795.00/12–2750
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
General Bradley called Mr. Acheson this afternoon and said that the Joints Chiefs were waiting for the memorandum which Mr. Acheson was having prepared.1 This led to a discussion of the memorandum.
The Secretary outlined the reasons we thought such a memorandum [Page 61] was a good idea. He mentioned briefly and rather generally what would be contained in the proposed memorandum. He said that he felt it would help if General MacArthur understood all of the reasons that we felt a stand in Korea was so important and the importance to the world of this stand.
General Bradley agreed that this was important, and mentioned conversations he had had with representatives of the press. He said that some of the press seemed to feel that there was lack of cooperation between the General and Washington and that the General was inclined to “free wheel”. General Bradley said that he felt it would be helpful to all if such a memorandum as Mr. Acheson suggested could go to the General and give him all the reasons we had for the positions we had taken.
General Bradley said that he did not agree that the military men who were scheduled to go to Korea should take the memorandum with them. He thought it best to have it sent by regular channels since it was primarily a political message. He said that if military men took it out, they would be put in an awkward position because they would be asked to explain it, and it is not primarily within their competence to do so. The General said he would discuss this point with the Joint Chiefs and repeated that the above was the current thinking, although they might think differently about it later.
- Reference is to the memorandum outlined by Mr. Acheson in his talk with General Marshall, supra. No copy has been found in the Department of State files.↩