Office of the Historian

UNP files, lot 59 D 237, “Slates”

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State1

confidential
[Washington,] June 28, 1954.
  • Subject:
  • Presidency of Ninth General Assembly

Discussion

The attached cable from Ambassador Lodge (Tab B)2 reports that Prince Wan is arriving in New York today to discuss the Thai appeal for observers in the Assembly. Ambassador Lodge would like to indicate to him that we can support him for the Presidency of the Ninth Assembly or, alternatively, that we can support Thailand’s election to the Security Council.

I believe Ambassador Lodge should be authorized to tell Prince Wan that we can support him for the Presidency if he wants the post. The reasons I favor this course are:

1.
Prince Wan is a staunch friend of ours and a very able parliamentarian. He has unconditionally supported the policy of united action in Southeast Asia and has given us strong support at Geneva. Upon our suggestion, he requested the Security Council to appoint a Peace Observation Commission in view of the Indo-Chinese situation. Thailand’s continued support is of key significance to us in the development of our Southeast Asian policy. Since Asian problems will be the center of attention at the Ninth General Assembly, it would be very desirable to have an individual from that area of the world elected President.
2.
Prince Wan was a candidate for the Presidency last year, but we supported Madame Pandit instead, and she was elected. This was a matter of great disappointment to Prince Wan. We have heard through the British and French that Prince Wan is a candidate again this year. It seems essential that, if he is a candidate, we support him.
3.
It would probably be more difficult to elect Thailand to the Security Council than to elect Prince Wan to the Presidency. Furthermore, the Philippines is a possible candidate for the Security Council.

I realize that Van Kleffens, who has been advancing his candidacy for some time, is also a strong friend of ours and would make an able President. Moreover, a European has not been elected President since 1946; Van Kleffens apparently has the support of the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries; and, in the light of the few conversations which we have had with the Dutch on the subject, they may well feel assured that we will not throw our weight in favor of an opponent. However, the considerations mentioned above in favor of Prince Wan seem clearly overriding.

[Page 548]

Recommendation

That you sign the attached cable (Tab A)3 authorizing Ambassador Lodge to ask Prince Wan if he is a candidate for the Presidency and, if he is a candidate, to assure him of our support.4

  1. Drafted by Paul W. Jones of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs.↩
  2. Not attached.↩
  3. Not attached.↩

  4. Concurrences of the geographic bureaus followed; the EUR clearance was accompanied by a memorandum printed Infra; the clearances for FE, ARA and NEA were initialled respectively by Drumright, Monsma and Kennedy. The clearance of the Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy was accompanied by Murphy’s handwritten notation: “The Dutch seem to assume our support of Van Kleffens and will be hurt & disappointed.”

    At the head of the memorandum was a handwritten notation by Roderic L. O’Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State: “Sec saw & talked with Mr. Key—decided to postpone this decision—R O’C”.

    Apparently the draft cable was not sent.

    ↩