Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

493.009/5–2551: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State

confidential

London, May 25, 1951—6 p. m.

6169. Notwithstanding apparent concessions Brit have recently made toward US viewpoint of FE problems, notably Morrison’s statement in Commons on Formosa on May 11,¹ and favorable Brit vote on strategic embargo res directed against China, Brit overall policy toward Chi remains substantially unchanged. In Emb view, concessions mentioned are rather modifications in emphasis and timing and shld not be construed as indication major shift. We believe UK was influenced by a desire to make a friendly gesture toward Truman Admin and these concessions were in large part designed to mollify Amer public opinion.

With regard to Formosa, PriMin stated in Commons on Dec 14² it wld be difficult reach satisfactory solution until Chi show they no longer preventing unification of Korea. In FonMin’s statement in Commons on May 11 he put Formosa on ice indefinitely by pointing out Formosan question is a matter of concern to nations other than those signatory to Cairo and Potsdam. In reply to planted question, he agreed it was desirable wishes of Formosans be taken into account. These statements made in order counteract impression in US that UK insisting on handing over Formosa immed to Chi Commies.

With regard to favorable vote on embargo res, HMG attitude was motivated by 3 main considerations (1) strong feeling of Hong Kong and Singapore Govts that public gesture wld, despite fact measures contemplated by AMC were already being taken by Brit, be dangerously provocative to Chi Commies, (2) fear that proposed AMC action wld be starting point for gen econ and polit sanctions to which Brit have been and remain strongly opposed and (3) Brit had been procrastinating in order exhaust all reasonable possibility GOC might be able take effective action. This hope having been frustrated, conclusion reluctantly reached action by AMC shld be no longer delayed. However, Brit remain strongly opposed to extension of measures to include gen econ and polit sanctions.

We believe Brit will continue vote in favor Chi Commie rep in those internatl bodies competent to decide membership issue. FE polit people have come to realization their position in this respect slightly ridiculous and are trying to devise some solution to get them off the hook; but FonOff, UN and legal depts hold to opinion that, having pontificated and reiterated only proper criterion to admission UN is de facto control, it wld be difficult to find a convincing legal explanation for altering present position.

A possible solution might be return to previous position and abstain on membership question. This Brit wld be reluctant to do as it wld amount to indefinite retention in UN of reps of Nationalist Govt, a solution which they wld find incompatible with their previous and present statements and which wld be subject sharp criticism in India and other Asiatic nations.

FonOff is somewhat puzzled over statement made in Secretary’s message, quoted in Deptel 4969, Apr 30,³ to Morrison that there be a “moratorium” on this subj. What they hope the Secretary implied is for both the US and the UK to abstain from voting on question of Chi membership in pertinent internatl bodies.⁴ We have distinct impression that FonOff believes it cld persuade the Cabinet to accept such a compromise solution. This wld be in line with what Emb understands FonOff prepared to agree to in connection with Jap peace treaty; FonOff believes that if US were agreeable to postponing the issue of which Chi Govt wld accede to the treaty and to permitting the Japs to make their own choice, then last major hurdle to an agreed position on Jap peace treaty wld have been successfully surmounted.

It must be remembered that this is a Labor Govt which must always bear in mind Labor opinion, which is still conditioned to considerable extent by “Socialist” ideological views on “emergence Col peoples in Asia.” To date, despite growing disillusion with Commie Chi, there have been no indications of large-scale shift in Labor sentiment on FE questions.

Gifford

1. For the text of Morrison’s statement, see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 482, cols. 1354–1355.
2. For the text of Prime Minister Attlee’s comments regarding Formosa on December 14, 1950, see ibid., vol. 487, cols. 2301–2303.
3. Ante, p. 390.
4. Acheson explained his proposal for a “moratorium” in a message to Morrison sent to London in telegram 5480, May 25, 1951, which was sent prior to the receipt of the Embassy’s telegram; for text of telegram 5480, see vol. ii, p. 247. Telegram 5560 to London, May 29, 1951, commented further: “We could, of course, not agree to abstain on this matter. If suggestion is again mentioned by FonOff you shd make this clear” (493.009/5–2551).