Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

CA Files: Lot 59 D 228: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ¹

top secret   priority

Tokyo, 25 March 1951—6:49 p. m.

C 58575. COMNAVFE² has suggested the following: “Provided that the situation in Korea does not become worse, and subj to the approval of the CINCFE, the Commander Seventh Fleet will be directed to obtain necessary photographic intelligence of the China coast and Hainan and to make a show of force in the East and South China coastal and Formosa Straits areas. In order to perform these tasks a force from the Seventh Fleet consisting of 2 CV, the Cruiser Manchester and appropriate destroyer escorts will depart Japanese waters in early April and return after a period of not more than two weeks. Priority will be given to obtaining the photographic intelligence so that as much as practicable of this information will be accumulated quickly should be a premature return to Japan–Korea waters become necessary.

This visit to the Formosan area will serve not only as a show of force and permit the gaining of intelligence but also will provide area familiarization for the ships crews and pilots, act as deterrent to a Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa and boost the morale of the Chinese Nationalists. Photographic surveillance of Hainan will provide data to determine the extent of the reported buildup of military installations in that area.

This operation will take place following prolonged period of air interdiction and close air support missions and will be of such short duration that the Chinese Communists and North Koreans should be unable to greatly augment their units in Korea or rebuild their surface communication facilities. In addition the force will be available for immediate recall should the need for their capabilities arise in an emergency. All naval units other than the two carriers, the Cruiser and the accompanying escorts will continue current operations in the Korea–Japan area.

From the standpoint of the Korean campaign there is no objection. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to whether such a maneuver is desirable are requested. [”]³

1. An undated note in Clubb’s handwriting, attached to the source text, called the telegram to Rusk’s and Merchant’s attention: “To note as important.” Another attached undated note, in Rusk’s handwriting, read, “This should be shown to Nitze. D.R.”
2. Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, Commander Naval Forces, Far East.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied in JCS telegram 86789, March 26, 1951: “JCS consider the operation outlined your C 58575 to be desirable. JCS also recognize that as sea conditions in the Formosa Strait improve it will be necessary to increase general readiness to accomplish missions assigned you with respect to Formosa” (CA Files: Lot 59 D 228).