Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/1–1251

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

top secret

[Washington,] January 12, 1951.

Meeting in the Cabinet Room at 10:30 A. M. with the following present:

The President	Mr. Symington3	Mr. Rusk
Secretary Acheson	Admiral Souers4	Mr. Jessup
Secretary Marshall	Mr. Wilson5	Mr. Lay7
The four Joint Chiefs of Staff1	Secretary Snyder6
The three Service Secretaries2	Mr. Matthews

General Marshall read aloud the incoming telegram from General MacArthur.⁸ He then said that the Joint Chiefs particularly wanted to ascertain at first hand the state of the morale of our forces and proposed that General Collins and General Vandenberg leave for Tokyo this afternoon at 2:00 o’clock. Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs wish to send a message to MacArthur which General Marshall read aloud.⁹

Secretary Acheson pointed out that the message did not seem wholly clear in some respects and General Bradley and General Collins undertook to explain the meaning of the message. General Collins said that the question was not on a decision to evacuate or not to evacuate but of the timing of the issuance of orders to begin the evacuation.

Secretary Acheson said he understood from these explanations that it was the intention of the message to conform to the views expressed by the President in his talks with Mr. Attlee. He suggested that it might be desirable to give General MacArthur more information on the political bases of American policy.

General Collins and Admiral Sherman argued for the separation of military and political questions.

The President referred to an estimate which had just been given him by the CIA which he thought was very helpful.¹⁰ He repeated the view which he had expressed to Mr. Attlee that he was unwilling to abandon the South Koreans to be murdered.

General Collins and General Bradley summarized the proposals they had in mind for the evacuation of the ROK forces and the prisoners of war, including the use of Cheju-do Island.

Secretary Snyder wondered whether a representative of the State Department should be sent to Tokyo with Collins and Vandenberg to explain political aspects to General MacArthur.

Secretary Acheson thought it would be unnecessary to do this. He then referred to the possibility of leaving some ROK forces on other islands and peninsulas along the Korean coasts in order to develop opportunities for learning effective methods of counter guerrilla and other unconventional types of warfare which would harass the Chinese Communists.

General Collins thought that Cheju-do Island would suffice for this purpose.

The President indicated general approval of the idea of arranging for appropriate evacuation of these forces but said that he did not want to pass on the operational details.

There was then discussion of General Bedell Smith’s proposal to go to Japan and the President approved his plan to go at once. General Smith said they had facilities for doing the kind of thing which Secretary Acheson had suggested. The President also approved the trip of General Collins and General Vandenberg and initialed the message to General MacArthur.¹¹

Philip C. Jessup

3. W. Stuart Symington, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.
4. Sidney W. Souers, Special Consultant to President Truman and formerly Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.
5. Charles E. Wilson, Director of Defense Mobilization.
7. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.
1. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.
6. John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury.
2. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews; and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletiter.
8. Telegram C–53167, January 10, from Tokyo, p. 55.

9. The message referred to in the text was dispatched to General MacArthur on January 12 as telegram JCS 80902; for a paraphrased text with deletion, see Hearings, p. 907. The deleted sentences read as follows:

   “However, we are concerned about effect on troops, particularly ROK forces, if it should become known to them that a decision to initiate troop evacuation were made at this stage in operations. Instructions to evacuate are almost certain to become known soon after issue. Judging from your C–52964 [January 8, 1951, not printed] this might well result in partial collapse of ROK troops, thus seriously jeopardizing the ability of Eighth Army to reach a relatively secure beachhead about Pusan and hold it during period required for actual evacuation.”

   The telegram informed General MacArthur that, based on all factors known to them, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been forced to the conclusion that it was infeasible under existing conditions, including sustained major effort by Communist China, to hold a position in Korea for a protracted period. Suggesting factors to consider, the telegram requested General MacArthur to estimate the timing and conditions under which he would have to issue instructions to evacuate Korea. It also informed him that, meanwhile, the directives contained in paragraph C of JCS 80680, printed on p. 41, would remain in effect. (JCS Files)

10. Reference is to the Special Estimate entitled “International Implications of Maintaining a Beachhead in South Korea” (SE–1), dated January 11, p. 61.
11. Generals Collins and Vandenberg left for Tokyo on the evening of January 12, taking with them the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense printed in NSC 101, infra. They conferred with General Mac–Arthur in Tokyo on January 15 and again on January 18 (Tokyo time) after returning from a visit to Korea. President Truman sent a personal message to General MacArthur on January 13, the text of which was transmitted in JCS 81050, p. 77.