Confirming what I said the other day, I discussed the substance of the
attached memorandum with Messrs. Matthews and Nitze. We are all three
agreed that the launching of the major Communist offensive in Korea
should be regarded and publicly described as the Communist answer to our
efforts to resume the armistice negotiations, and hence constitutes the
definitive breaking off of such talks by the Communists.
[Page 920]
I think the Ambassadors understand this
and I think further from my conversation with General Bradley last
Saturday1 that the JCS hold a similar view.
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of
Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Merchant)
top secret
[Washington,] September 10,
1951.
[Subject:] Possibility of Major Communist Offensive
in Korea
There has been much speculation as to the reason for the Communist
recalcitrance in the armistice discussions, their failure to resume
the talks and their obvious build-up for what might well be a major
offensive. One seemingly logical reason is that the Communists may
attempt to drive the United Nations forces back to the 38th
parallel, or even south of that line, and then indicate their
readiness to resume discussions. If the talks were to resume under
such conditions, when United Nations forces are clearly at a
military disadvantage, the Communists would undoubtedly again take
the position that the 38th parallel is the de
facto and only logical demarcation line and that the
arguments of the UN Command’s representatives that an armistice must
be based on a militarily defensible line are without foundation,
since they had proved that no line can be really defensible. An
attack which succeeded in driving us back to the parallel and a
renewed Communist offer for a settlement at the 38th parallel might
well create a demand by American and foreign public opinion to
accept the Communist terms.
Present instructions to General Ridgway emphasize that, if the talks
are to be broken off, the responsibility for such action must be
made to rest with the Communists. In the event of a massive
offensive designed to drive us to the 38th parallel or further south
and a Communist refusal to accept another locality for the peace
discussions, it would appear that the United Nations Command might
better accept the responsibility for breaking off negotiations than
to incur the risk outlined above. It is better that we terminate
negotiations while in a relative position of strength, as we are
now, and at the moment when it is clear that the Communists have
launched a new, major offensive and when a continuance of the
negotiations is obviously futile, rather than during a tactical
withdrawal towards, or south of, the 38th parallel.
[Page 921]
If it is deemed advisable to terminate peace discussions under such
conditions, General Ridgway should be directed to issue a statement
pointing out that the Communists’ repeated fraudulent charges of
United Nations violations of the neutrality zone, their
unwillingness to discuss a realistic military armistice, coupled
with a simultaneous massive build-up, including the introduction of
not only new Chinese Communist and North Korean forces but also
Caucasian puppet troops, and the launching of an offensive, proves
beyond doubt that they entered the discussions for no other purpose
than to gain time in which to strengthen their forces for further
aggression. The announcement should state that he is, therefore,
breaking off armistice discussions.
In order to determine the necessity and advisability of adopting the
suggested course of action and to determine whether the Joint Chiefs
of Staff should now direct General Ridgway to break off the
discussions at such time as it is determined that a major Communist
offensive has been launched, it is recommended that the Department:
- (1)
- Consult with the Department of Defense in order to
determine whether UN forces are considered to have the
capability of holding the present line in the face of an
all-out attack;
- (2)
- Determine whether a possible break-off of negotiations
should now be discussed with the Ambassadors of the
participating countries, and whether they should be notified
in advance of any announcement;
- (3)
- Determine whether, if a break-off in the armistice
negotiations is effectuated, the courses of action which
have been proposed in the event there is no armistice also
come into effect;
- (4)
- Review and develop a program of public information and
psychological preparation for the break-off in the peace
talks to place the blame clearly on the Communists and to
justify our action.
With respect to paragraph 3 above, consideration should be given
particularly to that portion of the proposed courses of action which
provides for the lifting of restrictions against the bombing of the
Yalu dams and the adjacent power installations. It must be
remembered that, if these dams are bombed in order to effect their
total destruction, our bombers will be exposed on many occasions to
attack by the enemy, who will enjoy a privileged sanctuary inasmuch
as the principle of “hot pursuit” comes into effect only in the
event of a massive enemy air offensive. It is
believed that such bombing, continued over a prolonged period of
time, will inevitably lead to a demand by the Air Force and the
American people that our pilots be allowed to pursue the enemy into
Manchuria and China and destroy him wherever they find him. In this
case, our guiding principle of localizing the conflict to the Korean
peninsula will no longer be applicable.
