Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563

Memorandum by Charles Burton Marshall to Kenneth C. Krentz of the Policy Planning Staff¹

top secret

[Washington,] June 4, 1951.

1. While in the Far East I held many dozens of conversations on Chinese problems with a wide variety of individuals. I generally kept full notes. I have written up the principal ones to keep my memory refreshed. Attached are copies of the memorandums.² These are not broken down and analyzed. They are placed and numbered in order of occurrence. They cover several topics, given below along with the relevant portions of the memorandums:

• a. The covert mission regarding communication with Peiping—Enclosures 1, 2, 4, and 12.
• [Here follow the other topics on which Marshall had gathered information, with citations to the numbered enclosures.]

2. In summary and conclusion, I set forth the following in relation to the first four of the above topics:

a. As to the covert mission—

Two contacts were attempted. I assume the word got through.

The results, as regards response, up to now appear negative.

The whole idea is probably worth while with a view to advantages which might accrue in event of war even though the immediate results are not apparent.

b. As to conditions on the mainland.

The effects of the war up to now fall far short of being decisively hurtful to the Communists.

To the contrary their hold on the mainland is apparently strengthened; the war has enabled them to push ahead with their penetration and their system of totalitarian controls.

No weakening of, or break within, the regime is in sight.

The regime is thoroughly locked into collaboration with Moscow.

Terror and resentment among the population cannot be articulated and organized into effective resistance without intervention from the outside.

In this situation of frustrated opposition to the regime, Chiang Kaishek’s standing with the people on the mainland has improved. It is much better now than many of us have tended to think.

c. As to the Formosa situation—

The situation is apparently improving.

Formosa constitutes our main tangible asset in respect to the Chinese problem.

d. As to the third force—

So far it does not amount to much. It consists mostly of petty politicking among inconsequential people. Hong Kong is not a good base for it.

Its base should be set up elsewhere—probably Manila.

Its foundation should be established among the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia rather than among refugee characters.

A conference here in Washington, to be held soon, for the purpose of getting all agencies to take a new look at the third force and working out a better understanding of aims and methods as between Washington and the field would probably be helpful.

1. According to a distribution list attached to another copy of the source text, copies were sent to Matthews, Rusk, Bernhardt, Hickerson, and Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence (S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563: C. B. Marshall File).
2. Enclosures 1, 2, 4, and 12 consisted of Marshall’s memoranda of conversations of May 4, 7, 9, and 17, pp. 1652, 1653, 1655, and 1667. The other enclosures, consisting of 15 memoranda by Marshall of conversations between May 9 and 23, are not printed.