Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

793.00/6–451

Memorandum by Richard E. Johnson of the Office of Chinese Affairs to the Director of That Office (Clubb)¹

secret

[Washington,] June 4, 1951.

Subject: Nationalist Raids Against the Mainland

Attached are some reports² pulled from CA files which present a fragmentary but perhaps useful picture of Nationalist raiding operations against the mainland during the past few months. Several of the reports come from official, Nationalist sources. The Taipei radio has boasted of more raids to come. It therefore appears that the Nationalists may be attempting to feel us out on the subject in which case our present silence would logically be interpreted as consent.

The following paragraphs summarize the highlights of the reports and present some observations regarding the “legality” of the raids under the Chinese Government’s “neutralization” undertaking.

A series of raids on points on the Chekiang mainland and the island of Yuhuan, off the Chekiang coast apparently took place November 19–22, 1950. According to a US Army report (attached), the raid was made by Nationalist “commando groups”, with the assistance of the Nationalist Navy. … However, it is interesting to note that this report describes only the hit-and-run attack on the outlying Communist-held island “Yuhuan-hsien”, and makes no mention of concurrent raids on mainland points. While the report describes the role played by Nationalist naval units (gunboats), it indicates that the troops landed were guerrillas (“from the Action Column of the Kiangsu-Chekiang People’s Anti-Communist Assault Army, in cooperation with Nationalist elements in the Communist Yuhuan-hsien Battalion”). The report describes in detail tactics used and gives a glowing description of successes: 451 Communists killed, 210 wounded, 94 prisoners; rifles, ammunition, and miscellaneous booty seized. All this was accomplished, it is said, by 992 Nationalist “effectives”, of whom only 49 were killed.

The press carried reports of Nationalist guerrilla attacks “on Sanmen Bay and Nanchen Island” on March 9. The Embassy was asked to investigate these reports (Deptel 1047, April 6).³ …

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Embassy at Taipei reported on April 30 (Taipei’s 1518, April 30)³ an account from the local press of an April 22 guerrilla raid in Wenchow Bay, again on the Chekiang Coast. The guerrillas were said to have withdrawn after seizing 50 tons of rice and killing or wounding 400 Chinese Communists.

It is interesting to note that the Nationalists, in describing these raids, have endeavored to make them appear “legal” under the neutralization undertaking. On the surface it appears that their reasoning might have some validity.

The US Government’s aide-mémoire to the Gimo of June 27⁴ said:

“Your Excellency will understand that a continuation of air and sea operations by forces under your Excellency’s command against the Chinese mainland (underlining supplied)⁵ or against shipping in Chinese waters or on the high seas would not be compatible with the discharge by the Seventh Fleet of the mission assigned to it. The US Government is therefore confident of your full cooperation in the issuance of the orders necessary to effect the termination of such operations, and its forces have been instructed to proceed on the assumption that such orders have been issued.”

The Chinese Government replied, in writing:

“In consideration of the urgent nature of the communication and the common interest involved in the proposal, the Chinese Government wishes to express agreement in principle, and to inform the US Government that necessary orders to suspend the air and sea operations as requested have been issued.”

The pretext for legality mentioned specifically in the attached March 26 Taipei radio broadcast (that raids would be launched from a Nationalist-held island “Outside the sphere of the Seventh Fleet’s patrol”) would appear to have little validity. The undertaking which the Chinese Government accepted “in principle” made no reference to the Seventh Fleet’s “sphere of responsibility” and hence our ban presumably covers raids launched from Nationalist-held islands outside that sphere. However, the two reports received … describe raids undertaken by guerrillas against Communist-held “offshore islands”. The Nationalists are perhaps reasoning that these raids are within the letter of the law, since (1) they were allegedly undertaken by independent Nationalist guerrilla units (not “forces under [the Gimo’s]⁶ command”), and (2) they were directed against offshore islands (not “against the Chinese mainland”).

Taipei radio, on March 26, referred to a December Nationalist raid on “Yungwan” Island, off the Chekiang coast, and predicted that the Nationalists may unleash “a series of limited amphibious operations to recapture some small but strategically important islands off the South China coast before this autumn, ‘in the name of guerrilla forces’.” It is emphasized that these operations will be necessarily limited in scope, “aiming at either the recapture of some small islands or staging commando operations on a certain thinly defended part of the Red-controlled China coast”. It is stated that Nationalist authorities will exercise utmost care to observe our neutralization policy, and that future operations must accordingly be launched from Kinmen and Taicheng Islands (Nationalist-held), off the Chekiang coast, “both outside the sphere of the Seventh Fleet’s patrol”.

While not an official Chinese Government release this report has an official ring, particularly in view of its reference to our confidential representations to the Chinese on this subject in December.⁷ It appears that the Nationalists are attempting to feel us out on the subject of mainland and offshore island raids, by broadcasting their intentions in this manner and, previously, by furnishing us … reports of raids undertaken. In the case of the Yuhuan-hsien raid we received a detailed account, apparently a “sales job” for our benefit. It is likely that other raids have been undertaken without our knowledge. In any event, it appears from the Taipei broadcast that more may be forthcoming. In the absence of any reaction from the US Government to radio and press publicity and official intelligence handouts, the Chinese Government is likely to conclude that we do not consider these raids a violation of the “neutralization” undertaking (or that we are condoning these operations regardless of their “legality”).

These raids have certain obvious advantages from the standpoint of US interests: 1. Only a few Nationalist troops are committed at any one time, hence the results of a total defeat would not be disastrous from the standpoint of the defense of Formosa and the morale of anti-Communist elements in Southeast Asia and on the mainland; 2. No US involvement has been necessary so far; 3. A certain amount of damage can be done, perhaps to Communist staging centers along the Formosa invasion coast; 4. Numerous hit and run raids up and down the coast might tie up a considerable number of Communist troops for defensive purposes (perhaps causing a greater diversion of troops than would result from an all-out assault); 5. If the Nationalists are earnestly attempting to coordinate mainland guerrilla operations … and have any support among mainland anti-Communist elements, these raids should afford them an opportunity to establish communications and perhaps furnish supplies.

These are points which Defense … should properly weigh. …

1. Clubb sent the memorandum to Merchant. A notation in Merchant’s handwriting in the margin of the source text read, “We shld do nothing. LTM.”
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.
4. The text of the U.S. aide-mémoire of June 27, 1950, and a summary of the Chinese reply are included in Telcan 39, June 27, 1950, and telegram 1000, June 29, 1950, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, pp. 188 and 226.
5. Printed here as italics.
6. Brackets in the source text.
7. No record of such representations has been found in Department of State files, but see Rankin’s letter of December 20, 1950, to Merchant in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 606.