador Lodge told Jebb that the fact of 130,000 United States casualties has created an emotional attitude in this country which makes the seating of the Chinese Communists absolutely unthinkable.

Turning to the problem of the use of a veto to block the seating of the Communists, Mr. Stein pointed out that the veto applies only in the Security Council, whose importance in fact has greatly declined in recent years. The Communists could do as much harm and probably more if seated in the General Assembly which has been doing most of the Security Council’s work, in the ECOSOC or in the Trusteeship Council; the problem is to hold the majority on our side; if we manage to hold the majority in the Assembly, we will be able to do so in the Security Council where in fact we need only four other members to join us in blocking the Communists; on the other hand, if we lose the majority, and if seven members of the Security Council are willing to vote to seat the Communists, these same seven members might be willing to vote to overrule an attempt by Dr. Tsiang and the United States to exercise the veto quoting the statement made by the United States Representative in January 1950 in the Security Council to the effect that the veto does not apply to this issue.

It was the consensus of the group that if a Security Council meeting is held in June under the United States Chairmanship for the purpose of noting the armistice, we would be able to head off an attempt to change the Chinese representation. Recognizing that a defeat of the move to seat the Communists would not create a res judicata in the Security Council, Ambassador Lodge thought that if the United States takes the initiative in the Security Council and adopts a confident, vigorous attitude on the representation issue it might be psychologically advantageous and improve our chances to keep the Communists out of other organs. It was agreed that the position of the UK and the French is crucial and that a formula must be found possibly extending the present moratorium agreement. If such a formula is agreed upon, the British and the French in the Security Council and in the forthcoming ECOSOC meeting in Geneva might point to the so-called Cuban resolution adopted by the Assembly in 1950 implying that the Assembly is the organ to consider the representation issue; moreover, if and when the Seventh Session reconvenes following an armistice, it would take ⅔ majority to take up the Chinese representation question in view of the Assembly’s decision to postpone this issue for the duration of the session. It was agreed that the representation issue will arise in a really acute form in the 8th Session.

Ambassador Lodge pointed out that a great deal of diplomatic preparation is necessary, particularly for the impending ECOSOC meeting in Geneva and it was agreed that a study of the attitudes of the ECOSOC members should be made and the member governments approached on an individual basis. Ambassador Lodge then requested that the Department prepare for him a brief statement of a formula which he would pass to the President for use at the Bermuda conference.

Returning to the problem of the veto, Mr. Bechhoefer pointed out the ambiguities of Article 27 of the Charter. The four precedents of the “double veto” were discussed in detail.

Turning to the problem of whether the decision on Chinese representation is procedural or substantive, Ambassador Lodge thought that there were three separate problems: (1) the question of admission of a state to UN membership, (2) the question of authenticity of credentials of a representative, and (3) the question which of the rival claimant governments is entitled to represent a United Nations member state. In his view, the Chinese representation problem falls in the last category, it involves a decision of far reaching importance as to whether a tyrannical regime which had usurped power over 400 million Chinese people will act as their representative and has nothing to do with the credentials problem. In Ambassador Lodge’s view the decision on this issue is substantive and the contrary position of the previous Administration entirely fallacious as was its entire China policy. He added that the Secretary of State agreed with him on the applicability of the veto.

At Ambassador Lodge’s request, the Departmental officers explained the thinking behind the position that the decision was procedural. Mr. Bechhoefer pointed out that in January 1950, there was a serious question whether the Soviet Union would attempt to veto the seating of the Yugoslav representative in the Security Council. The Soviets might have argued that if the veto applied to Chinese representation, the Soviet Union could veto the Yugoslav seating. He read the Department’s letter addressed to Senator Connally as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which was approved by the National Security Council and President Truman and which pointed out the possible consequences upon the operation of the Security Council if a veto should be deemed applicable to the representation issue.² The Interim Committee recommendation that the credentials issue be considered procedural was discussed. The general United States position as the anti-veto champion in accordance with the Vandenberg resolution³ was reviewed and the propaganda effect of a change in the United States position was considered.

Ambassador Lodge thought that the seating of the Chinese at this time would destroy the UN and reiterated his view that the representation issue cannot be considered a credential problsem, and, therefore, most of the arguments in the Connally letter were not relevant. It was pointed out that while a good argument might be made to distinguish the representation and credential issues, it might not be possible to maintain such distinction in the Security Council once a precedent is established that the veto is applicable to the representation issue.

It was recalled that in the MacArthur hearings, Mr. Acheson suggested a reference of the question to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion; Ambassador Lodge thought that this approach would not be politically appealing.

The question of urgency of consultations with all other delegations in New York was discussed and it was agreed that such consultations should be held on the basis of the forthcoming Departmental message containing instructions as to the line to be taken. It was pointed out that other delegations would ask how long the United States will maintain its opposition to the seating of the Communists. Ambassador Lodge thought that the answer should be along the line of Senator Knowland’s phrase that the word “never” does not exist in practical politics.

There was a consensus of the group that (a) any decision as to the applicability of the veto will have to be made in Washington, probably by the National Security Council and the President; (b) our principal problem is to keep the majority with us since the veto even if used might be overruled; (c) use of the veto while possibly preventing the seating of the Communists in the Security Council might do us harm in our efforts to keep them out of the Assembly and other organs; and (d) if it should be decided that the veto is applicable, any such decision should not be publicized and the veto would be used only as an extreme means where all other measures have failed.

1. Conversation was held on June 10.
2. For information on this matter, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. ii, p. 186.
3. This refers to Senate Resolution 239, June 11, 1948, the so-called “Vandenburg Resolution”; for documentation on the legislative history of this resolution, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 1–351, passim; for text, see ibid., vol. i, footnote 7, p. 25.