794A.5/7–651
The Chargé in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State
No. 8
Subject: Initial MAAG Recommendations Submitted to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
The attached Report and Recommendations by Major General William C. Chase, Chief of the MAAG, dated June 15, 1951,1 and handed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Chinese translation a few days later, respond to a request made by the Generalissimo when General Chase first arrived in Taipei. This report should be considered in conjunction with a MAAG telegram of June 29 (MG 7130)1 to the Secretary of Defense, which reported further details in the same connection.
The Report and Recommendations, which had previously received my concurrence and that of the Chief of the ECA Mission, were first handed by General Chase to General Chou Chih-jou, Chief of the Chinese General Staff, who reviewed them, had a translation prepared, and transmitted the original and translation to the Generalissimo as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Before the translation was sent to the Generalissimo, however, it was reviewed by American officers with a knowledge of Chinese and found to be accurate.
After the Generalissimo had studied the Report and Recommendations, a conference was arranged for June 27 in the Generalissimo’s office. Those attending, besides the Generalissimo, included General Chou Chih-jou, Director-General Wang Shih-chieh, Dr. Moyer of ECA, General Chase of MAAG and myself. Dr. Shen Chang-huan, the Government Spokesman, acted as interpreter.
General Chase reviewed and added explanatory remarks to various [Page 1731] points in this report. There seemed to be agreement in principle on all recommendations in so far as their implementation lies within the province of the Chinese Government. Toward the end of the conference, which lasted for an hour and a half, the Generalissimo asked me whether I had any further comments to make. I remarked that while agreement had been expressed on virtually every point which came up for discussion, the Generalissimo at the outset had indicated that there were some points on which he disagreed. I inquired whether he wished to discuss these on the same occasion. He replied that he would deal with them in a written communication. I then said that any suggestions we were making to the Chinese Government, whether in military or economic fields, were intended to improve the effectiveness of the Chinese military establishment and to contribute to the economic well-being of the people of this island—not for doctrinaire political reasons.
Shortly after the above conference General Chase received the following letter dated June 27, 1951:
Dear General Chase: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your Report of Observations and Recommendations dated June 15, 1951. Since your arrival in Taiwan on May 1, you and members of the MAAG, in spite of inclemency and extreme heat of the weather, have not spared yourselves in visiting and observing all branches of our armed services. The tireless devotion to duty and the whole-hearted cooperation demonstrated by your good self and members of your staff are very much appreciated by me personally. With the exception of the parts dealing with political workers and the Combined Services2 which are features particularly demanded by the circumstances of the day, I agree in the main with your observations and recommendations. I have therefore asked General Chou Chih-jou to study carefully in consultation with you the concrete measures that should be adopted to implement your recommendations. I am confident that the timely and effective implementation of your recommendations will go far in contributing to the realization of our common aims.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Chiang Kai-shek
Presumably this letter had been drafted prior to the conference.
The Generalissimo’s deliberate avoidance of any discussion of topics where important differences of opinion evidently exist, while at the same time maintaining his position on these points, appears to be the opening move in a renewed Sino-American contest over the manner [Page 1732] in which American military aid is to be utilized. The differences over Combined Services may prove less important than the Generalissimo apparently had feared, since the MAAG desires only to improve the effectiveness of this organization—not to abolish it. The question of political commissars, however, lies close to the center of the gap which separates American and Chinese thinking in a field at once ideological and practical. It is intended to pursue this matter firmly and consistently on the practical basis of establishing the authority of military commanders in a degree commensurate with their responsibilities and, in general, promoting morale and mutual confidence. Unquestionably the Chinese Government must have means of coping with subversion and espionage among both the Armed Forces and the civil population. There must also be appropriate provision for indoctrination and morale building among the troops in particular. However, informed Americans and many if not most Chinese military officers consider the present methods used in both fields to be seriously defective. With the possible exception of the actual apprehension of spies, it seems likely that more harm than good is being accomplished as regards the effectiveness of the military establishment. (See Embassy’s despatch No. 4 of July 2, 1951, entitled “Chinese Government Training Schools for Government and Military Personnel”.)3
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The relevant paragraphs of General Chase’s report read as follows:
“9. The present supply system under a Combined Service Force, is a highly centralized ‘Empire’, guilty of hoarding much matériel presently needed by the troops for training and operations. The Divisions have to go back to rail-heads and bring up their supplies on the backs of their men.
“10. There is, throughout the Armed Forces, a highly objectionable system of Political Commissars, that acts to penalize initiative and under-mine the authority of commanders of all echelons.”
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