I concur in the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“3. a. Establishment under UN supervision of a
unified, independent and democratic Korea,
assured,
insofar
as
possible,
against
Communist
domination,
with maximum assurance against Communist
subversion or aggression.”
“3. c. “Plan for phased withdrawal of foreign
forces with reasonable
maximum assurances against internal
disorder
and
external
aggression.
Communist subversion or aggression.”
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
top secret
Washington, 31 August
1951.
Subject: Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings
(Tripartite Talks) Draft Position Paper (WFM T–10), Dated 18 August
1951, Entitled “United Nations Action in Korea in Case of an
Armistice.”
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated, from the military point
of view, the following views on the Department of State draft
position paper, subject as above.
2. The paper as a whole is not clear concerning the relation of the
political conference following an armistice in Korea to discussions
of other Far Eastern problems. (See paragraphs 1, 2, and 5 b of the Position to be
Presented.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that no
other Far Eastern problem should be taken up in connection with the
contemplated political settlement and accordingly recommend that it
be made clear that the conference will be strictly limited to
discussion of matters pertaining solely to Korea.
3. Although the United Nations action in Korea is without precedent,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff find it difficult to understand why
nonbelligerent nations are being considered other than in their
status as members of the United Nations for inclusion in the Korean
political conference. Communist China has been consistent in
maintaining that it is not a belligerent in the Korean War and that
the Chinese forces in Korea are merely “volunteers.” This fiction
has been continued during the armistice negotiations. There is no
evidence that forces of the USSR have participated in the Korean
War. Inasmuch as the USSR is a member of the United Nations, it
should be assumed that its interests will be amply protected by the
United Nations Delegation and, in any event, the USSR should not be
accorded a voice in the two forums. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, recommend that the
political conference be limited to representatives
[Page 879]
of belligerent nations in addition to
the delegation appointed by the United Nations.
4. In paragraph 5 b of the Position to be Presented it is suggested the conference be
held at Kaesong or in the demilitarized zone of Korea. Difficulties
already encountered at Kaesong would indicate that this location
should not be used for the peace conference. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, therefore, recommend that reference to Kaesong as the
location of conferences be deleted from the paper (See also
paragraph 4 b of Courses of
Action in Korea in Event the Armistice Negotiations are
Successful).
5. In paragraph 3 f of the Courses of Action in Korea in Event the Armistice Negotiations
are Successful it is stated that, “Failing agreement on
unification, the United States should … seek ad
hoc agreement on such other matters as may be possible,
including a mutual reduction of forces.” This
mutual reduction of forces is acceptable, from the military point of
view, only if it is linked to the maintenance of a boundary between
the two states which is militarily acceptable to the United
States.
6. In paragraph 3 g of the Courses of Action in Korea in Event the Armistice Negotiations
are Successful it is stated that it would be desirable for
some Communist Chinese forces to remain in Korea so as to enable us
to utili e the threat of action against China in the event of
violation of the armistice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that
the last sentence of paragraph 3 g be amended
as follows, changes shown in the usual manner: “Nevertheless,
recogni ing the realities of the situation and
the
desirability
of
some
Chinese
Communist
forces
remaining
in
Korea
so
as
to
enable
us
to
utilize
the
threat
of
action
against
China
in
event
of
violation
of
the
armistice, the United States should
be prepared to accept the retention of some Chinese Communist forces
in North Korea.”
7. Subject to the acceptance of the changes recommended in paragraphs
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the
military point of view, concur in the subject paper.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
