330/4–3054: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State

confidential

678. Re SC elections and presidency ninth GA. Department’s 522 is very thorough analysis of reasons why we should support Belgium for SC seat. However, Department should consider following points in relation to Van Kleffens candidacy GA presidency before arriving at final decision on this important matter:

1.
As reported in Usun 664,1 Wan (Thailand) is apparently running for presidency GA and Department is aware of Wan’s disappointment because we supported Pandit. If we support Van Kleffens (see letter from Lodge to Key dated April 22, 1954) and simultaneously support Belgium for SC vacancy, the two Benelux countries would hold a disproportionate share of the choice ninth GA plums.
2.
We should not again rebuff Wan who has always been staunch friend of US and represents a country of key importance in development our Southeast Asian policy. His importance is crucial now in view of situation in Indochina.2 Double support to Belgium and Netherlands would also weaken our influence with Arab-Asian bloc on large number issues of primary importance Western allies.
3.
While true that traditionally one seat on SC has alternated between three Scandinavian and two Low Countries, yet this is very narrow application of principle of geographic representation, particularly if WE area is contrasted with Asian area. Also, at present juncture, maximum weight should be given to predominant principle (Article 23) of contribution to international peace and security. Without in slightest degree minimizing Belgium’s contribution, one must at this time emphasize potential contribution SE Asian countries on our side.
4.
Paragraph 1–B of reference telegram expresses doubt that we could obtain ⅔ vote for Thailand or Philippines for SC. USUN doubts if this is valid judgment. It is believed Arab-Asians plus LAs could obtain necessary support for either country, especially in view of fact that neither has been elected to SC heretofore.
5.
Re paragraph 2, Department’s estimates may be perfectly sound but nonetheless, we feel this narrow margin on Chinese representation is too thin and should be bolstered.

I propose following:

We want above all please Wan and he should be our first choice. For this reason I am strongly inclined to favor US offering him our backing for either the presidency or the SC. The [Then?], depending on his choice, we would have to work out as between Dutch and Belgians what offices we would support them for.

However, I recognize there are very strong reasons for supporting Van Kleffens for presidency this fall and there are also strong reasons [Page 536] for having Thailand on SC for next two years. Therefore, if Department feels all of these reasons outweigh strong reasons in favor of giving Wan his choice, I would acquiesce on condition that:

1.
We promptly inform Thais our support their election SC. (Thais have not to my knowledge told us that Wan seeks presidency nor have Belgians sought our support their election SC).
2.
We promptly inform Dutch our support Van Kleffens for presidency GA.
3.
We promptly inform Belgians our decisions and reasons therefor and pledge them our strong support election some other important office they may desire. We should point out US has always strongly supported Belgium for election to various UN posts and bodies, including SC, whereas Thailand has never served in SC.

Lodge
  1. Apr. 26, 1954, not printed; it is an U.S. Information Digest (310.5/4–2654).
  2. For documentation on Indochina, see volume xiii.