Department of Defense Files: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C 56199. Ref DA 82818, 7 Feb.1 The folg comments are submitted on Joint Chiefs of Staff 2118/15.2
The capability which that paper gives the Chinese Communist Army of eventually defeating Nationalist Forces and maintaining internal security brings to the fore the importance in these considerations of developments on the mainland which can only be speculated upon at this time, such as:
- 1.
- Degree of Chinese Communist success in continuing campaign to suppress guerrilla activity.
- 2.
- Extent of improvement in Chinese Communist Mil Forces as the result of Soviet aid and advice.
- 3.
- Success of Chinese Communist Govt in consolidating territorial gains and in gaining public support, willing or unwilling. In general, these trends appear to indicate that action against Communist China would be more timely at an early date than it would be later.
China has not been within the scope of responsibility of the FEC. Hence, there is no direct access to sources of info pertaining to that area. Without add info an unqualified est of what might be accomplished in China by guerrilla warfare alone cannot be made. The discussions of the probable Chinese Communist reaction to each of the proposed courses of action and its probable effects are plausible enough but avail info is not sufficient to warrant their acceptance as conclusions.
Our sponsorship of guerrilla activity would result in neutralizing to some extent Communist China’s capabilities for mil action along other lines more inimicable to our interests. It is improbable, [Page 1580] however, that any large scale defection of Communist troops or citizens will take place until it is believed that the Nationalists have a good chance of remaining on the mainland. It is doubtful that this condition of mind can be created until a major force has gained a lodgement there. Unless the attainment of short range objectives (particularly the prevention of employment of Chinese Communist Forces in areas contiguous to China) is considered of paramount importance, resort to guerrilla warfare might possibly result in dissipation of the asset we now have in the Chinese Nationalist Forces to the detriment of longer range objectives.
The development of guerrilla potential into guerrilla power is time consuming. However, particularly where Comm are primitive, and in the event case 5 is being given favorable consideration at the national level, it might be well as a prelude to project the immediate implementation of case 3. In this connection the Chinese have in the past shown a susceptibility to rendering service to the highest bidder and while the US cannot openly engage in bribery to defection, it is believed that the purchase of high Communist civ and mil officials might prove an economical method of assisting in disestablishing the present auth in China.
Folg Chinese Communist entry into the Korean war, the Joint Planning Staff has, in anticipation of directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, developed preliminary plans along the lines of case 5. Under this concept, the US would provide air, naval and log support for a landing of the Chinese Nationalist Forces. US Air and Naval Forces would protect Formosa, freeing Chinese Nationalist Combat Forces for employment on the mainland. It was est that shipping could be assembled for initial lift of 100,000. The Shanghai area was selected for the principal landing. The objective of opns ashore was the domination of South China behind the protection of a defensive line along the Yangtze River. These studies were, of course, oriented specifically to the Korean situation rather than the broader objectives of Joint Chiefs of Staff 2118/15.
On the basis of intelligence which is avail to the FEC at this time, eval of the assertion of Para 8 that US intervention in China will probably not result in a Soviet decision to engage in an open war with the US, cannot be made.
Implicit in Para 19 is a rejection of any of the courses of action listed in cases 1 through 5 in the event of overt Soviet participation. It is assumed that this refers to Soviet participation in China alone and that in the event of a gen war consideration would be given to the returns which might be anticipated by the actions listed in the study.
[Page 1581]Ref Para 7.
Use of oriental standards in loading greatly increases the capacity of the Naval lift. 7,200 refugees were lifted in one Landing Ship Tank during the evac from Hamhung. It is est that shipping could be assembled within 2 months for an initial lift of 100,000 Chinese Nationalists. More recent figs on Nationalist Naval Forces suggest the replacing of Para D, “Navy,” on Page 129 with the folg:
“Navy: 42,300–1 Coastal Destroyer, 10 Destroyer Escort, (6) Destroyer, 2 Patrol Craft Escort, (5) Patrol Frigate, 11 (3) Minesweeper, 2 Minelayers, 5 (3) Gunboats. Figs in parens are inoperable at present. Amphib craft include 10 LST, 1 Aux Repair Light, 8 LSM, 6 LSI Large.”.
Ref time est in Para 20 under cases 4 or 5. It must be noted that little of the equip recommended by the FEC survey report has been dlvrd. A basic factor is the time required for log prep of the Chinese Nat Forces.
In summation, it is believed the Chinese Nat Forces should be equipped along somewhat austere standards and trained for eventual employment on the mainland. Recommendations contained in FEC survey of mil assistance required by the Chinese Nat Forces which were oriented to the def of Formosa might require revision in the light of their prospective employment on the mainland. Eventual employment of the Chinese Nat Forces, when they are capable of eff action, cannot now be predicted with finality. US identification with guerrilla warfare should be a prelude to larger opns which have a substantial prospect of overthrowing Communist auth in China, or portions of it.