Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

793B.00/5–2951: Telegram

The Chargé in India (Steere) to the Secretary of State

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New Delhi, May 29, 1951—noon.

3398. Personal and confidential for McGhee and Mathews. Shortly after conversations at Kalimpong with Dzasa Liushar, Tibetan Foreign Secretary (Embtel 3258, May 17),¹ Tsepon Shakabpa, who claimed be personal representative Dalai Lama, and Jigme Tering² requested further discussions. Wilkins proceeded Calcutta May 24 this purpose. Details conversations being forwarded airpouch May 31.³

In brief, Shakabpa stated he personal representative Dalai Lama and had come Calcutta for purpose seeking US advice what Tibet should do when Tibetan-Communist Chinese talks at Peiping broke down. Shakabpa said Tibetan Government had received word from Tibetan delegation at Peiping that on May 13 talks “were almost at deadlock”.

Shakabpa said Communist China wanted suzerainty over all Tibet “as far as Himalayas” including control defense and external affairs. Tibet would be willing concede for Inner Tibet but Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government wished autonomy for internal affairs and conduct own defense for Outer Tibet. Dalai Lama adamant in refusing concede control defense to Communist China and if forced do so either by pressure or extension present Communist Chinese military occupation would immediately leave Tibet.

Shakabpa also added that while passing through Kalimpong from Yatung to Calcutta Dzasa Liushar had shown him Ambassador’s letter to Dalai Lama (Deptel 1633, April 6).⁴ Foreign Secretary himself was immediately proceeding Yatung to discuss with Dalai Lama and Tibetan Cabinet. Meanwhile, Shakabpa had continued Calcutta for purpose asking number questions for which Foreign Secretary and Shakabpa needed answer. Shakabpa planned return Kalimpong immediately where he would await replies before returning Yatung. Questions follow:

(1) Should Tibet report UN when current talks break down and how should they do it? Was UN still interested in Tibet and could it be of any help? What would US do? Would it be willing grant visas?

(2) As Tibet had no official relations with Ceylon, wld US be willing approach Government Ceylon re asylum for Dalai Lama and his followers?

(3) Would US be willing grant asylum Dalai Lama and approximately 100 followers? How would he be received? As head of state? Would US be willing provide for their expense?

(4) If Dalai Lama leaves Tibet would US be willing supply Dalai Lama with military assistance and loans of money when time ripe for purpose enabling Tibetan groups rise against Communist China invader? Money needed to encourage groups.

(5) Would US be willing establish some form representation at Kalimpong for liaison between US officials and Tibetan authorities? Shakabpa stressed necessity for representation which would be informal and covert in character.

(6) Dalai Lama wished his elder brother, Takster Rimpochi,⁵ to leave Tibet and visit India. Takster’s opposition to Communist China following his arrival Lhasa from Kumbum monastery has made it difficult for him remain Tibet in face possible Communist Chinese criticism. In event Takster could not remain India for similar reason, could Takster and Tibetan servant proceed US in unofficial capacity?

Shakabpa was informed Ambassador would be consulted re all questions and replies would be communicated him Kalimpong soonest.

Foregoing discussed with Ambassador Henderson at Mussoorie May 27. Embassy requests urgent instructions re replies to Shakabpa’s questions. With respect replies, Embassy has following suggestions which were worked out with Ambassador and have his approval:

(1) US believes Tibet might reiterate content Tibet’s previous appeals to UN, adding new developments such as Tibet’s endeavor through talks Peiping to reach agreement and substance Tibetan and Communist positions. Tibet might dispatch Tibetan delegation to Lake Success with new appeal instead waiting UN invitation. US believes UN still interested and that Tibet entitled to hearing. While US was one only of many UN members it would do its best persuade other UN members consider new Tibetan appeal. US continued be willing grant visas.

(2) US considers much wiser for Dalai Lama’s own representatives approach Ceylon Government in Colombo in first instance. Approach would be from one Buddhist country to another. Ceylon would probably prefer direct approach rather than indirect through US. If we approached formally, US might subsequently be charged with imperialistic plot which would embarrass Ceylon Government. If Tibetan Govt requests, US wld, however, be willing approach Ceylon Government informally re matter. US would in any event be willing approach Ceylon Government re permission for Tibetan representatives to enter and travel in Ceylon and re appointments with Ceylonese officials.

(3) US would be willing grant asylum Dalai Lama and approximately 100 followers including members families. Dalai Lama would be received as eminent religious dignitary and head autonomous state of Tibet. US unable promise pay expense but would be willing consider what assistance might be given. If Tibetans should come US, it would be advisable they live in modest and dignified fashion. US will do utmost help Tibetans solve financial problem. Tibet might, for example, hold present and future gold purchased (Embtel 3366, May 26)⁶ in US instead shipping Tibet.

(4) US still prepared provide military assistance providing practicable ship Tibet without violating laws or regulations of India. US unable promise loans money in advance as would depend on situation. Although US unable now state what it might be able do in financial field for purpose indicated, US prepared take action which might be effective encouraging Tibetan regime and maintain autonomy.

(5) US willing send US officers Darjeeling and Kalimpong for frequent queries of situation but could not establish official representation for Tibet.

(6) US would be willing Takster and servant visit US if unable remain India.

In Embassy’s opinion it fortunate Tibetan authorities have suggestions contained Ambassador’s letter and that Foreign Secretary personally carrying Yatung for discussion with Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government. Embassy also considers highly important at this stage relations between Tibet and Communist China that US responds as affirmatively as possible to Shakabpa’s questions.

Importance underlined by May 28 press reports re Sino-Tibetan agreement (Embtel 3380, May 28).⁶ Embassy has no confirmation and unable estimate accuracy. Reports have thus far emanated from Peiping, Hong Kong, London and Kathmandu (Embdesp 389, 390, 391, May 29).⁷ It may be reports based on agreement which Tibetan delegation at Peiping accepted and Tibetan Government considers agreement still requires approval or ratification by Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government at Yatung.

Embassy also notes Kathmandu press report re establishment new Tibetan Government at Lhasa (Embtel 3391, May 29).⁶ Possibility therefore exists this government which is reported sympathetic Communist China may have been set up and itself approved agreement rather than Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government Yatung.

On May 13 Dzasa Liushar told Wilkins Tibetan delegation did not have full powers and all important points would have to be referred back to Yatung. Shakabpa also stated Dalai Lama adamant in refusing relinquish control Tibetan defense and if forced do by pressure or extension Chinese Communist military occupation Tibet, would leave Tibet.

Embassy therefore believes official Tibetan announcement should be awaited before accepting Peiping statement as conclusive. Meanwhile Shakabpa’s questions re possible departure Dalai Lama from Tibet take on added importance and should be answered urgently. Furthermore, Embassy convinced US should demonstrate interest in Tibet in every practical political and economic way; otherwise there is little doubt Tibet will fall under complete Communist Chinese control by default.

We have not yet consulted GOI re press reports but will endeavor sound out immediately for their information from Indian representative Lhasa; also attitude GOI will take.

Steere

1. Telegram 3258, not printed, reported those parts of the conversations which concerned Tibetan wool (893B.24222/5–1751); see despatch 2891, May 24, 1951, p. 1682.
2. An associate of Shakabpa who acted as interpreter.
3. Despatch 2615, May 26, 1951, not printed.
4. See footnote 2, p. 1619.
5. Thubten Jigme Norbu, known as Taktser Rimpoche.
6. Not printed.
6. Not printed.
7. None printed.
6. Not printed.