795.00/9–451
The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, September 4,
1951.
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Department of Defense
has considered your department’s Draft Position Paper (WFM–T–10/1) dated
[Page 880]
18 August 1951, and
entitled “United Nations Action in Korea in Case of No Armistice”.
The Department of Defense is unable to concur in this paper for the
reasons set forth in the enclosed memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, dated 29 August 1951, and 13 July 1951.1 I am in agreement with the comments and
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in these two
memoranda with the exception of the recommendation in paragraph 1-e of the memorandum of 13 July.
Because of the important implications involved in this particular
recommendation, I am reserving my position with respect to it and am
transmitting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National
Security Council for early consideration.2
Faithfully yours,
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
top secret
Washington, 29 August
1951.
Subject: Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings
(Tripartite and British Talks) Draft Position Paper (WFM T–10/1),
Dated 18 August 1951, Entitled “UN Action in Korea in Case of No
Armistice.”
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated, from the military point
of view, the following statement of views on the Department of State
draft position paper, subject as above.
2. On 13 July 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to you a
memorandum on the subject of “United States Courses of Action in
Korea” on which they recommended you obtain Presidential approval.
The memorandum included the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of additional actions to be taken to increase military
pressure on the enemy in the event that the current armistice
negotiations in Korea fail. In the formulation of this memorandum,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered and rejected any concept of
relating United States actions in Korea to specific enemy actions.
The subject Department of State position paper attempts to relate
both the military actions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and several political actions within Department of State
capabilities to hypothetical military contingencies following
failure of the armistice talks.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view,
consider this concept to be not only unsound but so dangerous
militarily
[Page 881]
as possibly to
jeopardize the security of the United Nations forces in Korea.
Specifically they would point out that:
-
a.
- Both the commander in the field and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would be unnecessarily limited in their freedom of
action in view of the consultations which are required;
and
-
b.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff previously recommended and they
now reaffirm their recommendation that all of the military
actions included in their memorandum to you dated 13 July
1951 be initiated after the failure of the armistice
negotiations and that none of them await such contingencies
as de facto cease fire, massed enemy
ground attack, or massed enemy air attack. In this
connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be unwilling to
accept the military risk incident to consultation with the
sixteen participating nations preliminary to initiation of
countermeasures set forth in paragraph 1 of their memorandum
referred to above. Furthermore, from the military point of
view, there is not and cannot be a truly de facto cease fire without agreement.
4. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur
in the Department of State draft position paper WFM T–10/1. They
adhere to the recommendations contained in their memorandum to you
dated 13 July 1951 subject to the following change:
Delete from subparagraph 1 d the word “Rashin”
and the comma which follows.
Reason: This change is necessitated by the governmental decision to
bomb Rashin.3
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
