793B.00/7–1551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

top secret   priority

13. Reur 2, rptd Calcutta 1.1 Dept believes Korean cease-fire developments make desirable Dept retention maximum flexibility re tone and timing our reaction to any Tibetan appeal to UN. This particularly true because complexity UN hearing Tibetan appeal maximizes importance reaction of other UN members to appeal. (See Deptel 2051 to Delhi, 2 June, numbered para 1.)

You therefore authorized suggest Tibetans that if Sino-Tibetan agreement rejected it wld be useful and desirable await Chi Commie reaction before appealing UN; that this suggestion not intended discourage action this regard Tibetans may consider rightful, but plain [Page 1730] evidence Chi intention pursue aggressive course despite public assertion Dalai Lama’s views wld give added force to UN appeal.

Dept dubious validity or usefulness argument that Tibetan autonomy might be retained by further negots. Re last sentence second para reftel, Tibetans shld not be given view of strength their case for appeal to UN or advice as to timing more explicit than that set forth above.

Acheson
  1. Steere reported in telegram 2 that during his recent talks with British High Commissioner Nye, they had agreed that, because of Korean developments, it was an inopportune time for a Tibetan appeal to the United Nations, but that it would be unwise to suggest this to the Tibetans. Steere continued that he thought it might be advisable to suggest to the Tibetans that after repudiating the Sino-Tibetan agreement, they should wait to learn the Chinese reaction before appealing to the United Nations; perhaps Tibetan autonomy could be preserved by further negotiations, or, “If Chi persist in carrying out occupation then Tib has strongest possible case for appeal to UN and shld do so at once.” (793B.00/7–151)