S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563
Memorandum by John Paton Davies of the Policy Planning Staff
Negotiated Settlement of the Korean Conflict
Lie’s1 suggestion to Gross that Gromyko2 would be prepared to talk about Korea3 is a fairly clear indication that the Kremlin is interested in discussing with us a negotiated settlement of the Korean conflict. It seems that the very least we should do in this circumstance is to undertake a probing for intelligence purposes of the current Soviet attitude on the Korean impasse. This can be done without prejudice to a continuation of hostilities, if the Soviet reaction does not offer promise of a settlement acceptable to us.
It is therefore recommended that Bohlen4 be instructed to provide Gromyko’s principal assistant, Lavrentiev,5 an opening to raise the question of Korea and develop for our benefit Soviet thinking regarding a negotiated settlement. Because the Russians are likely to be more communicative if they think they are dealing only with us, as the only other great power in the world, the discussion should be bilateral rather than quadripartite. As the conversation should be on an informal basis and so contrived that Lavrentiev takes the initiative, we need not in advance of the event inform the British and French that we are conducting this exploration. Only if the Soviet proposals look attractive should the talks be raised to the Jessup-Gromyko level. We can cross that bridge when we come to it.
There is attached a suggested draft telegram to Jessup and Bohlen in implementation of the above recommendation.6
It is axiomatic in traditional diplomacy that when one is confronted with two enemies it is often profitable to play them off against one another. To our discomfort we recognize that the Russians are doing just that with respect to ourselves, the British and the French. Thus far we have not consciously undertaken to do this in the case of the [Page 1608] Moscow-Peiping axis. The present might be a good time to essay a beginning. Certainly the Korean conflict would appear to be the most likely issue on which to foster friction between the Soviet Union and Communist China.
Therefore, it is recommended that simultaneously we conduct an exploratory operation towards the Chinese Communists seeking to elicit from them their version of the terms on which they would settle the Korean conflict. We may discover that they have the same terms which the Kremlin offers us. If so, we will have acquired an interesting piece of intelligence. If not we will have acquired an even more interesting piece of intelligence—and an opportunity of major and far-reaching importance.
There is no one in the Far East qualified and in a position to perform this mission. It is therefore recommended that Mr. C. B. Marshall be instructed to proceed to Hong Kong immediately for this purpose.
- Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations.↩
- Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was in Paris as head of the Soviet Delegation to the meetings of the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, March 5–June 21; for documentation concerning the meetings, see vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.↩
- For Lie’s suggestion, see telegram 1293 from USUN, March 16, 1951, p. 239.↩
- Charles E. Bohlen, Minister at the Embassy in Paris, was a member of the U.S. Delegation, headed by Ambassador Jessup, to the Deputies meetings.↩
- A. I. Lavrentiev, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was a member of the Soviet Delegation to the Deputies meetings.↩
- The draft telegram is not printed, but see telegram 5207 to Paris, April 3, 1951, p. 290, which was almost identical.↩