S/S Files: NSC 101
Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council
top secret
NSC 101
Washington, January 12,
1951.
Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and
Korea
The enclosed memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is
transmitted herewith, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, for
the information of the National Security Council.
The enclosure is also being referred to the Senior NSC Staff for use in connection with the
report on “Possible U.S. Action to Counter Chinese Communist
Aggression”1 currently under preparation by the Senior NSC Staff at the direction of the President
for consideration at the next Council meeting on January 17, 1951.2
[Page 71]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)3
top secret
Washington, January 12,
1951.
Subject: Courses of Action Relative to Communist
China and Korea.
- 1.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tentatively agreed upon the
following objectives relative to Communist China and Korea
together with the actions to be taken to attain them with some
indication as to the timing.
- 2.
-
Objectives:
-
a.
- Maintain the security of the off-shore defense line:
Japan—Ryukyus—Philippines.
-
b.
- Deny Formosa to the Communists.
-
c.
- Delay a general war with Russia until we have achieved
the requisite degree of military and industrial
mobilization.
-
d.
- Prevent, by all appropriate means, the further spread
by force of Communism on the mainland of Asia:
particularly into Indochina, Siam and Malaya.
-
e.
- Support the South Koreans as much and as long as
practicable; keeping alive an exile government of Korea,
if forced to evacuate Korean territory.
-
f.
- Support establishment in China of a government
friendly to the United States.
- 3.
-
Actions to be taken:
-
a.
- With the preservation of the combat effectiveness of
our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the
situation in Korea or evacuate to Japan if forced out of
Korea.
-
b.
- Limit major U.S. ground forces in the Far East to
those now committed, unless:
- (1)
- The outcome of the present Chinese offensive
should indicate that we can profitably remain in
Korea with the number of U.S. divisions now
committed, in which event, if the Army could
provide them and at the same time meet our
commitments in Europe, not to exceed two partly
trained divisions might be deployed to Japan to
increase its security.
-
c.
- Expedite the build-up of Japanese defense
forces.
-
d.
- Move troops to Japan from Korea as necessary to defend
Japan.
-
e.
- Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of
trade with China.
-
f.
- Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and
place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is
stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and
depending upon circumstances then obtaining.
-
g.
- Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China
coastal areas and of Manchuria.
-
h.
- Remove now the restrictions on operations of the
Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic
support to those forces as will contribute to effective
operations against the Communists.
-
i.
- Continue to bomb military targets in Korea.
-
j.
- Press now for UN action branding Communist China as an
aggressor.
-
k.
- Send a military training mission and increase MDAP to Chinese
Nationalists on Formosa.
-
l.
- Furnish now all practicable covert aid to effective
Nationalist guerrilla forces in China.
-
m.
- Initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives
in Communist China at such time as the Chinese
Communists attack any of our forces outside of
Korea.
-
n.
- Increase MDAP to
Indochina and assist training of Viet Nam forces if
requested by French authorities.
-
o.
- Consult with Siamese authorities and, if requested,
furnish a military mission and increase MDAP aid to Siam.
-
p.
- Strengthen the Philippines primarily by exerting
pressure on the Philippine Government to establish
internal security.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
