310.2/8–354
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Matthews) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)
Dear Bob: Many thanks for your personal letter of July 261 concerning l’affaire Van Kleffens. As I said in one of my messages, I can well understand the reasons which decided the Department to support Prince Wan, especially in view of the tremendous emphasis on Asia in our Congress and in the light of the Geneva negotiations, etc. Nonetheless that does not make the situation much easier here.
There is one misapprehension which you mention in your letter that I should like to correct. You say that you think the Dutch “perhaps are unwise to advance the notion that their support of EDC is something which they did ‘for the United States’”. The Dutch have never advanced the idea that they ratified the EDC to please the US. In fact there is no country in Europe more resentful of or stubborn against the slightest form of pressure than the Dutch. While you were not in Washington at the time, some of us recall that they were decidedly lukewarm at the outset to EDC and Van Roijen told me that several times when the idea first came up. It was only after, in their slow, deliberate and realistic way, they reached the conclusion that all alternative solutions were much less satisfactory from the Dutch point of view that they accepted EDC and became the staunch supporters of the idea that they are now. This came about not because of any pressure from the US or because the Dutch thought they would be doing us a favor. It was solely through the same logical reasoning that has brought the Department to feel so strongly that EDC is the only really satisfactory solution.
What Luns told me was not that they had ratified EDC as a favor to the United States, but in effect that Bedell in his satisfaction at the Dutch action had said the Dutch could ask practically anything of us and it would be granted. I am sure from Bedell’s comment that this was a misunderstanding probably growing out of Van Roijen’s excessively enthusiastic reporting after Dutch final action. I agree Luns was unwise in mentioning this, which he did, somewhat understandably, due to extreme emotion and disillusionment.
As set forth in my several telegrams, the Dutch attitude is not so much based on their desire to have a Dutchman President of the General Assembly. It is rather that they feel, however erroneously, first that we had definitely encouraged the Van Kleffens candidacy and second that Asia has been over-emphasized in the UN and Europe pretty much ignored. For this they largely blame the US.
[Page 577]There is no point in belaboring the matter further since the Department’s telegram No. 159 of July 30 settles the matter. I can only take consolation that we will not in fact lobby either for or against either candidate and I do hope we can maintain that position. It would be helpful here if Prince Wan were also told that. Incidentally, the Dutch still feel confident that Van Kleffens can win as their present box score does not include the three Scandanavian countries or others who do not formally, they say, commit themselves beforehand.
[Here follow personal remarks.]
As ever,
- Not printed (310.2/7–2254).↩